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### **Service Delivery and State Legitimacy: Multi-Stakeholder Processes in Water and Sanitation in Ethiopia**

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November 2011

**Research in the context of “Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Services and State Institutions” consortium – Country Report, Ethiopia**

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# Abbreviations

ACSI	Amhara Credit and Saving Institution
ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
ARDO	Agriculture and Rural Development Office
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BoH	Bureau of Health
CDF	Community Development Fund
CHP	Community Health Promoter
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DA	Development Agent
EO	Education Office
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FEDD	Finance and Economic Development Department
FINNDA	Finland International Development Agency
HD	Health Department
HEW	Health Extension Worker
HO	Health Office
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
KA	<i>Kebele</i> Administration
KCC	<i>Kebele</i> Coordinating Committee
KNPSD	Knowledge Network on Peace, Security and Development
KPC	<i>Kebele</i> Project Coordinator
MAT	Management Advisory Team
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MSM	Maastricht School of Management
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Process
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OFED	Office of Finance and Economic Development
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORDA	Organization for Relief and Development in Amhara
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty

PFO	Project Facilitation Office
PMC	Project Management Committee
PPP	Public Private Partnership
RoEF	Representative of Embassy of Finland
RoMFAF	Representative of Ministry of Foreign Affair of Finland
RWSEP	Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
TPL	Traditional Pit Latrine
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
VHC	Village Hygiene Communicators
WA	<i>Woreda</i> Administration
WAB	Women’s Affair Bureau
WAD	Women’s Affair Department
WAO	Women’s Affair Office
WAE	WaterAid Ethiopia
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WATSANCO	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Committee
WCC	Woreda Coordinating Committee
WPC	Woreda Project Coordinator
WRDB	Water Resources Development Bureau
WRDD	Water Resources Development Department
WRDO	Water Resources Development Office
ZA	Zonal Administration
ZCC	Zonal Coordinating Committee



# Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of a research conducted in Ethiopia by the ‘MSPs, Service Delivery and State Institutions’ working group of the ‘Network for Peace, Security and Development’.<sup>1</sup> The research aimed at generating insight in:

- the nature of cooperation between multiple state and non-state actors for the improvement and delivery of basic services; and
- how such cooperation affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state institutions involved

To achieve the above objectives the study was guided by the following research question: **“how do multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) for the improvement of service delivery affect the performance and governance of those services, and how does this affect the legitimacy of state institutions?”**

We have assessed two MSPs, which were established for water and sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery. The study identified the various societal actors (state, civil society, donor, and private sector) engaged in the MSPs and analyzed the governance mechanisms they functioned in. It has also analyzed the achievements of the MSPs in improving WASH service delivery and their impact on the legitimacy of the state institutions involved.

The study employed both primary and secondary data collection techniques. Secondary data were collected from reports and other publications while primary data were collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews from five categories of respondents: public and private MSP participants; users/beneficiaries; policy makers; donors/financers; non-MSP service providers; and key experts. The two case studies were conducted in the Achefer (case 1) and Fogera (case 2) districts (*Woredas*) of the Amhara National Regional State. The Achefer *Woreda* MSP was initiated by a local NGO – Organization for Relief and Development in Amhara (ORDA) – while the Fogera *Woreda* MSP was initiated, as part of a regional program, by an international donor agency - the Finland International Development Agency (FINNDA). The two MSPs shared similar objectives: improving WASH services through capacity building of local institutions and communities for planning, implementation and evaluation of WASH service development projects as well as management of service utilization. In addition to the above objectives, the MSP in Fogera *Woreda* aimed at addressing cost and technological problems to ensure community managed WASH service delivery.

The MSPs studied indeed had effects on the legitimacy of the state institutions involved. These were attributed not only to MSPs’ effect on service delivery (output), but also to the initiation and governance (input and throughput) of the MSPs. The local people in both case studies considered water service delivery primarily the responsibility of the state in general and of the *woreda*/district governments in particular. The MSP structures and processes at different (regional, local and grassroots) levels in general and the grassroots levels in particular created opportunities for citizens to directly participate and influence WASH service delivery decision making. Such processes increased community members’ sense of belongingness to the local governments, which has a positive influence on the legitimacy of participating state institutions. The findings also indicated that over-publicity of the roles and contributions of dominant non-state MSP initiators had a counterproductive effect on the legitimacy of state institutions.

## **The MSPs outputs: effect on the performance and governance of WASH services**

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<sup>1</sup> A specifically policy oriented analysis of the findings can be found in the Policy Implication Note related to this Country Report. This document is available through the author ([fenfet@gmail.com](mailto:fenfet@gmail.com)) and on [www.msm.nl](http://www.msm.nl).

Assessment of the national, regional and local contexts in which the MSPs operated showed that WASH services are among the basic services that have lowest coverage in the country. The post 1991 Ethiopia Government has identified WASH as one of the primary sectors that deserve great attentions in the fight against poverty. The government recognized the pressing nature of the problem and its limited capacity to effectively address it and hence, called upon all development actors to join hands. The national water policy and strategy vividly showed the need for integrated WASH service delivery as well as the need for substantial collaboration between multiple agencies representing multiple sectors (public, private, donors, CSOs, and citizens at large). Regional and local governments have taken the primary responsibility of coordinating the efforts of multiple actors in the implementation of the national policy and strategy, which created opportunities for the establishment of WASH MSPs. The findings from the two case study *woredas* revealed that the MSPs had indeed important impacts on the performance and governance of WASH services. Input (initiation, objectives, funding, and actors) and throughput (institutionalization, communication, and decision-making) are important factors that influence the degree of the MSPs' impacts.

#### *MSP input*

Both MSPs were initiated in a top down manner by actors external to the local administration. They were conceived in the context of pre-defined projects designed to achieve formal objectives. Hence, local governments and community members had little chance to influence the objectives and the design of the MSP structures. The objectives of the MSP initiators and regional counter parts, i.e., improving access to WASH services and building communities' capacity to effectively manage these services, however, were shared by the local governments and community members. In terms of institutional representation, despite public sector dominance, the MSPs involved all sectors of the society (state, civil society, donor, private, and community members). Most of the state agencies, which were involved in the MSP structures at different levels, played the role of facilitation and coordination while private actors were active in supplying skills and materials. In both MSPs, communities through their Water and Sanitation Committees (WATSANCOs), had contributed finance, labour and locally available materials. Moreover, they were actively involved in the management of water point construction and utilization of water. In fact, the Fogera MSP did devolve the whole management responsibility (including procurement and contractual negotiation) to WATSANCOs, which established a remarkable and successful experience that had influenced policy makers to the extent of adopting similar approach in other community-based service initiatives. On top of taking the initiatives, the non-governmental and donor organizations, had actively participated in the facilitation and coordination of the MSPs and also played key roles in mobilizing funds.

Both MSPs aimed at improving WASH services through capacity building of local institutions and communities for planning, implementation and evaluation of WASH service development projects as well as management of service utilization. They were successful to a significant extent in supporting communities to organize themselves and take the responsibilities of constructing and managing the utilization of water points. The Fogera MSP was successful in building the capacities of communities and local government agencies (sector offices). The Achefer MSP was also successful in building communities' capacities, but not the local government agencies due to emphasis on the former. Training community members through the project office appeared more effective than training them through local government agencies since the project office had better resources (human, financial, logistics, etc) than local government agencies. This approach however, suffers from lack of sustainability since such support will phase out when the project ends. Authors believe that training community members should not be limited to specific period of time; it should rather be a continuous process. Thus, building the capacities of local government agencies that are engaged in community capacity building is an important approach to ensure sustainability. In terms of introducing and practicing integrated WASH services, the Achefer MSP has been taken as a model not only for the regional, but also for the national WASH sector development. In spite of the tremendous achievements in water service expansions, the Fogera MSP did

little in integrating it with sanitation and hygiene. There was neither sufficient awareness creation effort nor community support programs.

#### *MSP throughput*

Both the Achefer and Fogera MSPs involved not only multiple actors, but also multiple structures formally established at regional, local and grassroots levels. This created possibilities to institutionalize and coordinate the activities of the MSPs with multiple levels of government. The Fogera MSP was more institutionalized than the Achefer MSP since the activities of the MSP were well embedded into government structures and service development programs at different levels. Both MSPs facilitated and coordinated their interactions and relationships between actors through formal communication structures. Interaction between regional, local and grassroots levels of MSP structures was facilitated through vertical communication whereas interaction between MSP members at the same level (e.g. at regional level) was facilitated through horizontal communication. Interaction was basically governed by predefined rules set and accepted by participants. The rules underscored that every actor has equal rights to participate and equal power to influence decision making and implementation processes. In spite of this, the initiator of the Achefer MSP –ORDA – was identified as a dominant actor in agenda setting and decision making at local/district level. Such practices undermine the use of valuable local ideas and experiences and as well as opportunities for learning- by-doing. Actors should not capitalize on the degree of their contributions (material, financial and/or human) and roles (initiator, facilitator or coordinator) to influence MSP decision making and implementation processes.

Despite the two MSPs had involved all sectors of the society (state, civil society, donor, private, and community members), entry was limited only to those actors identified in the project document. Such rigid project boundaries undermined the possibilities to mobilize more resources from potential stakeholders.

#### **MSPs Outcomes: effects on the legitimacy of state institutions**

One of the most important contributions of the two MSPs was the establishment of multi-actor structures at local and grassroots levels aimed improving WASH service delivery and building communities' capacity for effective management of these services. MSP initiators and regional government agencies encouraged and supported the establishment of multi-actor structures between the local government agencies and community members in which they had to interact and decide jointly. This had significantly improved the degree of state- society interactions and thereby the legitimacy of state agencies. Improvements in service delivery had also effect on the legitimacy of the state institutions involved since such improvements positively influenced the perception and attitudes of citizens towards the government in general and the local governments in particular. However, the MSPs did not have the same effect on the different types (such as general, embedded, process and performance) of legitimacy. Moreover, community members' tendency to attribute much of the contributions to MSP initiators – NGOs and donor- had negatively affected the performance legitimacy of state institutions.

In terms of general legitimacy, government agencies operating at different levels did not face any challenge of recognition by the local people. Government in general and the local/*woreda* governments in particular, were considered to be the primary actors and end-responsible for basic service delivery. The Fogera MSP created several opportunities for communities to learn more about government agencies and this had a positive impact on general legitimacy. The Achefer MSP however, has done little in creating such opportunities. Despite the recognition of the various levels of government, community members in this *Woreda* had a feeble understanding of the powers and duties of each level of government.

The MSPs in the two case study *woredas* had different impacts on the embedded legitimacy of the state agencies involved. Weak capacity of local representative and sector agencies was a common problem that undermined the trust and confidence of the local people in them prior to the MSPs. Under such circumstances, the MSPs' capacity building efforts had an important effect on embedded legitimacy. The

Achefer MSP created only limited capacity building opportunities for local government/*woreda* sector agencies and hence had a limited impact on improving embedded legitimacy. The Fogera MSP was highly embedded into the government structures where capacity building of participating government actors at all levels in general and at local level in particular constituted one of the core intervention areas and therefore had considerable impact on embedded legitimacy. Local capacity building through training of experts, however, also resulted in an undesirable effect: most of the experts, who received the trainings through donor/NGO supported programs, changed jobs to NGOs and donor organizations. Thus, practically, these efforts had little impact on the capacity of local government agencies. This is counterproductive in improving the legitimacy of state institutions as it causes perpetuation of weak capacity of state agencies to produce and deliver public services.

The MSPs in both case studies improved cooperation and collaboration between state and non-state actors and thereby the process legitimacy of the participating state institutions. The MSP structures introduced participative governance that, among other things, created space for citizens to participate in and influence service delivery decision making processes. Though not totally attributed to the MSPs, it was found that over the last five years, there was a change in the government's approach towards demand driven community participation. The involvement of small private actors in the construction and supply of materials for water points was a new initiative introduced by the MSPs. Such hallowing out of the state functions to private actors also improved process legitimacy. Coordination of multiple actors in general, and multiple state actors in particular, through an MSP was, however, a demanding process. The priority government agencies gave to their own regular bureaucratic activities over the MSP activities constituted a major challenge.

Local people in both case studies did not feel that local government agencies were capable of providing fair and sufficient safe drinking water services. The MSPs played important roles in bridging the gap in WASH service delivery and the performance capacity of state institutions to fill this gap. The MSPs improved the quality, quantity and accessibility of safe drinking water in the case study *woredas*. In terms of attribution of performance, local people in the case study *woredas* tended to attribute more to MSP initiators than to the state institutions involved. Thus, only limited performance legitimacy for state institutions could be deduced from the MSPs. Over publicity of the initiators among the local citizens was a major factor that undermined the performance legitimacy of the state institutions. Thus, NGOs and donors should not present themselves as omnipresent and the only way to improve the lives of poor citizens. They should ideally limit their direct involvement in project implementation and focus on building capacities of government agencies to enable them to take the leading role in the production and delivery of services. Fair distribution of services is another important issue of performance legitimacy. In this regard, in spite of improvements, the geographical reach of the WASH services was not fair enough; people residing in peripheral areas did not benefit from the WASH services produced and delivered by the MSPs. In the case of Fogera MSP, fairness suffered not only due to geographical factors, but also due to the "elite capture". The blame for lack of sufficient and equitable service distribution goes to state institutions.

In general, the following are key lessons derived from this study:

- MSPs initiated and introduced on the basis of planned project/program were quite successful in achieving their objectives, but had rigid boundaries for potential actors to join.
- MSPs are key instruments to introduce demand-driven and community-centered service development through grassroots participation. This is however, no guarantee for equitable service distribution among communities or for avoiding 'elite capture'.
- The balance of decision making power in the whole MSP governance milieu depends on the manner in which the MSP was initiated. Architects of the MSPs (donors/NGOs and regional government agencies) were more influential than local government agencies and communities.
- MSPs influence service delivery outputs as well as service delivery practices. The degree of their

influence is however, dependent on the degree of embeddedness of their programs into government service development programs, applicability of the approaches they introduced, and the degree of service delivery performance they achieved.

- MSPs have positive impacts on state legitimacy. State legitimacy as a function of participation in MSPs for service delivery however, seems to hinge on some core issues: integration between MSP and state governance structures; visibility of state institutions within the MSP; and avoiding competition between state and non-state partners (about, for instance, personnel and funding).
- Donors/NGOs are important actors of MSPs. Nonetheless, their contributions to MSP functioning and state legitimacy depend on their conducts.
- Donors/NGOs can influence government policies more on the basis of proven development approach and results rather than by normative arguments.

# SECTION 1

## INTRODUCTION<sup>2</sup>

This report is concerned with multi-stakeholder processes (MSP) and their contributions to service delivery and state legitimacy. The project aims to gain insights in how these arrangements may contribute to the legitimacy of state institutions. Analysis is based on two MSP case studies organised around water and sanitation in the Amhara National Regional State in Ethiopia. Fieldwork took place between October 2009 and March 2010.

Improving basic services is high on the agenda in many developing countries. Provision of social services (like health, education) and utilities (like water, electricity, waste management and infrastructure) is often problematic, either because services are lacking or because they are of poor quality, expensive or discriminatory. This can have many adverse consequences for people's health, income-earning capacities and other crucial aspects of development. Moreover, service provision is considered important because it is assumed that people's appreciation of their government largely depends on the extent to which the state can provide reliable services – or enable other actors to do so. Hence, there is widely-held assumption that states can enhance their legitimacy through better service provision.

One of the pertinent questions in this regard is what the role of the state in service provision is, can be, or should be. Privatization and decentralisation have led to the involvement of new actors in the organisation and governance of services. Moreover, the Weberian model in which the welfare state takes responsibility for the provision of services has in most societies been weakened or abandoned. Alternatives, such as “New Public Management” approach, suggest that in basic service provision the state should “steer the boat instead of rowing it”, which means that the state takes on a norm-setting, and monitoring role, while guiding the relations between public agencies, private providers and end users.

Churches, traditional organisations or local community based organisations often develop their own initiatives to compensate for the lacking services, while the international aid system provides for parallel service delivery systems. This is not to say that people will always be assured of services. The multiple institutions that evolve can be patchy or do not add up to a full coverage of services, or lack resources, quality, or accountability. Nonetheless, this multiplicity may also open up space for cultivating new forms of service delivery.

The combination of a multiplicity of institutions and changing perceptions of the role of the state in service provision has led to growing trends of initiatives that aim to organize service delivery through mechanisms that involve different actors. This report is concerned with such multi-stakeholder initiatives for WASH service delivery. Multi-stakeholder initiatives cover a wide range of structures and levels of engagement. They can be highly engineered and formed in the context of a planned project, or evolve from partly planned and partly spontaneous, informal arrangements. They can be initiated by local or international actors and can be very diverse in their shape and purpose. The very fact that they can be considered MSPs may go unnoticed by the participants.

The concept of MSPs thus refers to large sets of phenomena. Moreover, the use of the term MSP displays an interest in processes beyond the contractual arrangement per se. The term ‘multi-stakeholder’ is often attached to networks, platforms, processes, and partnerships and denotes an interest in the quality of the process in terms of values around decision-making, accountability, inclusiveness and citizen

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<sup>2</sup> This section is an adapted version of chapter 1 of the Theoretical Framework produced for this research as written by Hilhorst, D. 2010. Introduction. In Noor, M., N, Douma, G. Van der Haar, D. Hilhorst, I. Van der Molen and N. Stel. 2010. Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions. Theoretical Framework and Methodologies. Working Paper. Available on: [www.psdnetwork.nl](http://www.psdnetwork.nl).

participation. The literature on MSPs is therefore very conducive for a research project interested in the relations between state legitimacy and service provision through multiple societal actors in developing countries. Also to shed light on a concern that has recently been expressed by donors, governments and in development literature, that support to out-of-state service providers (NGOs in particular) may result in improved services on the short term, but will on the long term undermine the government's legitimacy. The heightened interest in MSPs could even be understood as a desire to resolve this problem.

The project that this report supports concerns the "Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Services and State Institutions" research consortium, and is part of a wider initiative: the Knowledge Network on Peace, Security and Development (KNPSD). Apart from generating insight into MSPs and their relations with state legitimacy, the project aims to identify bottlenecks and critical success factors of MSPs on service delivery and to make recommendations for international donors for strengthening the legitimacy of state-institutions through multi-stakeholder processes.

The report covers two case studies conducted in two *woredas*/districts of the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS), Ethiopia. The first case study deals with the *Achefer Woreda* MSP, which was initiated by a local NGO - Organization for Relief and Development in Amhara (ORDA). The *Fogera Woreda* MSP represents the second case study that was initiated, as part of a regional program, by an international donor agency - the Finland International Development Agency (FINNDA).

This document is set up as follows: the next section deals with research methodology adopted for conducting the study. This section aims at elaborating on methods, approaches and techniques used to provide answers to the research questions. Section three provides an overview of the national and regional contexts where the case studies were conducted. Sections four and five are devoted to empirical analysis and discussions. Section four discusses the input, throughput and output of the MSPs organized around WASH services while section five discusses the impact of the MSPs on the legitimacy of state institutions. Section six provides overall conclusions and recommendations.

## SECTION 2

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY<sup>3</sup>

This research examines how multi-stakeholder processes organised in water and sanitation influence the performance and governance of services and how this has an effect on the legitimacy of state institutions. It is this two-step interrelation between MSPs, service delivery and state institutions that is put central in this research and that guides the project's methodology. Figure 2.1 illustrates the interrelation of MSPs, services and state institutions.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual scheme

This embedded relationship is operationalized in a number of research objectives and questions, which will be presented below<sup>4</sup>. The study captured and analyzed the nature, processes and impacts of MSPs through:

1. Mapping of actors (included and excluded), their capacities and resources
2. Description of the characteristics of MSPs and the rules governing the process
3. Concrete deliverables, in terms of goals achieved in service delivery.

<sup>3</sup> This section is an adapted version of chapter 5 of the Theoretical Framework produced for this research as written by Noor, M. 2010. Research Methodology. In Noor, M., N, Douma, G. Van der Haar, D. Hilhorst, I. Van der Molen and N. Stel. 2010. Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions. Theoretical Framework and Methodologies. Working Paper. Available on: [www.psdnetwork.nl](http://www.psdnetwork.nl).

<sup>4</sup> Complementary to this chapter, an operationalization of the methods and approaches for field research is presented in a separate research protocol. This protocol serves as a guide for all researchers performing the field studies. It can be obtained through the author ([fenfet@gmail.com](mailto:fenfet@gmail.com)) or via [www.psdnetwork.nl](http://www.psdnetwork.nl).






Figure 2.2: Multi-stakeholder process [Based on Van Tulder, R. (2009), Hemmati (2002), Dore (2007), Warner (2007)]

In order to get an understanding of MSPs and how they contribute to service delivery and improve state-society relations, this research will focus on two types of MSPs: one initiated and facilitated by a local actor (NGO) and another initiated and facilitated by international actor (donor). These processes will be studied in terms of the performance (how they contribute to service delivery) and governance (how the MSP are governed). Moreover, we will look at how MSPs link top down and bottom up approaches and specifically focus on how the performance and governance influence the legitimacy of state-institutions.

## 2.1. Research questions

The literature review (see Annex 2) illustrated the link between service delivery, legitimacy of state institutions and MSPs. It is assumed that MSPs in services may influence the performance and governance of services and eventually also influence the legitimacy of state institutions. The following key research question has been formulated:

**How do multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) for the improvement of service delivery affect the performance and governance of those services and how does this affect the legitimacy of state institutions?**

A number of sub questions have been formulated to further operationalize the main research question:

1. Which actors and trends can be identified, which are relevant for service delivery in the studied context?
2. What are the characteristics of the multi-stakeholder process organized for service delivery?
3. How is the multi-stakeholder process governed?
4. What is the performance of services?

5. How do the process and generated outputs affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions?
6. What are the key factors in the (socio-political, institutional) context influencing MSPs, service delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?

## 2.2. Methodological choices

The concepts used in the research questions are derived from Annex 2 that describes the theoretical foundations for the research. As some of these concepts are broadly defined, working definitions and methodological choices are explained and justified below.

### *Multi-stakeholder processes*

A multi-stakeholder process is defined as a process organized around services or utilities, which has the notion of bringing together public, private and civil society actors (regional/local and international) who have an interest in a problem, and engaging them in a process of dialogue to identify problems and seek solutions. In this research we take into account MSPs organized around water and sanitation and hygiene services, which were initiated by local and international actors internationally and locally initiated MSPs.

Multi-stakeholder processes can be analyzed based on various criteria. However, the focus of this research is not MSPs as such, but the influence of such processes on the performance of services and the legitimacy of state-institutions. As a result, the analysis of MSPs concentrates on the characteristics of MSPs (including how the process was initiated and by whom), the actors included in the process and on how the process is governed. The assumption is that these conditions determine the overall outputs of the MSPs in terms of service performance and effects on the legitimacy of state-institutions.

### *Legitimacy of state institutions*

Legitimacy refers to the degree to which relevant state institutions are perceived – by various target groups – as “right” (i.e. preferable to alternatives) when assessed from a *public* perspective. In the context of this research, five forms of legitimacy are distinguished: general and embedded legitimacy; process legitimacy; performance legitimacy; and international legitimacy. These forms of legitimacy are further specified in concrete indicators in Annex 1, and operationalized in terms of questions in the research protocol.

### *Service delivery performance*

The main focus of the performance of services lies in this research project on the quantity and quality of services delivered, studied in light of the consumption need expressed by the population. Additionally, attention is paid to policy changes and processes related to the service sector studied and influence on official decision-making. Services are in the context of the research understood as basic utilities that include water and sanitation and hygiene.

By studying basic services, a number of issues need to be taken into consideration. First of all, though a number of conceptual models of service delivery as core element of state-society relations have waxed and waned over the years (e.g. decentralisation, privatisation, social welfare, neoliberals); none is perceived as guiding in this research. In fact, it is precisely the objective of the research to learn more about how services intertwine with state-society relations. Furthermore, by studying MSPs inevitably attention needs to be paid to donor involvement in service delivery – especially in those cases where MSPs are donor driven which is a reality in countries where government services prove incapable of assuring sufficient coverage. Finally, by looking into the actual and perceived performance of services in terms of quality and quantity, a link can be made with participation of citizen groups in MSPs and accountability mechanisms. This will need to boil down to questioning whether consumers of services give more importance to *performance* or *participation* in service delivery, which inevitably links up with accountability mechanisms and, finally, legitimacy processes.

The above described concepts and methodological choices define the main focus of the research. The study also looks into the surrounding context, which has an influence on the process and outcomes. This refers to issues like socio-political, cultural and institutional environment of the country/regional state studied, as well as an overview of trends in the governance of a specific service in the analysis.

Based on the theoretical framework, our preliminary expectations for the research are:

- 1) Through multi-stakeholder processes the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions in service delivery can be increased or decreased;
  - i. The configuration of the MSP (participating actors) has an influence on the legitimacy of state institutions
  - ii. The internal governance of the MSP has an influence on the legitimacy of state institutions
- 2) Multi-stakeholder processes organised around services have a positive effect on the performance of services;
- 3) Improvements in the coverage, quality or governance of basic services may contribute to the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions



Figure 2.3. Water Infrastructures in ANRS [pictures taken by Mina Noor]

## 2.3. Research design

### 2.3.1. A case study approach

The conditions under which MSPs operate are complex and MSPs depend greatly on their specific context. MSP research therefore involves examination and analysis of the whole dynamic of vertical and horizontal interactions, different degrees of involvement and varied contributions of the actors, the results achieved through such processes, and ultimately the impacts on state-society relationship. A research that aspires to capture such dynamic and complex phenomenon needs to find out in-depth information that uncovers detailed characteristics. According to Yin (2003), case study is an essential method that is capable of serving such purposes. Case studies are generally preferred when in-depth investigations are required and when “how” and “why” questions are being posed in a research (Yin, 2003:1). Also, case study research is most appropriate when the research aims to cover not only the phenomenon of study, but also the contextual conditions. Case studies tend to be “holistic” rather than dealing with isolated factors (Denscombe, 2007, cited in Multipart, 2008:122). Finally, “case studies can be

based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence”, which makes it possible to rely on multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003:15). The following section covers the logic of design and data collection techniques inherent to case studies.

### **2.3.2. Selection criteria for the MSP case studies**

The theoretical framework (see Annex 2) of the research has emphasized the possible differences in various types of MSPs (initiated by local or international actors). Therefore, the aim of the study is to analyse two MSPs (initiated by local and international actors).

Case studies cannot be randomly selected, but “are chosen on the basis of known attributes” (Denscombe, 2007, cited in Multipart, 2008:124). This requires the screening or mapping of potential MSPs as cases, based on attributes or operational criteria which will make sure “that the cases are identified properly, prior to formal data collection” (Yin, 2003:78). Therefore, the two MSP cases were selected on the bases of the following definitional and relevance criteria used for the research:

#### *Definitional criteria:*

- The MSP is a process which has the notion of bringing actors together who have an interest in a problem, and engaging them in a process of dialogue and action;
- The MSP is either locally initiated or it refers to processes initiated by foreign actors (such as governmental/bilateral and non-governmental donors).<sup>5</sup>

#### *Relevance for the research*

- The MSP is organized around utilities or basic services such as water, waste, electricity or roads<sup>6</sup>. Health and education are excluded from this research;
- The MSP operates at local and/or meso level; national and global MSPs are not considered in this research as the aim is to study the engagement of citizens in multi-stakeholder processes and the perceptions of beneficiaries of services on the legitimacy of state-institutions;
- The MSP preferably involves three types of actors, private, public and civil, with at least one public sector representative and at least one civil society representative;
- The MSP should be operating, with measurable output, in order to analyse whether the MSPs has contributed to these outcomes. Therefore, MSPs which have not achieved a minimal level of concrete outputs will be exempted. The MSP must be functioning for at least 2 years, at the time of research, in order to ensure that there are outputs to examine;

Mapping of potential cases to be studied was conducted in light of these criteria (see Annex 3).

## **2.4. Data collection and analysis**

### **2.4.1. Data sources and collection techniques**

In order to answer the research questions and sub-questions formulated, the researchers made use of various qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques to gather the data from both secondary and primary sources. Actors, involved in or knowledgeable on the MSPs, were the major sources of secondary and primary data. Respondents were identified during the mapping of the cases and field research processes.

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<sup>5</sup> In order to gain insight in the influence of external actors on multi-stakeholder processes, and make policy recommendations for international donors, the research team decided to study two MSP case studies whereby one of the cases was initiated by a local actor and the other one by international actor.

<sup>6</sup> The two cases were from within one service/utility –WASH/ since the MSPs identified during the mapping were found operating in the WASH sector.

Primary data were thus collected through interviews, observation and focus group discussions.<sup>7</sup> Interviewing constituted the most important instrument of data collection. The authors conducted a total of 38 interviews (19 interviews for each case study). The interviews were basically semi-structured, which allows for a certain measure of control of the topic that is discussed, without leaving the impression that the researcher is rigidly controlling the interview and allows the conversation to lead in new directions, which in the case of exploratory research is of crucial importance (Russel, 1995, cited in Multipart, 2008).

The mapping of MSPs gave a general overview of the relevant actors in the studied cases from which respondents were selected. Additional respondents and key-informants were identified from references to them in documents and snowball sampling techniques. Respondents were classified in to five target groups (see Annex 4):

- MSP participant: service provider (public and private: production, delivery, and maintenance)
- User/beneficiary;
- Policy maker;
- Donor/financer; and
- Non-MSP service providers and key experts .

Thus, the semi-structured in-depth interviews, which on average took an hour and fifteen minutes, were conducted with regional and local government officials and experts; donor and NGO heads and experts; and private entrepreneurs. Heads and experts of selected non-MSP service providers were also interviewed.

Secondary data were collected through review of:

- Statistical abstracts, memoranda, agendas, minutes of meetings, written reports, administrative documents (such as project agreements, program documents, progress and evaluation reports), study reports, etc.
- Archival records such as service records, organizational records (such as charts and graphs), and so on.

Direct observation refers to field visits to one of the villages where the respective MSPs were operating and the observation of the types of water, sanitation and hygiene services and facilities made available for the local people through the MSP projects.

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<sup>7</sup> Focus groups refer to an interactive method in which a group of people discuss and exchange on different opinions and perceptions they have regarding a specific question related to a concept, topic or issue (Marshall and Gretchen, 1999: 115). Focus group discussions were conducted with randomly selected community members in one of the *kebeles* where the respective MSPs were operating (11 in case 1 and 13 case 2). The focus groups were exclusively made up of community members where local/*kebele* leaders were deliberately excluded with the objective of ensuring free discussion and expression of ideas by participants.

## SECTION 3

### UNDERSTANDING CONTEXTS

#### 3.1. General context

Access to basic services is not a given issue for a substantial part of the world's population, in particular those living in marginal regions. According to the 2004 World Development Report, in 2000 20% of the world population had no access to safe water, 50% went without adequate sanitation (World Bank, 2004). The problems with basic services relate to coverage, access and quality, as well as to the governance of service provision. Elite capture may play a role and limit equal access to resources (Bardhan, 2004). In many developing countries, the provision of basic services is not controlled or organized exclusively by the state. Instead, a range of non-state actors is involved in service delivery, ranging from NGOs operating services on the basis of the humanitarian imperative to religious institutions, small scale community solutions, and private entrepreneurs offering services.

Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) have emerged as mechanisms which can link state and non-state service providers and possibly have an influence on the legitimacy of the state. This is one of the reasons why donors have recently become more interested in service delivery through MSPs (for detailed general contextual and theoretical discussions, see Annex 2).

#### 3.2. The national context

Ethiopia occupies a surface area of 1,133,380 square kilometer and has a total population of 79.221 million, making it the second most populous nation in Africa next to Nigeria (PSD HUB/ ACCSA, 2009a; Central Statistical Agency, 2008). Ethiopia is one of the ethnically most diversified countries in Africa with more than 70 ethnic groups. According to the 2007 census report, there are 10 ethnic groups that have a population of one million and above. Oromo and Amhara represent the largest ethnic groups, constituting 34.5 and 26.9 percent of the total population respectively (Population Census Commission, 2008). 43.5 percent of the total Ethiopian population is Orthodox Christian and 33.9 percent is Muslim. Protestant and traditional religious group accounted for 18.6 percent and 2.6 percent respectively. The majority (83.9 percent) of the population lives in rural areas and depends mainly on agriculture. In terms of regional distribution, about eighty percent of the population of the country lives in three regional states: Oromia, Amhara and Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples (Population Census Commission, 2008).

##### 3.2.1. History

Ethiopia has existed as an independent nation for over three thousand years. The fact that Ethiopia remained independent, apart from a brief occupation by Fascist Italy (1936-41), throughout its long history makes it unique among African countries (Fenta, 2007; Paulos, 2007). In spite of Ethiopia's long history of independence, it was not able to establish modern constitutional government until the third decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This was due to several centrifugal forces nurtured, among others, by ethnicity and geography that posed a serious challenge to the emergence of a unified modern state. It was the Imperial Government that for the first time introduced a constitutional government in 1931. Since the adoption of the first Constitution, Ethiopia has experienced three different regimes: the Imperial (1930-74), the *Derg*/Military (1974-1991) and the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1991 to date) (Fenta, 2007).

The Imperial and the *Derg* regimes established highly centralized political and administrative systems. The Imperial regime established an absolute monarchy (Meheret, 2002). The *Derg* regime came to power in 1974 and ruled the country on the basis of provisional laws for more than a decade. In September 1987, it introduced a new Constitution modeled on a Marxist-Leninist state (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). The Constitution further consolidated the centralization process and established an authoritarian state that hardly left any space for participatory governance and development. Monopolization of state power by military elites and further repressive measures intensified civilian and armed resistance (mostly ethnic-based) across the country that ultimately resulted in an overthrow of the Military regime in May 1991 (Fenta, 2007).

The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) established a Transitional Government in the same year. In 1995, it adopted a new Constitution that provided clear provisions for political pluralism and democratic governance (FDRE, 1995).

### 3.2.2. The State

The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) introduced a federal system of government – constituting the Federal Government, nine ethnic-based Regional States and two<sup>8</sup> city administrations.




Figure 3.1 Map of Ethiopia [Source: (Wijnands et al., 2007:9)]

#### Key

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1 Addis Ababa City Administration            | 7 Harari People National Regional State                       |
| 2 Afar National Regional State               | 8 Oromia National Regional State                              |
| 3 Amhara National Regional State             | 9 Somali National Regional State                              |
| 4 Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State; | 10 Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State |
| 5 Dire Dawa City Administration              | 11 Tigray National Regional State                             |
| 6 Gambella National Regional State           |   |

<sup>8</sup> Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa; Addis Ababa had expressly been identified by the Constitution but not Dire Dawa.

The federal and regional states have their own legislature, judiciary and executive branches. The federal government is responsible for establishing and implementing standards and basic policy criteria for public service delivery. Moreover, it expands and administers federally funded institutions that provide services to two or more States<sup>9</sup>.

Based on the federal and regional constitutions, the Regional States have established four tiers of government: the regional, zonal, *woreda*, and *kebele* levels (Fenta, 2007).

- Regional State has its own legislature, judiciary and executive bodies. It is fully responsible for social, economic and political developments within its jurisdiction.
- Zonal administration<sup>10</sup> is an intermediary administrative structure between the regional and *woreda* governments. It is responsible for the planning and implementation of service development and other socio-economic developments within its jurisdiction.
- *Woreda*/district level of *government* is the lowest unit of government to which budgets are allocated and disbursed. It has an elected council that oversees the cabinet, i.e., a body responsible for executive functions. It has also a judiciary system responsible for ensuring the rule of law within its jurisdiction. The *woreda* government is the leading actor in local social, economic, and political developments, which has to facilitate and coordinate the interventions of various state and non-state actors and communities.
- *Kebele* administration is a grassroots local government structure led by elected council and an executive body-cabinet elected from among members of the *kebele* council. Despite its political and administrative importance, the *kebele* does not have government budget and technical staff. Therefore, its role in service development and delivery largely relates to mobilizing the local people (Fenta, 2007).

### 3.2.3. Current socio-economic situation

The Ethiopian economy is predominantly agrarian. Agriculture constitutes a large share of the GDP (an average of 45 percent for the period 2001-09) and engages the majority (about 80 percent) of the Ethiopian labor force (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2009).

The Ethiopian economy lacks a strong private sector. Its development was severely affected by the nationalization policy of the *Derg* Government. The *Derg* suppressed operating private firms and discouraged new development through policies that denied access to credit and imported inputs (Brixiova, Not Dated). Ever since the establishment of the Transitional Government in 1991, the current regime (EPRDF) declared and exerted efforts to build a competitive private sector. The Government issued and implemented a series of economic reform programs<sup>11</sup> that have substantial implications for economic stabilization and structural adjustment (PSD Hub/AACCSA, 2009a). After almost two decades of privatization exercise, however, the government controls more than 50 percent of the total value of production of medium and large scale enterprises and 70 percent of the value of modern economic activities (PSD Hub/AACCSA, 2009a:44).

In terms of overall development objectives, poverty eradication is proclaimed a priority of the Government of Ethiopia and the country's development policies and strategies<sup>12</sup> are geared towards this

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<sup>9</sup> Proclamation No. 1/1995: A Proclamation to Pronounce the Coming into Effect of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 51(9 &13).

<sup>10</sup> Except in the case of SNNPRS and three Nationality Zones of the Amhara National Regional State, zonal administration has no elected council.

<sup>11</sup> Among others include privatization of state-owned enterprises, liberalizing the investment climate, deregulation of the domestic prices, devaluation of foreign exchange, and abolition of all export taxes and subsidies.

<sup>12</sup> The Ethiopian Government formulated the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) in 2000S, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program that covered the period 2002-2004, and the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty for the period 2005/06-2009/10.



end. Through a series of poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies and programs Ethiopia has achieved an average GDP Growth of above 11 percent since 2003 (AIMDG, 2008). Due to such fast growth, the proportion of people living below the poverty line of \$1 per day decreased from 45.5 percent in 1996 to 37 percent in 2006, which further decreased to about 33 percent in 2007 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009). The 2010 UNDP Human Development Report indicated that Ethiopia ranks 11<sup>th</sup> in progress over time in improving human development index (UNDP, 2010:30). Considerable progress has also been made in the areas of expanding economic infrastructures such as irrigation, market infrastructures and financial services (AIMDG, 2008).

In spite of such continued improvements, Ethiopia still remains one of the world's poorest countries (Barnes, 2006). The 2010 UNDP HDI report revealed that Ethiopia stands at 157 out of 169 countries (UNDP, 2010). UNICEF's report in 2007 showed that the income per capita in Ethiopia was one of the lowest in the world at around \$160 (PSD Hub/AACCSA, 2009a). Generally, Ethiopia is still striving to meet the basic necessities of life for its citizens affected by widespread and deep-rooted poverty (AIMDG, 2008).

### **3.2.4. Service delivery in Ethiopia**

The Ethiopian public service delivery system has been historically characterized by state monopoly. There was neither an enabling policy environment nor strong private and civil society sectors capable of producing and delivering public services (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2000; Fenta 2007). During the Imperial and *Derg* periods, there was little room for civil societies to grow and their role was mainly to provide relief and emergency activities (Fenta, 2007). In fact, during the *Derg* regime, all public services were by law brought under state monopoly.

The establishment of a Transitional Government in 1991 introduced a decentralized federal system that gave way to the establishment of self-governing regional states and local governments. Ethiopia has seen political and economic liberalizations in many areas that have transcended beyond restructuring the public sector; it aspired involving multiple actors (private, CBOS, NGOs and donors) in the whole development milieu (Mikkelsen et al. 2008; Fenta, 2007). The Government has recognized the private sector as a partner in the economic and services development endeavors of the country (AIMDG, 2008:342). The Government has hallowed out public services development activities not only to the private sector, but also to civil society organizations and donors which has created opportunities for international and national development agencies (NGOs and donors) to intervene in and support public service delivery and overall socio-economic development processes (Fenta, 2007). The preferred areas that civil society actors were called up on to intervene include environment, education, health, safe drinking water, women's empowerment, infrastructure etc. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2000).

For coordinated, harmonized and effective development interventions, donors and NGOs have recognized the need for joint structures/MSPs that could bring them together. Ethiopia is a pilot country for the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) harmonization agenda. Both Government and a majority of international partners are keen to harmonization process in the spirit of the Rome Declaration (2003) and the Paris Declaration (2005) (DAG Ethiopia, 2008:6). In order to avoid overlaps, identify gaps in their portfolios of support and promote coordination and collaboration, donors have organized themselves and established a forum called Development Assistance Group (DAG) Ethiopia (Battle and Tanburn, 2008). The development partners have endorsed Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) and the MDGs as the overarching frameworks for their development cooperation with Ethiopia and have taken steps to align their country strategies around these and the broader harmonization agenda (DAG Ethiopia, 2008:5). This multi-stakeholder process is not limited to the donor sector. The Government of Ethiopia and its development partners have established High Level Forum (HLF), chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and co-chaired by DAG. The HLF is a principal multi-stakeholder platform for dialogue between the Government and the development partners (DAG Ethiopia, 2008).

The post 1991 period witnessed a proliferation of CSOs/NGOs (International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, Not dated). For example, the number of NGOs grew from 70 in 1994 to 368 in 2000 (Dessalegn, 2002). This is mainly attributed both to global changes and as well as changes in the political landscape of Ethiopia that formally recognized the role of NGOs in the national socio-economic revitalization. NGOs have been actively participating in a wide range of sectors and activities aimed at improving the lives of the poor population (PANE, 2005). The aftermath of the 2005 election has affected NGO-government relationships, however. Government control has increased in post 2005 since the Government considered many NGOs to have had meddled into unconstitutional anti-government movement together with the oppositions that caused serious violence in the aftermath of the May 2005 elections. Most NGOs believe that the new Charities and Civil Societies Law is very restrictive of their involvement in governance issues. In spite of this, cooperation between NGOs and government agencies in general and local government institutions in particular, is encouraging (Mikkelsen et al. 2008).

### **3.2.5. The WASH sector in Ethiopia**

Ethiopia is said to be the “water roof of Africa”, endowed with diversified sources of water that can be used for different purposes. It has 12 major river basins and 12 large lakes. Annual surface runoff water is estimated to be about 122 billion m<sup>3</sup>, while groundwater resource is estimated to be around 2.6 billion m<sup>3</sup>. Unfortunately, however, due to its high altitude and rugged topography, much of the water flows out of the country being carried away by trans-boundary rivers such as the Blue Nile, Tekeze, and Gibe (MoWR, 2001a; 2002b; MoFED, 2006). There are several other factors that have affected the development and management of water resources in Ethiopia – geo-political and lack of sufficient financial and technological capacities being among the most critical ones (MoWR, 2002b; MoFED, 2006). Since the introduction of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) in 2002, greater efforts have been exerted to enhance the management of the sector and its contribution to the socio-economic development. On the bases of the success achieved and the lessons learned from the SDPRP, Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) pushed forward implementations of the water sector policy and strategy. The implementations of the policy and strategy vividly showed the need for substantial collaboration between multiple agencies representing multiple sectors (public, private, donors, CSOs, and citizens at large) (MoFED, 2006). During this period, significant steps have been taken towards improving overall water resource management, including conclusion of the Nile Basin Initiative. Some 90 urban water supply systems were constructed or rehabilitated and about 160,000 village wells and other rural water supply systems were provided, raising average access to rural water supply from 24% in 1999 to 34.5% in 2004.

The Ethiopian Government has explicitly recognized that improving safe drinking water and sanitation services are among most important areas of poverty reduction programs that would have an impact on the overall socio-economic development (PANE, 2005). Over the last 15 years, Ethiopia made major strides in achieving significant increases in the coverage of basic services (Garcia and Rajkumer, 2008). Despite improvements, catering to all citizens in general and the rural population in particular, are still major challenges. In 2009, the national safe drinking water coverage had reached 67 percent (Bureau of Water Resources Development, 2010). This shows that 33 percent of the population had no access to safe drinking water. With respect to sanitation, the Ethiopian Ministry of Health (MoH) estimated the coverage at 30 percent (AfDB/OECD, 2007).

The Ethiopian Government considered that sustainable use and management of both the water resources and the environment are crucial for the success of socio-economic development and the reduction of poverty in Ethiopia. In 2001, the Government formulated a national water policy and strategy. In 2002, the Government of Ethiopia, in collaboration with regional states formulated the National Water Sector Development Program (WSDP) that covers a period of 15 years. Producing and supplying clean water for drinking and sanitation is one of the priorities of the WSDP. By the end of the period (2016), the program aimed at achieving 76 percent overall coverage and 98 and 71 percent for urban and rural populations respectively (MoWR, 2002b). The coverage of sanitation and hygiene is lower than safe drinking water coverage. PASDEP (2005/06-2009/10) aimed at increasing rural sanitation coverage from 17.5 percent to

79.8 percent and urban sanitation coverage from 50 percent to 89.4 percent of the population by the end of the program (MoFED, 2006).

As stipulated by the Water Sector Development Program (WSDP), the following categories of institutions characterize Ethiopia's WASH sector (MoWR, 2002a):

**Government institutions:** Implementation of the WSDP activities at Federal and Regional levels involve not only water-related institutions, but other institutions as well. Nevertheless, Ministry of Water Resources at the Federal level and water resources development bureaus (WRDB) at the regional level assume the leading responsibility for program implementation. Their principal roles are to provide leadership in making high-profile decisions. Local/*woreda* governments are primarily responsible for facilitating planning and implementation of water and sanitation schemes at community level though the involvement of multiple actors. Water resources development offices are on the front line of the whole planning and implementation exercises.

**Private sector:** The private sector so far played a limited role in the development of the water sector. As the government moves towards the implementation of WSDP, however, the private sector is considered an important partner. The government is examining the possibility of introducing different kinds of incentives to create conducive condition to private sector participation in implementing WSDP activities.

**Local communities and individuals:** The WSDP articulates that communities and individuals are expected to invest capital and labor and to improve their resource management practices. Communities are considered responsible for managing common resources, improving their own organizational set up, undertaking and maintaining projects, and increasing the involvement of women.

**Non-governmental organizations:** NGO contribution to WSDP involves coordinating and linking their activities to the development programs of the regional and local governments. NGOs perform four important functions within the context of WSDP implementation: (a) bringing additional financial resources; (b) strengthening technical capacities of regional and local government agencies; (c) organizing local communities; and (d) undertaking rehabilitation works.

**External support/donor agencies:** Given the huge financial needs of WSDP, the role of international lending and donor institutions in providing financial resources and technical assistance to implement the program activities can hardly be over-emphasized. The WSDP provides a comprehensive framework to donor agencies not only to select projects and programs for financing in accordance with their respective country assistance strategies, but also to coordinate water sector activities to improve the efficiency and management of external assistance.

In order to create an enabling environment, in which stakeholders meet and discuss on how to implement the WSDP, the Government has established a National Steering Committee (NSC). The Committee consists of representatives of relevant federal ministries/institutions, regional states, donors, and private sector representatives. Selected community representatives from different regions are also represented in the Committee. The Committee is responsible for monitoring of the program progress and providing policy advice and guidance to implementing actors at different levels (MoWR, 2002a).

In addition to the WSDP and NSC, a study by Water and Sanitation Program (WSP)-Africa (2010) identified different water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programs that were supported by different donor organizations. The first was the World Bank financed Water Supply and Sanitation Program (WSSP), which began in 2004 with a US\$100 million specific investment loan to the Government of Ethiopia. The program allocated around 60 percent of the fund to rural areas while the rest was targeting small and medium sized towns under a separate 'urban' component. The WSSP paid primary emphasis to capacity building at federal, regional, *woreda* and community levels across all Ethiopia's regions. Community level intervention of the program includes supporting the establishment of Water and Sanitation Committees (WATSANCOs) and the development of scheme management plans, and therefore ensuring the capacity of communities to operate and maintain their water and sanitation infrastructure is a key component of the program (WSP-Africa, 2010).

Previous discussions showed that the WASH sector is ingrained into clear policy and strategic frameworks on the bases of which its development program was formulated. Not only are MSPs considered as important approaches for WASH service development, but they are also well embedded into the sector’s development policies, strategies and programs.

### 3.3. The regional context: the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS)

ANRS is one of the nine Regional States of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is located in the central and north western parts of the country (see Figure 3.2) (Fenta and Mekonnen, 2009). The ANRS covers an area of 154,048.77 sq. km that accounts 15 percent of the country’s total area, which makes it the third largest region next to Oromia and Somali Regions. It roughly accounts for 25.5 percent of the total population of the country. The largest share (88.6 percent) of the population resides in rural areas and is engaged mainly in agriculture (BoFED, 2009a:2-6). Ethnic and linguistic wise, the Amhara, who speak the Amharic language (the official working language of the region) is the largest nationality that accounts for 91.48 percent of the Region’s population.

Politico-administratively, the Region is divided into 11 zonal administrations, 150 (128 rural and 22 urban) *woreda* governments and 3,429 *kebele* administrations.




Figure 3.2 Map of ANRS: Administrative Division by Zones and *Woredas* [Source: Johannes et al. (2007:7)]

A number of bilateral and multi-lateral donor agencies and NGOs have been involved in different sectors since the establishment of the self-governing regional government in 1992 (BoFED, 2005). Multi-stakeholder platforms between state and non-state actors have been established at multiple (regional,

zonal and *woreda*) levels<sup>13</sup>. The platforms consisted of state actors and non-state actors (donor agencies and NGOs) operating at the respective level. The regional forum, which is responsible for major policy and other enabling environment issues, conducts annual meetings. Experience-sharing and learning from best practices are some of the important agenda items of the forum. The zonal and *woreda* level forums are responsible for operational activities, i.e., discussing intervention areas (sectors), plans, achievements, and problems as presented by the non-state actors and implementing public sector partners. Assessment of the degree and effectiveness of technical and administrative support provided by government agencies to non-state actors is also an important subject of discussion. The forums are mandated to identify and take corrective measures on any actor that caused problem in the course of project implementation<sup>14</sup>. In 2005, the Regional Government provided with a comprehensive guideline to further consolidate and create a fertile ground for the development of MSPs. The guideline intends to enhance partnership between development partners, ensure efficient and effective resource mobilization, and coordination of planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of service development projects supported by multiple actors (BoFED, 2005). The development of better enabling environment attracted more non-state actors and resources to the region. For example, in 2003, there were only 37 non-state actors operating in the region with a total amount of about US\$ 3.25 million development supports. In 2007, the number of non-state actors increased to 140 while their supports grew to about US\$ 120. 78million (BoFED, 2009b)

### 3.3.1. The WASH sector in the ANRS

The ANRS is one of the poorest regions of the country (BoFED, 2005). The level of infrastructural development and delivery of basic service is insufficient. In 2008, the overall coverage of safe drinking water in the region was 56 percent (88 percent urban and 52 percent rural). This shows that nearly half of the rural population and 44 percent of the total population have no access to safe drinking water supply (Bureau of Water Resources Development, 2010).

On the bases of the National Water Resources Management Policy and the Water Strategy and Sector Development Program, the Regional Government has given priority to safe drinking water development and adopted a strategy which, among other things, aimed at: developing ownership and management autonomy to the lowest possible local level; improving efficiency and effectiveness thorough multi-stakeholder involvement including the public, private, donors, NGOs and community based actors; ensuring sustainability of water schemes through gradual transition towards full cost recovery for urban schemes and recovery of operation and maintenance costs for rural schemes; and integrating sanitation and hygiene services with safe drinking water service (Bureau of Water Resources Development, 2010). In light of the above premises, the regional, zonal and *woreda* level water resources development agencies and other development actors are exerting efforts to develop safe drinking water from different sources. By 2009, there were a total of 12,782 safe drinking water schemes of which 5,188 (40.59 %), 4,417 (34.56%), and 3,177 (23.86%) were developed by donors, NGOs and government agencies respectively. Private actors were involved in consultancy and advisory services and as well as in development of water schemes (Bureau of Water Resources Development, 2010). Such efforts have resulted in a steady improvement (see Table 2) of the regional safe drinking water coverage over the last four consecutive years (BoFED, 2009a:58).

Area	Year				
	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09*
Urban	78	80	85	85	88
Rural	31	35	41	47	54

<sup>13</sup> NGOs' Officer, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (12/11/09).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

Urban + Rural	36	40	45	52	56
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Table 3.3 Safe drinking water coverage (%) of the ANRS (2004/05-2008/09) [Source: Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (2009a:59) and Bureau of Water Resources Development (2010)]

Nevertheless, there are still considerable challenges to ensure universal access to safe drinking water. Lack of sufficient finance, poor infrastructure (road) and rugged topography, erratic rain fall and draught, shortage of skilled personnel, and poor management of water schemes are some of the critical problems that affected the development of the WASH sector in the region (Bureau of Water Resources Development, 2010).

### 3.4. The context of the case study *woredas*

#### 3.4.1. Achefer *Woreda* (Case 1)

Achefer *Woreda*<sup>15</sup> is one of the 14 *woredas* in West Gojam Zone of the ANRS. The *Woreda* seat, Durbetie, is found about 65 kilometers away from Bahir Dar, the seat of the ANRS. As per the Office of Finance and Economic Development (OFED) forecast of 2009, the *Woreda* had a population of 189,343 of which urban population accounts only 9.2 percent. The *Woreda* occupies an area of 1,183.05 square kilometers, which is divided into 20 *kebele* administrations (2 urban and 18 rural). Subsistence agriculture is the dominant economic activity that engaged about 89 percent of the population (OFED, 2009). Many *kebeles* were inaccessible and hence, expansion and development of social and economic services such health, education and water remained challenging. Only 56 percent of the population had access to safe drinking water. About 74 percent of the population had access to health services within a diameter of 10 kilometers. Despite improvement over the last five years, sanitation and hygiene services are still low (OFED, 2009).

#### 3.4.2. Fogera *Woreda* (Case 2)

Fogera *Woreda* is one of the 10 *woredas* in South Gondar Zone of the ANRS. Woreta is the *Woreda* seat, located about 50 kilometers away from Bahir Dar. The *Woreda* had a total population of 226,595 of which urban population accounts only 11 percent (Population Census Commission, 2007:60). The *Woreda* occupies an area of 1,095.64 square kilometers, which is divided into 28 *kebele* administrations (one urban and 27 rural). Here, too, many *kebeles* were inaccessible and hence, expansion and development of social and economic services such as health, education and water were not easy. About 70.5 percent of the population had access to health services within a diameter of 10 kilometers. About 69.9 and 64.8 percent of the population had access to safe drinking water and sanitation and hygiene services respectively (Health Office, 2010).

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
<sup>15</sup> At the time when the first WASH project was designed and implemented, Achefer was one *Woreda*. It splitted into South and North Achefer in 2007. The study covered all WASH services developed by the MSP in both South and North Achefer

## **SECTION 4**

### **INPUT, THROUGHPUT AND OUTPUT OF THE MSPs**

This section examines the organization and functioning of the MSPs studied and how the MSPs affected the governance and output of WASH services in the two case studies.

The analysis of the two case studies revealed that multiple state and non-state actors operating at various levels were involved, which resulted in multi-level MSP structures (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). The first case study has structures at regional, local/district and grassroots/community levels while the second case study starts at the central/national level and extends down to community level. The case studies covered by this study are of formal nature. Nonetheless, the first MSP was loosely institutionalized while the second was more extensively institutionalized and embedded into existing government institutions.



Source: Authors' own construction

Figure 4.1 MSP structure of ORDA-WAE WASH Project in Achefer *Woreda*






Figure 4.2 MSP structure of RWSEP- CDF the case of Fogera Woreda

## 4.1. Input: initiation, objectives, funding and actors

### 4.1.1. Initiation

The first MSP in Achefer *Woreda* was initiated by a local NGO – the Organization for Relief and Development in Amhara (ORDA). As shown in Figure 4.1, the MSP involved multiple actors that include regional government agencies, local and international NGOs, *woreda*/local government and its agencies, grassroots/community level administrations, communities, and small scale private entrepreneurs. Not all actors were brought into the MSP at one level and at the same time. ORDA first signed a memorandum of understanding with an international NGO – WaterAid Ethiopia (WAE) - on the basis of which it prepared an integrated WASH project. Regional level actors (Bureaus of Finance and Economic Development, Water Resources Development and Health) were brought in when ORDA submitted the WASH project to the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development for agreement. *Woreda* level actors were brought into the MSP process by ORDA during the time of project preparation. The *Woreda* Administration (WA), Health Office (HO), Water Resources Development Office (WRDO), ORDA-WaterAid project office, Education Office (EO), Agriculture and Rural Development Office (ARDO) and the Office of Finance and Economic Development (OFED) constituted the *woreda* level MSP. The first four are core actors of the MSP while the last three are basically collaborators<sup>16</sup>. The ORDA-WAE project office, together with other *woreda* actors, invited local communities to establish community level MSP structures for the purpose of specific project planning and implementation. Private small scale entrepreneurs joined the *woreda* level MSP at the time of project implementation<sup>17</sup>.

The MSP in Fogera *Woreda* is part of a bigger planned bilateral development cooperation called Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program (RWSEP) in the ANRS. It was initiated by a bilateral donor agency – the Finnish International Development Agency (FINNDA). The program primarily focused on rural areas and rural-semi-urban centres in four zonal administrations<sup>18</sup> and 14 *woredas*<sup>19</sup> of which the case study Fogera *Woreda* is one. As shown in Figure 4.2, the MSP for RWSEP involved multiple actors at multiple levels. Bilateral agreements were signed in 1994 with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Finnish Government and the then Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (now Ministry of Finance and Economic Development) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia that gave a formal shape to the initiative. Two important MSP structures were established at the regional level that consisted of agencies of the bilateral donor and the regional government. Zonal and *woreda* state agencies were called up on to form MSP structures at the respective level to coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the program. *Kebeles*/communities and local private actors were invited in similar fashion to promote effective implementation of RWSEP projects. In 2003, RWSEP introduced a Community Development Fund (CDF) approach to project implementation in which communities and local private entrepreneurs (suppliers and water artisans) emerged as the principal MSP implementing actors.

The MSPs had rigid boundaries for potential members to join. Entry to the MSPs was open only to actors identified and defined in the program/project documents to carry out one or more activities/functions such as facilitating and coordinating, funding, planning, implementing, supervising, monitoring, and evaluating<sup>20</sup>. State and non-state actors who did not fall in the umbrella of the project/program documents were not allowed to participate. This undermined opportunities for pooling resources (managerial, material and financial) from various donors and NGOs for common objectives and synergy

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<sup>16</sup> Have no sector specific interest like Health and WRD Offices.

<sup>17</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09).

<sup>18</sup> South Gondar, East Gojam, West Gojam, and Awi Zonal Administrations.

<sup>19</sup> Bibugn and Enbsie in East Gojam Zone; Dera, Fogera, Farta and Estie (now has been divided in to two *woredas*) in South Gondar Zone; Bahir Dar Zuria, Yelimana Densa, Quarit and Dega Damot in West Gojam Zone; and Ankessa and Guangua in Awi Zone.

<sup>20</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10).

in service production and delivery<sup>21</sup>. In the case of RWSEP for example, no other donors could provide funds or any other contributions to the program due to the bilateral agreement<sup>22</sup>. Though to a limited extent, the RWSEP in its CDF approach opened its door for membership<sup>23</sup> CSOs to join the MSP at the *woreda* level. Evidence however, showed no positive progress in this regard since such CSOs have neither the capacity nor the interest to actively participate<sup>24</sup>. Entry was much easier and open for small scale local private actors. Both MSPs were open for water artisans who possessed the needed skills and who were willing to take further training. In the case of the RWSEP-CDF, not only water artisans but also local traders were encouraged to join the MSP to supply construction materials. In both MSPs, it was found that communities could freely join the MSPs anytime whenever they satisfied eligibility criteria<sup>25</sup> for project/program support. However, it was evident that not all communities had equal capacity to meet the funding criteria. Hence, weaker communities were by default excluded. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Achefer and Fogera *Woreda* MSPs were initiated by an NGO and donor agency respectively in a top-down manner, communities in general and women in particular were at the centre of the whole WASH development processes. Getting community members on board was not a problem due to extensive awareness creation and the active involvement of the local government structures up to the grassroots level. Both MSPs aimed at empowering communities in the process of WASH services development. The Fogera MSP however, had given an extended autonomy to communities including financial management and procurement of works and materials.

#### 4.1.2. Objectives

The initiators of the two MSPs shared a similar starting point: local people in the region have limited access to safe drinking water and sanitation and hygiene services. This problem was attributed to lack of awareness among communities; lack of coordination among sector agencies and development partners, including communities; lack of integration between water and sanitation delivery systems; and gender insensitive approaches in the development and delivery of the WASH services. Based on these premises, the MSPs aimed at:

- Improving access to safe drinking water at community and household levels;
- Promoting gender equality;
- Raising awareness and promoting sanitation and hygiene practices among communities through an integrated approach and through the involvement of multiple actors;
- Building the capacity of local government agencies and communities for planning, implementation and evaluation of WASH service development projects as well as management of service utilization

In addition to the above objectives, the MSP in Fogera *Woreda* aimed at addressing cost and technological problems; the unit cost must be lowered substantially through introduction of low-cost technologies that communities can afford<sup>26</sup>.

In both cases, MSP initiators and regional government agencies were the key actors who identified and set the objectives. While local governments and communities were primary implementing partners of the MSPs, they had little or no role in defining the overall objectives of the MSPs. Nonetheless, they had full right to object if the objectives do not fit to their needs and interests. According to regional and local

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Team Leader, Management Advisory Team for RWSEP-CDF (22/02/10); Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10).

<sup>23</sup> Mass-based associations such as Teachers', Youth and Women's Associations.

<sup>24</sup> Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (12/02/10).

<sup>25</sup> Community members should get organized and establish WATSANCOs, which is responsible for preparing and submitting official requests to *woreda* level MSPs.

<sup>26</sup> The Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Region Three Program Document (1994-1998).

officials, however, the MSPs were successful in defining objectives that reflected the needs and interests of the local governments and communities. Moreover, local officials were effectively brought on board through extensive communications and discussions with regional agencies and MSP initiators in the processes of project preparation. This was identified as an important process for local governments to understand and share the defined objectives.

### 4.1.3. MSP Actors

There is no basic difference between the two MSPs in terms of the composition of actors (see Figures 4.1. and 4.2). Both MSPs involved multiple actors representing multiple sectors (public, private and community actors) at different (regional, local and community) levels. Specific motives, capacity and nature of contributions to the MSP varied across actors operating at different levels. Different members of the MSP contributed one or more types of resources according to their abilities, such as finance, skilled personnel, labor, locally available materials, best practice, etc. Nonetheless, the nature of contribution and degree of involvement of each category of actor in the two MSPs was not the same. The specific roles and contributions of each category of actor in each MSP case study are discussed here below.

#### 4.1.3.1. Actors of the Achefer MSP (Case 1)

##### *Public sector actors*

Public sector actors participated in the MSP representing different levels of government (regional, *woreda* and *kebele*). Regional level public sector actors include Finance and Economic Development, Health, and Water Resource Development Bureaus. Under the coordination of Bureau of Finance and economic development (BoFED)<sup>27</sup>, these Bureaus played important roles in the processes of project appraisal and approval. They also provided technical and policy inputs that fall within the jurisdictions of the respective bureaus. The Health Bureau for example, appraised sanitation and hygiene components while the Water Resources Development Bureau appraised safe drinking water components of the WASH project. Each bureau carefully appraised the MSP project to ensure that its components fall within the sector's priority and strategy and meet national/regional standards. Though these roles seem to be general and infrequent, they constituted the core elements of the MSP as nothing would be operationalized at the local level without navigating through these processes<sup>28</sup>. Monitoring and evaluation was the other important role of regional bureaus. Monitoring and evaluation teams, whose members were drawn from participating bureaus, conducted mid-term and terminal evaluations of the WASH project<sup>29</sup>.

Local government MSP actors include the *Woreda* Administration and sector agencies. The *Woreda* Administration participated in the MSP since it is responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of socio-economic activities in the *woreda*. Water Resources Development and Health Offices are directly responsible for water, sanitation and hygiene services in the *woreda* and hence, they constituted core public sector actors of the local level MSP. They played important roles during the design, planning and implementation of the WASH project. The Health Office provided technical support and capacity building training to Water and Sanitation Committees (WATSANCOs)<sup>30</sup>, Village Hygiene

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<sup>27</sup> BoFED is a focal Bureau responsible for the coordination of donor and NGO development cooperation to which donors and/or NGOs submit their projects. BoFED distributes project proposals to relevant sector bureaus to review and appraise a component(s) that has/have to do with their functional jurisdictions.

<sup>28</sup> According to the MSP initiator –ORDA, these processes ensured coordinated and harmonized service development and delivery. However, regional bureaus sometimes considered secondary their responsibilities in the MSP and hence; caused delay in decision making and implementation activities.

<sup>29</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (09/11/09).

<sup>30</sup> WATSANCOs consisted of members elected by community members from among themselves. To be elected as member of the WATSANCO, a community member among others should be: well recognized and accepted by the community, beneficiary of the project and willing to work on voluntary basis.

Communicators (VHCs)<sup>31</sup> and Community Health Promoters (CHPs)<sup>32</sup> in relation to the sanitation and hygiene component of the project. It also assigned health extension workers to work together with WATSANCOs, VHCs and CHPs in promoting hygiene and sanitation among community members through health education and home-to-home visits. The Water Resources Development Office participated in assessment of ground water sources, site identification and in planning and construction of hand-dug wells and springs. It also participated in the trainings of WATSANCOs, water artisans and water caretakers<sup>33</sup>. Moreover, it provided technical assistance to WATSANCOs when major maintenance and/or replacement of water pumps were required<sup>34</sup>.

The Education and Agriculture and Rural Development Offices were collaborative local government actors aimed at complementing the efforts of the MSP in general and the efforts of core local government actors in particular. The Education Office facilitated active participation of schools in the provision of health education to students and establishment of sanitation and hygiene demonstration sites from where students could learn and apply to their villages and homes. Likewise, the Agriculture and Rural Development Office facilitated integrated environmental management through Development Agents (DAs). DAs promoted water shade management and afforestation activities among the local people so as to improve the groundwater level for sustainable water services<sup>35</sup>. The Office of Finance and Economic Development was not engaged in operational matters, but took responsibility for following up project implementations and resource utilization through periodic reports submitted to it by the project office<sup>36</sup>.

*Kebele* administrations are the grassroots level public sector actors, which served as a bridge between communities and the local government in ensuring active community participation and fair distribution of services in their jurisdictions<sup>37</sup>. The specific and most important roles of the *kebele* administrations include preliminary assessment and endorsement of communities' requests for project support, public mobilization for resource (labor and material) contributions, facilitation of site selection, organization and facilitation of *kebele* wide participatory discussion forums, and administration and control of conflicts (arising due to differences between community members in using locally available materials and land)<sup>38</sup>.

#### *Civil society actors*

ORDA and WaterAid Ethiopia (WAE) were the two civil society actors to which the establishment and functioning of the MSP in Achefer was greatly attributed. ORDA is a local NGO operating in ANRS. It is engaged in multi-sector development efforts, aimed at mitigating chronic poverty in the region. ORDA has been working in partnership with many local, regional and international (public, private, civil society, and community) actors that have similar interests in mitigating poverty through joint interventions in one or more sectors. Production and delivery of safe drinking water is one of ORDA's key intervention

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<sup>31</sup> VHCs are elected and trained community members who educate and promote sanitation and hygiene in their villages.

<sup>32</sup> CHPs are high school graduates recruited and paid by ORDA to promote hygiene through home-to-home visits and discussions with community members.

<sup>33</sup> Water care takers are elected and trained community members who are responsible for operation and maintenance

<sup>34</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid project office (11/11/09).

<sup>35</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); Focus Group Discussion, Achefer (11/11/09).

<sup>36</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid project office (11/11/09).

<sup>37</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); *Kebele* Administration Representative, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09); Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid project office (11/11/09).

<sup>38</sup> *Kebele* Administration Representative, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid project office (11/11/09).

areas<sup>39</sup>. The Achefer *Woreda* MSP was the result of such interests and efforts of ORDA in which it was engaged in the whole MSP (from initiation to implementation)<sup>40</sup>. It is not an exaggeration to state that ORDA was the principal actor of the MSP, which played multiple and key roles through a project office established at the *woreda* level. There was no activity of the MSP that did not involve ORDA. .

WaterAid is a British based international NGO dedicated exclusively to the provision of safe domestic water, sanitation and hygiene education to the world's poorest people. Though WaterAid was not directly involved in the project implementation, its objective and role in the MSP was not limited to funding. WaterAid works hard to find new systems that fit to the local context. The Achefer *Woreda* MSP in itself was experimental, driven by a desire to integrate water with sanitation and hygiene (WaterAid, 2008). WaterAid has a keen interest and played a key role in the design and implementation of an integrated WASH project in Achefer *Woreda*. It also facilitated the introduction of new ideas and practices from its international best practices. The use of different colours of flags to encourage latrine construction was for example an idea borrowed from WaterAid Bangladesh (WaterAid, 2008). One of the success stories of the Achefer *Woreda* MSP is the integration between water, sanitation and hygiene, which paved a new departure for ORDA

#### *Private sector actors*

The participation and the role of the private sector in the MSP were limited to the involvement of small scale private entrepreneurs in the construction of water points. ORDA-WAE project office and Water Resources Development Office recruited water artisans from among local community members based on the criteria of having acquired some practical experience in construction activities and willingness to work with the rural communities. ORDA, in collaboration with Water Resources Development Office, provided training to selected individuals in construction activities to enable them independently undertake construction of hand-dug well and spring development.

#### *Communities*

One of the most important distinguishing features of the Achefer *Woreda* MSP is its community centeredness. Communities participated directly and actively in need assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of WASH services development activities. Though communities had little practice in and awareness of WASH, it did not take much time to bring the local people on board due to consistent awareness creation and demonstration efforts. Community members understood the significance of WASH service in their lives and this transformed delivery of the services from supply to demand driven approach. Through the WATSANCOs, community members played multiple roles in WASH services development and delivery that include: assisting experts in site selection for water point construction; contributing labor, locally available materials and cash; and managing water utilization and maintenance activities.

#### **4.1.3.2. Actors of the Fogera MSP (Case 2)**

##### *Public sector actors*

Though RWSEP was basically a regional program, it involved federal/central level government actors (see Annex 5).

The then Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (now Ministry Finance and Economic Development) is a central government actor that signed, on behalf of the Ethiopian Government, the bilateral development cooperation agreement for RWSEP. It was not involved in operational activities, but sought periodic reports as per the agreement<sup>41</sup>. The RWSEP was also designed and implemented in the context of national policies formulated and supervised by the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR).

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<sup>39</sup> Deputy Director, ORDA (13/11/09).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Program Document: Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Amhara Region, Phase IV (March 2007).

At the regional level, a number of government actors including the Regional State participated in the MSP. The ANRS, through BoFED, provided the linkage between the federal/central and regional governments. Moreover, the Regional Government played key roles in providing policies and strategies that created the general enabling environment for the development and implementation of the program in the region<sup>42</sup>. The RWSEP Board was the highest decision making body responsible for approval of the annual work plans and budgets; approval of the annual reports; monitoring and supervision of the progress and performance; determining the strategic outlines and operating principles; and approval of changes in project scope and objectives. The PMC was responsible for supervising day-to-day operations of the program to ensure proper implementation of the Board's decisions. On top of participating in these collective decision making bodies, each bureau played other important roles. The BoFED, as regional coordinating body for donors' and NGOs' intervention played a facilitator role in the design and implementation of the RWSEP-CDF projects. The WRDB was a focal Bureau for the RWSEP-CDF projects, which assigned a permanent staff who served as a Director of the Program Facilitation Office (PFO). The program director, together with the Management Advisory Team, was responsible for the overall coordination, planning, implementation, and monitoring of the RWSEP-CDF activities in the region. Despite the lack of region specific policies and standards, the WRDB was responsible for ensuring that safe drinking water development and delivery activities of the RWSEP-CDF were carried out with a due observance of the national policies and standards. It provided technical and capacity building support for zonal and *woreda* level water sector agencies. The Bureau of Health facilitated the integration of sanitation and hygiene activities with safe drinking water development and delivery systems of the RWSEP-CDF. Promoting and incorporating mainstreamed gender issues into the RWSEP-CDF intervention areas was the primary responsibility of the Women's Affairs Bureau.

Zonal level public sector MSP actors include the Zonal Administration, the Water Resources Development Department, the Women's Affairs Department, the Finance and Economic Development Department, and the Health Department. They formed the Zonal Coordination Committee (ZCC), which was generally responsible for facilitating and supervising implementation of the RWSEP-CDF plans in the program *woredas*. The Zonal Administration provided an overall leadership to the ZCC while each zonal department was engaged in the provision of technical support to *woreda* offices.

The *Woreda* Administration, the Office of Finance and Economic Development, the Water Resources Development Office, the Women's Affairs Office, the Health Office, the Agriculture and Rural Development Office, and the Education Office represent the *woreda* level public sector actors. They participated actively in the RWSEP-CDF through the *Woreda* Coordination Committee (WCC) and *Woreda* CDF Board. The *Woreda* Administration was a principal actor of the MSP and was primarily responsible for the coordination and integration of the RWSEP-CDF projects into the government's regular activities. It was also responsible for ensuring that *woreda sector* offices provide the necessary technical supports and training to WATSANCOs and communities at large. Sector offices, on top of the collective (through the WCC and *Woreda* CDF Board) responsibilities they shoulder, they played other specific roles.

- The Office of Finance and Economic Development was, responsible for supervising community development fund transfers to and utilizations by WATSANCOs.
- The Water Resources Development Office (WRDO), the focal office at *woreda* level for RWSEP-CDF projects, was responsible for the facilitation and coordination of community project implementation. WRDO assisted communities in preparing proposals, assessing ground water sources, identifying water point sites, and in planning and construction of hand-dug wells and development of springs. It also provided trainings to WATSANCOs, user groups, water artisans, and pump attendants/water caretakers<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Amhara Region, Phase III Program Document (January 2003-December 2006).

<sup>43</sup> Pump attendants/water care takers are elected and trained community members who are responsible for operation and maintenance.

- The Education Office (EO) has most rich in-house experience with information education and communication (IEC) strategies and implementation. The Office played important role of sharing such experiences and strategies to members with the objective of adopting the strategy for awareness creation among the local people about sanitation and hygiene issues. It also facilitated the establishment of school environment and sanitation clubs (SESCs), which played important role in the *Kebele* Coordinating Committee (KCC).
- The Health Office provided technical support and training to WATSANCOs on how to promote sanitation and hygiene at household and personal levels. The deployment of health extension workers (HEWs) who closely worked with WATSANCOs and communities at large was another important contribution of the Health Office.
- The Agriculture and Rural Development Office (ARDO) facilitated integration of environmental management into the WASH projects at community level. Development Agents (DAs) of the ARDO actively participated in the KCC for RWSEP-CDF. DAs served as *kebele* program coordinator (KPC) of the RWSEP-CDF. In this capacity, DAs promoted the CDF approach among local communities and assisted them in initiating and preparing project proposals, record keeping, and preparing reports.

Previous discussions showed that regional, zonal and *woreda* government agencies were important actors of the MSP, which contributed different inputs. Yet in spite of the valuable technical and administrative supports public agencies provided, none of them considered MSP activities as important as sectoral and state functions. Most of them considered their responsibilities in the MSP secondary.

*Kebele* administrations were important public sector actors, which served as a bridge between the community and the local government. Through the KCC, *kebele* administrations facilitated and coordinated RWSEP-CDF activities. In fact, community project proposals and requests for funding from RWSEP-CDF would be accepted by the *Woreda* CDF Board for review only if it had been endorsed by the respective *kebele* administration. Promoting and ensuring active participation of community members, enforcing default of community members' contributions, facilitating site selection for water point construction, organizing *kebele* wide participatory discussion forum, and administration and control of conflicts (arising due to difference between community members in using locally available materials and land) were among the most important roles of *kebele* administrations<sup>44</sup>.

### ***International actors***

RWSEP is a regional program supported by FINNDA (financial and technical inputs)<sup>45</sup>. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland and the Embassy of Finland in Addis Ababa were directly involved in the affairs of RWSEP. The MFA was the highest competent body on the part of the Government of Finland that signed the bilateral development cooperation to which periodic reports had been submitted. Both the MFA and the Embassy of Finland were members of the RWSEP Board. They participated in major decisions such as approval of annual budgets and work plans; approval of periodic reports; monitoring and evaluation of project progress and performance; and determining the strategic outlines and operating principles of the program.

Moreover, FINNDA assigned a Management Advisory Team (MAT) at the Project Facilitation Office (PFO) in Bahir Dar. The primary functions of the PFO include provision of technical advisory and capacity building services to regional, zonal and *woreda* level public sector actors so as to enable them plan and monitor RWSEP-CDF projects. Through regional and zonal advisors, the PFO was also engaged in monitoring the implementation of CDF projects. Zonal advisors assisted *woreda* public sector actors in organizing and training WATSANCOs and user groups in different activities such as selection of sites for water point development, surveying, preparation of construction contracts, and procurement of

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<sup>44</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10); CDF Supervisor, Fogera *Woreda* (12/02/10).

<sup>45</sup> The Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Region Three Program Document (1994-1998).



construction materials. They also assisted *woreda* public sector actors in undertaking supervision and control of water point construction qualities<sup>46</sup>.

### *Private sector actors*

The RWSEP-CDF approach focused on the involvement of small-scale entrepreneurs (water artisans) and local traders so as to ensure sustainable implementation and management of water facilities<sup>47</sup>. Water artisans who were willing to serve as private contractors in water point construction were recruited by the WCC. In the case study *Woreda* (Fogera), there were 54 local artisans, of whom 10 were women, who had been trained in water point construction activities. They negotiated and signed contracts with WATSANCOs to construct and maintain water points. Moreover, the program encouraged small-scale local traders to be engaged in the supply of construction materials from which WATSANCOs directly procured. Traders were provided with information about the type and quality of materials, equipments and spare parts required for the construction and maintenance of water points<sup>48</sup>. All these created new market opportunities and increased the participation of the local private sector in the water sector development<sup>49</sup>.

### *Microfinance Institution*

The introduction of the RWSEP-CDF approach and the design and implementation of direct fund transfers from BoFED to communities represent the biggest transformation of the program towards building communities' capacity for sustainable development. This was possible due to the Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI). Most of the rural communities do not have access to modern banking services and hence direct transfer of funds to communities is not easy<sup>50</sup>. ACSI, which aims at reaching remotely located rural vulnerable communities, has established branches and sub-branches covering 2,940 *kebeles* in the Region. ACSI provides several services that include credit, saving, fund management, and money transfer<sup>51</sup>. This was the fundamental reason for involving ACSI in the MSP<sup>52</sup>. ACSI was mainly responsible for channelling CDF funds to communities through its enhanced branch and sub-branch networks. Funds were transferred and deposited into each WATSANCO's non-interest bearing saving account upon the instruction of the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development at the regional level and the CDF Board at *woreda* level. WATSANCOs withdrew or transferred funds from their accounts up on authorization by the *Woreda* CDF Board. ACSI had to prepare and submit consolidated periodic financial transaction reports to BoFED<sup>53</sup>.

### *Communities*

The MSP for RWSEP-CDF was guided by the major principle of promoting and supporting demand-driven and community-centered WASH service development. Support was mainly dictated by communities' demand and capacity building was directed towards enabling communities to manage their own services. Hence, the rural communities were in fact the main actors of the MSP. *Kebele* Coordinating Committees played key roles in promoting and creating awareness about RWSEP-CDF mechanisms. Based on such promotion and awareness creation activities, communities had to organize themselves and establish WATSANCOs so as to benefit from the RWSEP-CDF support. Under the

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<sup>46</sup> RWSEP (2009) 'Kemahibereseb Limat Fund Gar Beteyayaze Yeteleyayou Tesatafi Akalat Tegbar ena Halafinet: Yewooreda Mahibereseb Limat Fund Board Abalat Siltena' (Title in Amharic).

<sup>47</sup> Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (12/02/10).

<sup>48</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10); CDF Supervisor, Fogera *Woreda* (12/02/10).

<sup>49</sup> Program Document: Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Amhara Region, Phase IV (March 2007)

<sup>50</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10).

<sup>51</sup> Power point presentation by Mekonnen W. (presented by his representative), 'ACSI's Role in CDF', at the CDF Summit (9-10 February 2010, Bahir Dar).

<sup>52</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10).

<sup>53</sup> Power point presentation by Mekonnen W. (presented by his representative), 'ACSI's Role in CDF Implementation', at the CDF Summit (9-10 February 2010, Bahir Dar).

leadership of WATSANCOs, community members played several roles which include: initiating and preparing WASH project proposals; negotiating and signing contractual agreements with water artisans to undertake construction activities; procuring and transporting construction materials, equipment and water pumps; mobilizing resources (labor, local materials and cash); and managing water utilization and maintenance activities aimed at ensuring sustainable service delivery.

No	Kebeles	Schemes	TOTAL H.H IN THE KEBELES	Beneficiaries OF H.H	%	At Starting of Birr Know they have
1	Awala Backa	4 SPD	900	421	46.7%	4350.00
2	Konecra	2 SPD 2 HDW	918	300	32.7%	1460.00
3	Kurbha	3 SPD 2 HDW	1010	460	46%	1580.00
4	Dilamo	2 SPD 1 HDW	720	180	25.2%	1750.00
5	Ambeshen	1 SPD 4 HDW	1030	430	41.8%	1650.00
6	Lihudie	4 HDW	1054	325	30.8%	810.00
7	Gersistane	1 HDW	885	25	2.8%	300.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>37.26%</b>	<b>12,200.00</b>

**Water Fee Collection And Contribution Birr & Labour**

- SPD - 200 Birr per month for collection time monthly 6 month yearly = our target water 717 H.H X 5 = 35,844
- HDW - 200-1600 Birr at the Beginning of Construction Contribution
- SPD - 500-1600 Birr at the Beginning of Construction Contribution = We achieved 1000 2652 H.H X 5 = 37,26%
- HDW - Average 2.8% Total Contribution in labour materials and Birr
- SPD - Average 32.5% Total Contribution in labour materials and Birr

**WATER AID PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY FORM (PASF)**

Project No: 6053  
 Title: Water Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion in Ethiopia  
 Country: Ethiopia  
 Location: Acheff woreda  
 Program type: WSSHP urban

**Short Description**

**OBJECTIVES**

- Increase access to sustainable water supply, sanitation and hygiene services by alleviating the above constraints.
- Improving the local capacity of an organization in the sector which directly improves the health status and living standard of the target community.

Figure 4.3. Project documentation [pictures taken by Mina Noor]

## 4.2. Throughput: governance

Previous sections have shown that both MSPs involve multiple structures established to facilitate decision making and implementation of WASH projects. In both MSPs, there were two types of relationships: vertical and horizontal. Each level of MSPs operated in close contact with higher and/or lower levels of the MSPs to integrate planning, implementation and monitoring activities. Such interactions and integrations were facilitated through the vertical channels of communication. In the course of planning, implementation and evaluation activities, the vertical communication facilitated requests and reports of the lower level to the next higher level; and provision of feedback to the former by the latter. This reinforced process accountability as the lower level had to report to the higher level of the MSP how decisions were made, and the degree of achievements against stated objectives of the project. The vertical channel of communication also played a key role in facilitating the legitimacy of the MSPs at local and community levels since the relationships and communication showed the MSPs were operating under the supervisions of relevant higher level(s) of government authorities.

Interactions between members of each structure of MSPs were facilitated through horizontal communications, which were governed mainly by predefined rules (such as when and how agendas and minutes should be distributed to members, how decisions should be made and communicated in a situation when all members could not met, etc.) set and accepted by participants. The specific horizontal

interactions and decision making processes of the various levels of the MSP for each MSP case study are discussed below.

#### 4.2.1. Governance of the Achefer MSP (Case 1)

At each level of the MSP, actors interacted with each other on agenda setting, decision making, and information exchange. At the regional and *woreda* levels of the MSP, such activities were mostly governed by the rules of the game stated in the project agreement. Such rules were negotiated and agreed between signatory regional bureaus and ORDA/WAE. *Woreda* level MSP actors other than ORDA, however, did not directly negotiate and set each and every rule and condition. Their roles in this regard were limited to provision of inputs to the rules and terms of the project agreement<sup>54</sup>.

**Regional level MSP** - The regional level MSP was the highest decision making body of the WASH project in Achefer *Woreda*. It dealt with macro issues of the project such as project appraisal and approval, annual plan and budget approval, provision of feedbacks to periodic reports, and mid-term and terminal evaluations. In principle, any member could initiate agenda points and request the BoFED to organize a meeting. Practically however, agendas were usually set by ORDA. This was due to the fact that ORDA was regularly involved in the whole project while regional bureaus were busy in many other state activities. No matter who and how agenda issues were initiated, decisions were usually made on the basis of consensus derived from open discussions. In terms of actor accountability, regional bureaus are accountable to the regional government while ORDA is accountable to its Board of Directors<sup>55</sup>. Accountability is promoted through mandatory periodic (quarter and annual) performance reports, which are submitted to the respective supervisory agencies. All regional actors were selected on the basis of supervisory and sectoral functions in relation to the WASH project initiated by ORDA-WAE. Every member of the MSP had all the information since a copy of the project agreement, periodic reports, minutes, and any other correspondences were distributed to every member. In principle, any interested party should get such information from any one of the members. Practically however, many of them could not provide the information upon request due to poor record keeping. Nonetheless, ORDA had all the information at hand and was always willing to provide it to any interested party upon request.

**Woreda Level MSP** - It dealt with multiple project implementation agendas. The whole process was governed by the rules stated in the project agreement. Members met at least four times a year (and when need arose) during which any of the members could initiate agenda. Practically, however, agendas were mostly initiated by ORDA-WAE project office since *woreda* offices were usually busy in other state affairs. Decisions were mostly made on the basis of consensus. When differences rarely arose, more discussions were organized to the extent of field visits to project sites to see the situation on the ground and generate consensus. If consensus could not be reached, in principle, the *Woreda* Administration had the 'veto power' to decide on the matter. So far, there has been no such an extreme experience<sup>56</sup>. An expert from the Health Bureau, however, stated that not only agenda setting but also decision making processes were dominated by ORDA due to weak capacities of *woreda* sector offices to generate alternatives against those suggested by ORDA. Moreover, the expert added, ORDA had more power than the *woreda* government actors due to the strong political support it had from the regional government in general and key political leaders in particular<sup>57</sup>. Respondents from sector offices admitted the capacity problem they had and the greater influence of ORDA thereof; nonetheless, they did not accept the idea that ORDA had more political power<sup>58</sup>. The dominance of ORDA over agenda setting and decision making would undermine the use of valuable local ideas and experiences and as well as opportunities for learning-by-doing.

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<sup>54</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10).

<sup>55</sup> Director, ORDA (15/02/10).

<sup>56</sup> Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid project office (11/11/09).

<sup>57</sup> Water Quality Control Officer, Health Bureau, ANRS (16/02/10).

<sup>58</sup> Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).

The *Woreda* Administration and sector offices are accountable to the *Woreda*/local government council while the ORDA-WAE project office is accountable to ORDA's Head Office<sup>59</sup>. Actors communicated and exchanged information freely on equal terms. According to sector offices however, there was delay in exchanging important information from ORDA that hampered timely decision making. This is attributed partly to sector offices' weakness to demand information well ahead of time they need the information and partly to weak integration of the WASH project with local public sector plans. In terms of transparency of the MSP to external actors, in principle, every decision and information was accessible to all interested parties at the project office.

**Community level MSP** - WATSANCOs were the lowest MSP structures operating at community level. They were governed by rules that had been formally discussed and endorsed by all members of a community in the presence of *kebele* administration. At times, when community members failed to abide by the rules, *kebele* administrations intervened to correct such deviations. Each WATSANCO, chaired by a chairperson was authorized to set agendas. Matters that have to do with daily routines such as operation and maintenance were discussed and decided by the Committee. The Committee organized and conducted meetings on the 21<sup>st</sup> day of every month where all water users gathered together in a 'coffee ceremony' to discuss and decide on issues of contributions, water utilization, sanitation and hygiene (at home and around water points), and other community development issues. Meetings were open to all members of the community (men, women, elderly, and youth), which created opportunity to everyone to have access to information. Despite improvement, meetings were dominated by men. Women were still less assertive of their positions due to centuries old marginalization from public affairs. Members of the WATSANCO were accountable to community members who could dismiss all or any member of the committee any time they want<sup>60</sup>.

#### 4.2.2. Governance of the Fogera MSP (Case 2)

The various MSP structures established at regional (CDF Board and Project Management Committee), zonal (Zonal Coordinating Committee), *woreda* (*Woreda* Coordinating Committee and *Woreda* CDF Board), and *kebele*/community (*Kebele* Coordinating Committee and WATSANCOs) levels had defined duties and responsibilities. Interactions between members of each structure involved horizontal communication and relationships, which were governed by predefined rules set and accepted by MSP participants.

**Regional level MSP** - The RWSEP-CDF Board was the highest decision making body of the program and was responsible for key issues such as approval of the annual work plans and budgets; approval of the annual reports; and monitoring and supervision of progress and performance. The Board should meet twice a year, but could convene meetings at any time upon a request by one of the members<sup>61</sup>. Convening Board meetings however, was not an easy task as it involved different members that were busy in many other independent activities. Hence, in most of the cases, the Board convened meeting only once in a year. Annual meeting was compulsory since nothing could be done without the approval of the Board<sup>62</sup>. Agendas were usually developed by the Project Facilitation Office in consultation with Co-Chairs and other members. Members were invited in writing with annotated agenda and reference materials, no later than two weeks before a meeting was held. The Board meeting could be conducted when the two Co-Chairs (Bureau of Finance and Economic Development and Representative of the Embassy of Finland) and at least half of the remaining members were present. Issues were discussed thoroughly and decisions were usually made on consensus basis. Approved minutes would be distributed to Board members and to members of PMC and PFO. The PFO had a well established documentation and record keeping system for the whole program which interested parties could easily access. In terms of process accountability,

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<sup>59</sup> On top of periodic reports that ORDA officially submits to WAE, there was a contact person at ORDA Head Office through whom WAE followed up the whole project activities. This is

<sup>60</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>61</sup> Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Amhara Region, Phase IV.

<sup>62</sup> Team Leader, Management Advisory Team for RWSEP-CDF (22/02/10).

each member of the Board was accountable to a higher level body it represented. Regional bureaus for example, remained accountable to the Regional Government of ANRS.

The Program Management Committee (PMC) was the other important structure of the MSP at the regional level, which was responsible for supervising and operationalizing decisions of the Board. Meetings of the PMC were scheduled every quarter and could be organized when a justified request was made by the RWSEP-CDF Project Director and/or Management Advisory Team Leader. Agendas and reference materials of the regular meetings were distributed to the members one week before the scheduled meeting. Any meeting of the PMC could be conducted when at least Bureau of Finance and Economic Development and the sector bureaus were represented by authorized persons. Approved minutes of the PMC were distributed to the RWSEP Board and to all members of the PMC. The PMC also made decisions without formal meetings through exchange of letters and memos. The decisions made in such a process however, were eventually signed by all members of the PMC<sup>63</sup>. In fact, such practices were very common since getting all the members together for a meeting to discuss and decide on the day-to-day operations of RWSEP were difficult<sup>64</sup>. The PMC was accountable to the RWSEP Board.

**Zonal level MSP** - The Zonal Coordinating Committee was an intermediary structure between the regional and *woreda* MSP structures, which was responsible for coordinating and supervising the RWSEP-CDF plans and activities in the program *woredas*. It was supposed to meet every month<sup>65</sup>; in most cases however, it conducted only the mandatory quarterly meetings. Agendas, distributed in advance of the meeting, had to be prepared by the zonal program coordinator in consultation with the chair of the Committee and other members. Decisions were basically made on the basis of consensus<sup>66</sup>. The ZCC was accountable to the RWSEP Board while individual ZCC members were accountable to the zonal administration.

**Woreda level MSP** - The two important MSP structures at the *woreda* level include the Woreda Coordinating Committee (WCC) and the *Woreda* CDF Board. The WCC was responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of the RWSEP-CDF programs in the *Woreda*. Under the leadership of the Chief *Woreda* Administrator, the WCC conducted monthly and additional need-based meetings. Agendas were usually initiated and prepared by the *Woreda* RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator (WPC) in consultation with the chair and other members. Agendas of a meeting were distributed in advance of the meeting date and decisions were made on the basis of consensus<sup>67</sup>. The *Woreda* Administration and sector offices were accountable to the *Woreda*/local government council while the WPC was accountable to Water Resources Development Office. The *Woreda* CDF Board was responsible for the day-to-day execution of RWSEP-CDF activities in the *Woreda* and hence, it had to meet anytime when need arose<sup>68</sup>. Meetings were usually organized by the secretary of the Board in consultation with the chair and other members. If members could not meet, decisions were solicited via letters memos and telephone. Members had to agree and endorse the decision before any action was taken for implementation<sup>69</sup>. The Board was accountable to the WCC as were individual members. The CDF supervisor/secretary of the Board was accountable to the Board.

**Community level MPS** - *Kebele* Coordinating Committee and WATSANCOs were the lowest MSP structures of the RWSEP-CDF. Under the leadership of the chief *kebele* administrator, the KCC was responsible for co-coordinating community level planning and implementations of the RWSEP-CDF projects. The *kebele* administration was responsible for enforcing compliance. Community members

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<sup>63</sup> Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program in Amhara Region, Phase IV.

<sup>64</sup> Team Leader, Management Advisory Team for RWSEP-CDF (22/02/10); Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10).

<sup>65</sup> RWSEP (2009) 'Kemahibereseb Limat Fund Gar Beteyayaze Yeteleyayou Tesatafi Akalat Tegbar ena Halafinet: Yeworeda Mahibereseb Limat Fund Board Abalat Siltena' (Title in Amharic).

<sup>66</sup> Zonal RWSEP-CDF Advisor, South Gondar (18/02/10).

<sup>67</sup> Chief Administrator, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10).

<sup>68</sup> CDF Supervisor, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

however, were of the opinion that *kebeles* are not strong enough in carrying out such roles and responsibilities effectively<sup>70</sup>. All other stakeholders including regional and *woreda* government officials confirmed the weak capacity of *kebele* administrations. The *Kebele* Coordinating Committee conducted meetings whenever there was an agenda for discussion. Like other MSP structures, KCC decisions were made on the principle of consensus<sup>71</sup>.

WATSANCOs were established by community/beneficiary groups to promote their interests and coordinate their efforts to benefit from the RWSEP-CDF. Each WATSANCO had chairperson (usually a woman) and secretary elected from among themselves. The WATSANCO was responsible not only for the planning, implementation and monitoring of the WASH projects, but also for the management of actual service delivery. WATSANCOs conducted meetings whenever deemed necessary. Agendas were prepared by the chairperson and secretary of each WATSANCO. Community-wide meetings were organized by the WATSANCO to solicit community members' views on strategic decisions such as determining the rate of community contribution. WATSANCO members were accountable to community members and were subject to dismissal anytime if community members were dissatisfied with their performance<sup>72</sup>.

### 4.3. Output: Achievements and Impacts

Improving access to safe drinking water at community and household levels; raising awareness and promoting sanitation and hygiene practices among communities through an integrated approach; building the capacity of local institutions and communities for planning, implementation and evaluation of service development and delivery activities were among the most important objectives of both MSPs. This section tries to capture the extent to which the two MSP case studies have achieved these objectives and as well as their impacts on policy, social and cultural changes in the WASH sector.

#### 4.3.1. Achievements and impacts of the Achefer MSP (Case 1)

##### *Performance of service delivery*

*Actual service delivery performance* - Empirical data showed that safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene services in Achefer *Woreda* indeed improved due to the MSP. In six intervention *kebeles*, 75 water points had been constructed by the MSP, which created access to water for 19,179 people. As a result, the coverage of safe drinking water supply in the intervention *kebeles* improved from 2.3 percent to 61.8 percent. This also contributed to the improvement of overall *woreda* safe drinking water coverage from 6.6 to 56 percent<sup>73</sup>. Due to the integrated WASH approach introduced by the MSP, not only safe drinking water coverage, but also sanitation and hygiene coverage substantially improved in the intervention *kebeles*. The previously negligent (0.2 percent) coverage of sanitation and hygiene in the intervention *kebeles* had reached 61.6 percent. The change was attributed to extensive and intensive awareness creations and demonstrational activities (such as construction of model traditional pit latrine and eco-san demonstrations) carried out by the MSP. Demonstrational activities, based on locally available materials, coupled with extensive and intensive education provided to community members resulted in high replication of sanitation facilities<sup>74</sup>.

Active and sustainable engagement of community members to develop and use WASH services on a sustainable basis greatly depend not only on the level of communities' awareness, but also on community

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<sup>70</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>71</sup> CDF Supervisor, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

skills. With this objective, the MSP organized and provided different WASH related trainings to members of WATSANCOs, Village Hygiene Committees, Community Health Promoters, and Water Caretakers<sup>75</sup>.

**Perceived service delivery performance** - the MSP was evaluated favorably both by its members and non-members. The MSP in Achefer *Woreda* was considered as an important benchmark for the WASH sector due to its success in integrating safe drinking water service delivery with hygiene and sanitation services. It emerged to be a learning centre where people from different organizations and corners of the country as well as outside the country were coming to visit the WASH services developed by the MSP. For example, the WASH projects have been serving as demonstration sites for students of sanitation and hygiene at Gondar University<sup>76</sup>. WaterAid also acknowledged that the Achefer MSP was a success for all actors in the WASH sector. "An integrated approach to hygiene and sanitation promotion has been the key to the successes of Achefer" (WaterAid, 2008:6). Other stakeholders expressed their perceptions as follows: the Head<sup>77</sup> of the Regional Water Resources and Development Bureau for example, stated that the MSP in Achefer introduced a new approach in which communities are at the center of the whole processes. As a result, commendable achievements had been achieved within a short period of time and with limited resources. Heads of the *Woreda* Health and Water Resources and Development Offices proudly stated that the MSP had improved access, quality, and coverage of WASH services in the *Woreda* in general and in the intervention *kebeles* in particular. The Administration and Security Head of Ambeshen Jehana *Kebele*<sup>78</sup> also stated that though the scope of intervention was limited compared to the WASH problem in the *Woreda*; access, coverage and quality of WASH services of those *kebeles* covered by the MSP/project had substantially improved.

Community members in the intervention *kebeles* stated that since the intervention of the MSP project, water service delivery had improved in terms of access, supply (quantity), quality, and coverage. According to community members, not only water service delivery but also sanitation and hygiene facilities and services had improved. The MSP introduced methods and forums through which community members learned about sanitation and hygiene issues<sup>79</sup>. Awarding households with different colors of flags for different levels of achievement was a system with which community members were fascinated and to which they attributed the remarkable change in sanitation and hygiene practice.<sup>80</sup>

Non-MSP members that were engaged in similar service delivery in the *woreda* shared the above viewpoints. An NGO interviewee for example, stated that the Achefer MSP in WASH was really a model in terms of providing demand driven and community centered services<sup>81</sup>. A UNICEF interviewee also stated that the MSP in Achefer was one of the successful projects in WASH in the Amhara Region<sup>82</sup>.

### ***MSP and policy, social and cultural changes***

The impact of the MSP can also be assessed in terms of its impacts/influences on policy, the integration of services, community participation, gender equality, and social and cultural changes in the context of WASH service development.

**Policy** - The MSP did not have any influence on policy matters in the WASH sector. Neither state nor non-state actors focused on the policy role of the MSP. In fact, regional and *woreda* level public sector MSP actors stated that policy issues are the prerogatives of the Federal Government. ORDA and WAE instead

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<sup>75</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09).

<sup>76</sup> Manager, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); WaterAid Focal Person, ORDA-WaterAid WASH Project (05/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid WASH project office (11/11/09); *Kebele* Administration Representative, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09); Deputy Director, ORDA (20/11/09).

<sup>77</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (09/11/09).

<sup>78</sup> *Kebele* Administration Representative, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>79</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Head, Afro Ethiopia Integrated Development (12/11/09).

<sup>82</sup> Regional Coordinator, UNICEF (13/11/09 & 22/02/10).

focused on promoting best practices rather than advocating policy. ORDA's major conviction in this regard was that best practices are more powerful to convince government officials than advocacy. No matter how long it may take, ORDA was confident that its best practices would defiantly influence policy making<sup>83</sup>. Though the MSP had no impact on official policy (yet), it had been increasingly influencing the basic understandings of regional and *woreda* level decision makers towards WASH service delivery. Decision makers were more and more convinced that the traditional supply driven approach does not work and that there is a strong need for replicating the MSP's experience of promoting demand driven and community centered WASH service delivery<sup>84</sup>. The *Woreda* Health Office had already introduced similar approaches in non-project intervention *kebeles*<sup>85</sup>. The positive influence of the MSP at local level had transcended government bodies; neighborhood communities had already started organizing and mobilizing resources for WASH service deliveries<sup>86</sup>.

**Integration of services** - The MSP had significant influence on integration of services. Regional and local decision makers had realized the need for an integrated WASH service delivery that calls up on joint planning and cooperation between agencies engaged in health and safe drinking water service development and provision. The Head<sup>87</sup> of Water Resources Development Bureau stated that the Achefer experience clearly demonstrated the need for integrated water, sanitation and hygiene service delivery. He added that though traditional technocratic and mono-centric service production and delivery is still widely prevalent, Health and Water Resources Development Bureaus had started discussing and working closely to integrate water, sanitation and hygiene service deliveries. The influence of the MSP on the need for an integrated WASH service delivery was very much vivid at *woreda* level. As discussed above, Health and Water Resources Development Offices in Achefer *Woreda* had adopted the MSP's approach<sup>88</sup>. They promoted and provided integrated WASH services in *kebeles* that were not covered by the MSP/ORDA-WAE project (WaterAid, 2008). The MSP had also influenced some donor financed programs. For example, the World Bank WASH program in Achefer *Woreda* had been introduced on the basis of ORDA-WAE's project approach in the *Woreda*<sup>89</sup>.

**Community participation** - There was ample evidence from multiple sources about the changing nature of community participation in the case study *woreda*, which were primarily attributed to the MSP. Demand driven and community centered approaches to WASH service delivery had indeed improved the community's interest and commitment to participation<sup>90</sup>. *Woreda* sector heads and experts stated that the MSP did not only improve community participation, but also transformed the idea and practice of supply driven and traditional technocratic led service delivery to demand driven and community led approaches. Government offices had learned that community members could make big differences in their own service development provided that they are given enough space to actively participate and influence decision making processes. Community members also witnessed the impact of the MSP on their involvement in the local development processes. They stated that *woreda* government offices had shown increasing interest in involving the local people in development planning and decision making processes. This could be attributed, community members explained, to lessons learned from the successful experiences of ORDA<sup>91</sup>. The MSP however, equally demonstrated that, to ensure sustainable service

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<sup>83</sup> Director, ORDA (15/02/10).

<sup>84</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (09/11/09); Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda*. (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).

<sup>85</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).

<sup>86</sup> Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).

<sup>87</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (09/11/09).

<sup>88</sup> Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid WASH project office (11/11/09).

<sup>89</sup> The Regional WASH Program Coordinator for ANRS argues that the integrated WASH implementation approach was introduced by the World Bank not by ORDA. Other persons interviewed for this study however, did not agree with his view.

<sup>90</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (09/11/09).

<sup>91</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).



delivery through community management and maintenance systems, communities need rigorous technical capacity building<sup>92</sup>.

**Cultural and social changes** - Improvement in WASH service utilizations does not merely depend on the availability of facilities; it requires cultural and behavioral changes among users. There is a widespread assumption that such changes usually cannot be brought about in short period of time. The MSP in Achefer however, broke this myth through significant cultural and behavioral changes among the local people in less than three years. If interventions are planned and implemented together with the local people, changes can be brought about within a short period of time (WaterAid, 2008).

Through the MSP, the local people were provided with extensive and intensive training and education on different sanitation and hygiene practices. Such activities contributed a lot to cultural and social changes among community members. For example, open defecation was quite normal and acceptable among the local people. The training and education provided by the MSP convinced the local people that open defecation is a public shame. Accordingly, open defecation has now been considered a taboo<sup>93</sup>. Morning face washing and hand washing after defecation was a new practice introduced by the MSP. People were taught how to make face and hand washing facilities from locally available materials, which made it easy to practice. Now, face and hand washing is a standard and common practice not only in the intervention *kebeles* but also in all neighboring *kebeles* in the *Woreda*<sup>94</sup>.

Another important impact of the MSP on cultural and social change is the issue of gender equality. The position of women in the society was characterized by patriarchal relations. Women, particularly married women, rarely appeared in public since it was considered as an act of cultural deviation. Breaking such a cultural barrier was one of the most important objectives of the MSP in Achefer *Woreda*. ORDA believes that gender equality is an important component of sustainable development. Thus, promotion of gender equality occupies a central place in every development project<sup>95</sup>. For communities to benefit from the Achefer WASH project, involvement of women in every decision making processes of the WASH activities was a mandatory requirement. For example, in WATSANCO, out of five members, a minimum of two and a maximum of three of the members should be women. Women were brought on board not only in the WATSANCO but also in every community discussion. All these activities diluted the hard cultural barrier of keeping women behind the curtain. Nonetheless, women are not yet assertive enough.

#### **4.3.2. Achievements and Impacts of the Fogera MSP (Case 2)**

##### ***Performance of service delivery***

**Actual service delivery performance** - Data from Fogera *Woreda* showed that WASH services significantly improved due to the MSP. The *Woreda*, as of February 2010, had produced a total of 427 water points of which 382 (90%) were constructed through the MSP for RWSEP-CDF, which significantly improved access to safe drinking water to the local community. Every hand dug well constructed and every spring developed was designed to serve on average a population of 350 and 400 people respectively<sup>96</sup>. On the basis of this premises, the RWSEP-CDF MSP created access to water for 134,082 people in the *Woreda*. As a result, access coverage of the *Woreda* to safe drinking water service improved from about five percent (before the intervention of the MSP) to 69.9 percent<sup>97</sup>.

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<sup>92</sup> Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Process Owner, Safe Drinking Water Service Delivery, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).

<sup>93</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09); Social Worker, ORDA-WaterAid WASH project office (11/11/09).

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Director, ORDA (15/02/10).

<sup>96</sup> Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (12/02/10); RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>97</sup> Power point presentation by Balemual A. 'Practical CDF Implementation Experience in Fogera *Woreda*' presented at the CDF Summit (9-10 February 2010, Bahir Dar).

The MSP also provided community members with sanitation and hygiene education together with practical demonstrations (using institutional latrines<sup>98</sup> as models) on how to construct traditional pit latrines (TPL). As a result; there was a big change among the rural households in terms of having latrines. In 2010, out of the total 45,562 rural households, 25,594 (56 percent) of the households had constructed TPL that accounts for 64.8 percent of the population<sup>99</sup>. An informant however, pointed out that despite RWSEP being a pioneer in introducing and promoting sanitation and hygiene packages in the *Woreda*, the level of achievement stated above cannot be totally attributed to it<sup>100</sup>. He added that high priority given to sanitation and hygiene among policy makers and implementers was an important factor in improving sanitation and hygiene among the rural population through various programs<sup>101</sup>. In spite of his appreciation to the RWSEP-CDF in bringing actors together, an environmental health expert was critical of the MSP's emphasis on sanitation and hygiene. He stated that the program was very much pre-occupied with the development of safe drinking water instead of paying equal emphasis to sanitation and hygiene. Moreover, the expert added, sanitation and hygiene activities were less integrated with safe drinking water development and provision activities, which left the job half done<sup>102</sup>. Other informants had similar concerns<sup>103</sup>. In spite of differences between water points depending on the strength of the WATSANCOs, the authors of this research learned from the field visits that sanitation and hygiene were neither well practiced nor were considered by WATSANCOs as important agendas. Hence, practically, the program had indeed little impact on improving the situation in this regard.

Capacity building was an important component of RWSEP-CDF as well. Members of the WCC, *Woreda* CDF Board, KCC and WATSANCO; and *woreda* sector experts were provided with different types of training that among others include promotion and management of CDF, project management, and procurement and contract management. Operation and maintenance trainings were provided to pump attendants and water care takers<sup>104</sup>. Gender awareness and sensitization was an important component of every training program aimed at promoting gender equality<sup>105</sup>. In addition to training, the program provided other capacity building supports such as preparing CDF manuals, organizing experience sharing forum among WATSANCOs and community members, provision of hygiene and sanitation education materials, and provision of vehicles for *woreda* sector offices. *Woreda* offices, for example, received four motor bikes and one field car<sup>106</sup>.

***Perceived service delivery performance*** -The high performance and achievements of RWSEP-CDF had been well perceived and acknowledged by government officials (including high-ranking officials such as the Minister of the Ministry of Water Resources and the President of the ANRS) and by wide arrays of actors (MSP members and non-MSP members). It was underlined that the RWSEP-CDF had contributed a lot not only to the improvements of WASH coverage in the case study *Woreda*, but also to the regional WASH coverage<sup>107</sup>. The success had been attributed to its great efforts of introducing low-cost technologies and community-centered approaches where community members took full responsibility for financial administration, procurement and overall project management<sup>108</sup>.

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<sup>98</sup> The RWSEP-CDF Program provided financial support for latrine construction at schools and health institutions, which served double purpose: serving as model latrine construction while promoting sanitation and hygiene at schools and health institutions.

<sup>99</sup> Head, Health Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10).

<sup>100</sup> Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (12/02/10).

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> Environmental Health Officer, Health Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10).

<sup>103</sup> Training and Project Preparation Expert, Women's Affairs Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10); Director, ORDA (15/02/10).

<sup>104</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>105</sup> Training and Project Preparation Expert, Women's Affairs Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10).

<sup>106</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>107</sup> Welcoming speech by the Head of BWRD the CDF Summit (09-10/02/10, Bahir Dar).

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

“Through capacity building [RWSEP-] CDF transformed community potential into community power, making it ready for use in scalable and sustainable development programs nationwide and beyond.”<sup>109</sup>

Local government officials and experts also applauded the performance of the RWSEP-CDF. The Chief *Woreda* Administrator of Fogera *Woreda* stated that the performance of RWSEP-CDF is a historical record that improved coverage of access to safe drinking water from about five percent to 69.9 percent.

Community members stated that the RWSEP-CDF had occupied a central place in their life not only in terms of its contribution to improve access to safe drinking water, but also the educational and awareness creation roles it played. Community members elaborated that through the RWSEP-CDF, they were able to understand that many of the causes of their ill health were related to unsafe drinking water<sup>110</sup>. Nonetheless, community members did not hide that the supply of safe drinking water is not yet sufficient compared to the large population in their village. Community members further elaborated that the problem is not limited to insufficiency; there are villages in their neighborhoods that did not have access to safe drinking water at all<sup>111</sup>.

Non-MSP members also appreciated the RWSEP-CDF approach and recognized the remarkable performance it had achieved. Respondents<sup>112</sup> representing different organizations operating in the ANRS stated that RWSEP-CDF is known for its community centeredness, which enabled it to produce measurable results.

### ***MSP and policy, social and cultural changes***

The impacts of the RWSEP-CDF on policy, the integration of services, community’s participation, gender equality and social and cultural changes in the context of WASH services are discussed below.

***MSP and policy*** - The RWSEP-CDF has started influencing regional and even national policy issues. Both members and non-members of the MSP were convinced that the CDF approach should be adopted by government and non-government development actors not only in the WASH sector but also in other sectors where communities are at the center of the development processes. In fact, the approach had already been adopted by some development partners such as UNICEF<sup>113</sup>. Some of the regional officials suggested that the RWSEP-CDF approach should be scaled up not only in Amhara Region but also in the country at large<sup>114</sup>. The adoption of similar approach by the Benishangul Gumez National Regional State was a clear evidence of the merit of the RWSEP-CDF approach<sup>115</sup>.

***Integration of services*** - There were conflicting views about the capacity and impact of the RWSEP-CDF in promoting an integrated WASH service development and delivery. Technical advisors<sup>116</sup> of the PFO believed that enough had been done to integrate safe drinking water service delivery with sanitation and hygiene. Advisors elaborated that sanitation and hygiene issues constituted important components of WATSANCO members’ training with the objective of integrating these issues with water provision. Regional and local government respondents<sup>117</sup> stated that indeed, the program provided trainings to WATSANCOs on how to promote an integrated WASH service delivery. However, respondents argued, there were not enough mechanisms to effectively integrate sanitation and hygiene with safe drinking

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<sup>109</sup> Welcoming speech by the Head of Health Bureau at the CDF Summit (09-10/02/10, Bahir Dar).

<sup>110</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Director, ORDA (15/02/10); Representative, Sida Amhara Rural Development Program (20/02/10); Regional Coordinator, UNICEF (23/02/10).

<sup>113</sup> Regional Coordinator, UNICEF (23/02/10).

<sup>114</sup> Speech by the Deputy Head of BoFED at the CDF Summit (09-10/02/10, Bahir Dar).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Zonal RWSEP-CDF Advisor, South Gondar (18/02/10); Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (18/02/10); Regional CDF Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (18/02/10).

<sup>117</sup> Head, Bureau of Water Resources Development, ANRS (18/02/10); Environmental Health Officer, Health Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10); Water Quality Control Officer, Health Bureau, ANRS (16/02/10).

water service delivery. Community members also indicated that sanitation and hygiene have not yet been well integrated with safe drinking water services<sup>118</sup>.

**Community participation** - The RWSEP-CDF approach was considered as a pioneer in introducing and implementing highly decentralized demand-driven and community-centered development<sup>119</sup>. The program focused not only on responding to people's needs but also on empowering them<sup>120</sup>. It adopted a community-centered approach in which community members took full responsibility for initiating, planning, financial management, procurement, and all other project management activities. Such practices played key roles in creating and promoting community's ownership and sustainable use of the services<sup>121</sup>. The RWSEP-CDF approach broke the tradition of marginalizing (both by state and non-state development actors) the local people from resource allocation and fund management processes in their own development. The CDF approach had transformed the role of communities from mere beneficiaries of development programs to initiators and primary implementers of the program<sup>122</sup>. This is acknowledged by community members who stated that the RWSEP-CDF created an opportunity for them to participate in their own development in a way that is different from their previous experiences<sup>123</sup>.

**MSP and cultural and social changes** - Changes in behavior and culture towards improved sanitation and hygiene were not yet significant. In terms of environmental sanitation and hygiene, open defecation was not yet considered taboo. Moreover, many households were still sharing a living room with cattle. Generally, RWSEP-CDF had limited impact on cultural and social changes towards sanitation and hygiene due to low integration of sanitation and hygiene services with safe drinking water service. Like in many parts of the country in general and in the ANRS in particular, there are heavy cultural and social barriers for women to participate in public affairs. Gender sensitization, aimed at ensuring gender equality to make development more effective, was one of the core components of the RWSEP-CDF. The MSP had indeed influenced attitudes towards the role and place of women in society. Participation in public affairs is no longer reserved only for men. Both men and women are now participating in the management and delivery of safe drinking water service. In fact, the chairperson and secretary positions in the WATSANCOs were reserved for women to ensure greater influence of women in water decision making<sup>124</sup>. Such changes were attributed to the post-1991 political change and government's commitment to gender equality in general and to the RWSEP-CDF gender sensitization trainings offered to community members, WATSANCO members, school teachers, health extension workers, development agents, and *kebele* leaders<sup>125</sup>. To ensure effective implementation of gender sensitization towards gender equality, Women's Affairs structures (regional bureau, zonal department and *woreda* office) were principal members of the RWSEP-CDF structures at the respective levels<sup>126</sup>.

## 4.4. Conclusions

Looking back to the input side of the two MSPs, they were basically donor dependent. Non-state actors (funding agencies) took the initiatives to establish the MSPs through a top down approach. Non-state actors were on the frontline not only in terms of taking the initiatives, but also in defining MSPs' objectives and mobilizing funds. Despite the involvement of a number of state agencies representing multiple levels of government, most of them in general and local government agencies in particular were

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<sup>118</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>119</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10); Gender Mainstreaming Implementer, Women's Affairs Bureau, ANRS, (16/02/10).

<sup>120</sup> Water Quality Control Officer, Health Bureau, ANRS (16/02/10).

<sup>121</sup> Welcoming speech by the Head of BWRDat the CDF Summit (09-10/02/10, Bahir Dar).

<sup>122</sup> Environmental Health Officer, Health Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10).

<sup>123</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> Training and Project Preparation Expert, Women's Affairs Office, Fogera *Woreda* (15/02/10).

<sup>126</sup> Gender Mainstreaming Implementer, Women's Affairs Bureau, ANRS, (16/02/10).

on a receiving end in determining most of the MSPs' inputs. At the same time, state institutions proved indispensable in facilitation of communication and in coordination of MSP activities with other state functions. The processes revealed that non-state actors cannot substitute state agencies in this regard.

The governance of the MSPs was characterized by formalized structures and decision making processes in which state agencies at various levels of the MSP structures were assigned to play a leading role. Communications and decision making processes in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating of the MSPs' activities were governed by formally adopted rules. This promoted the legitimacy of the MSP structures, without which it was not possible to operate and perform. MSP structures were linked not only with individual state agencies, but also with parallel government structures that created opportunity for effective horizontal communications. This suggests that the governance of MSPs should be well integrated with government structures. Weak capacity of state agencies and the priorities they gave to individual sectoral functions over MSP functions were, however, the two critical factors that challenged the two MSPs. Thus, there is a need for striking the balance between the desirable central roles state institutions have to play in the governance of MSPs and their capacities and commitment to MSPs.

Despite difference in the degree of achievements, both MSPs generally achieved their objectives: improving access to safe drinking water at community and household levels; raising awareness and promoting sanitation and hygiene practices among communities; and building the capacity of local institutions and community members for planning, implementation and evaluation of service development and delivery. More importantly than reaching official objectives, however, was the fact that the MSPs promoted demand driven and community centered service development. This resulted in voluntary and active community participation in all processes, which in turn promoted sense of ownership and sustainable management of the utilization of WASH facilities. The MSPs did not aim at influencing formal policy making processes; the approaches they introduced and the service delivery outputs they achieved, however, had considerably influenced the attitudes and ideas of regional and national policy makers. Policy makers had been convinced of the success of the MSPs and had already started encouraging state and non-state development actors to similar approaches.

# SECTION 5

## THE IMPACTS OF THE MSPs ON THE LEGITIMACY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS

Legitimacy greatly depends on the perception and behavior of people, i.e., the way they think about certain situations and organizations and the way they react in response to them. In the context of this research, assessments distinguished between various forms of legitimacy that include: general, embedded, process, performance, and international legitimacy. There were a number of shared issues of legitimacy between the two case studies (ORDA-WAE WASH project in Achefer *Woreda* and RWSEP-CDF in Fogera *Woreda*) since the two case studies were conducted in the same Regional State, ANRS, where the structures and functioning of government agencies (from regional to grassroots levels) and the socio-political set-ups were quite similar.

### 5.1. General legitimacy

General legitimacy is a broad term, which among other things, refers to knowledge of the local people about existence, objectives and activities of the relevant government authorities; as well as the willingness of people to participate in activities and projects organized by the relevant government authorities. The term also covers the perception of local people whether specified services such as education, health, safe drinking water, hygiene and sanitation should be the responsibility of the state (government authorities); and if so, which level of government, i.e., local, sub-national or national level, should be responsible for them.

Evidence from the case studies revealed that government agencies operating at different levels were well known and recognized by the local people. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* claimed that they know and recognize not only the different government structures, but also the functions of each government agency<sup>127</sup>. In the case of Achefer *Woreda*, however, despite the recognition of the various levels of government, community members had a feeble understanding of the powers and duties of each level of government. The MSP had done little in this regard<sup>128</sup>. The Fogera MSP, however, has created several opportunities for communities to learn more about government agencies. Regional, zonal, *woreda* and *kebele* levels of government agencies came in close contact with community members in the course of planning, implementing and monitoring the RWSEP-CDF project. In such processes, representatives of each government agency had an opportunity to brief community members about the roles of that agency in the local socio-economic development in general and in the context of RWSEP-CDF in particular. Moreover, the RWSEP-CDF program documents clearly defined duties and responsibilities of each actor, which created another opportunity for the community to learn more about government agencies<sup>129</sup>.

Both in Achefer and Fogera *Woredas*, community members reported that the state is the only legitimate and capable actor to ensure peace, security and rule of law. Government in general and the local/*woreda* government in particular, were considered to be the primary actors and end-responsible for basic service delivery such as education, health, water, and road<sup>130</sup>. Community members in Achefer *Woreda* for example, stated that although NGOs contribute to service delivery improvement; primary responsibility

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<sup>127</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>128</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>129</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>130</sup> Focus Group Discussions, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09); (Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10)).

should lie with the government since NGOs stay only temporarily<sup>131</sup>. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* also stated that donors' and communities' efforts alone will not ensure universal access and sufficient supply of water. Therefore, the government should take the primary responsibility of ensuring sufficient service delivery<sup>132</sup>. All of these viewpoints clearly reflect that government agencies are considered end-responsible for ensuring fair, sufficient and quality safe drinking water services. In terms of the levels of government, community members in the two *woredas* indicated that *woreda* level of government is the most appropriate decentralized structure for local service delivery.

With regard to participation in development activities, community members in both Achefer and Fogera *Woredas* expressed their willingness and commitment to participate and contribute resources (labor, local materials and cash) to local development activities initiated by government and other actors. Getting community members on board was not a problem due to extensive awareness creation and the active involvement of the local government structures up to the grassroots level. They did, however, underline that such willingness and commitment could be realized under the situation that they are given enough decision making space in the processes of identification, prioritization and implementation of local service development. As to their willingness to pay for services directly to providers, community members in Fogera *Woreda* stated that they are willing to pay to services so long as the price is affordable and the service they receive is satisfactory. Community members stated they have been paying for services provided both by private and government providers, ever since modern health service provision started. Community members in Achefer had similar views. Community members in both *woredas* however, did not accept the idea of financing WASH services indirectly through taxes. The local people in Achefer were neither willing nor did they believe that they had the capacity to pay more taxes. Community members in Fogera were of the opinion that tax money hardly comes back to finance WASH services; so far, they did receive not such services through government budget. The community members in the case study *woredas* had no knowledge about what the government does with the tax money collected, because tax collectors rarely explained to them about the purpose of tax. This created major hesitation among community members to consider financing WASH services through indirect taxation. In fact, financing services indirectly through taxes was not well known among local authorities let alone among the rural community members<sup>133</sup>.

Generally, state institutions do not suffer from lack of knowledge and recognition by the local people. Primary responsibilities for basic public service production and delivery rest on state institutions in general and local governments in particular, in which citizens are willing to actively take part in all development activities. Community members have indeed demonstrated their willingness and commitment thorough active participations in the MSPs processes. The MSPs created opportunities for and played key roles in facilitating voluntary community participation. So the MSPs can be said to have contributed to general legitimacy of several state institutions.

## 5.2. Embedded legitimacy

Embedded legitimacy has several dimensions, which refer not only to current dynamics but also to prior state formation or other historical dynamics. Citizens' recognition of the relevant government authorities as a suitable representative of the state as well as trust in and recognition of local government councils as representing the population are important dimensions of embedded legitimacy. Citizens' perceptions of the degree of strength, independence, and adherence to rule of law by the relevant government authorities are also important components of embedded legitimacy.

As stated earlier, relevant government authorities and sector agencies were well recognized by local community members as legitimate and suitable representatives of the state. *Woreda* and *kebele* levels of

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<sup>131</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

government have councils directly elected by the local people. Though improving, the degree of trust and confidence of the local people in these councils was very low in both *woredas*. The local people stated that the two councils in general and *kebele* councils in particular have little power to influence government allocations and service delivery plans. In fact, *kebele* councils did not exercise any power of resource allocation since the *kebele* is not a budget centre<sup>134</sup>. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* stated that the MSP structures of the RWSEP-CDF had no impact on the capacity and local council-community relations since all program components were directly related to executive agencies and community members. In Achefer *Woreda* however, community members stated that the MSP for ORDA-WAE WASH Project had created a forum where the local people and *kebele* and *woreda* councilors meet to discuss about the distribution and WASH services.

*Woreda* sector offices were working in close contact with the local people and hence, community members in both *woredas* considered them as suitable representatives of the state to produce and deliver public services. In Fogera *Woreda* community members indicated that on top of capacity problems, there were some corrupt practices at the *woreda* level, which undermined the recognition of government institutions as suitable representatives of the state. Nonetheless, such practices were declining due to measures (such as demotion and fine) taken by the Regional Government with which community members were happy. They however, suggested further measures (such as dismissal from job and prosecution) to be taken so as to ensure ethical public service delivery<sup>135</sup>.

Different sources confirmed community members' views that *woreda* agencies had a weak capacity to produce and deliver services and to provide sufficient technical and administrative supports to local community members in their efforts of improving their own services. WSP-Africa for example, stated that *woreda* agencies suffered from slow planning and implementation of activities due to insufficient human resources<sup>136</sup>. Sector office respondents in both *woredas* also admitted that weak capacity was a major bottleneck to produce and deliver efficient and effective public services. The Heads<sup>137</sup> of Health and Water Resources Development Offices in Achefer *Woreda* stated that limited infrastructure (road), materials and equipment; and lack sufficient finance and trained personnel were the major constraints. The Chief *Woreda* Administrator and experts of Water Resources Development Office for Fogera *Woreda* also confirmed the existence of capacity gaps at wider scale.

The MSPs in the two case study *woredas* had different stories of improving embedded legitimacy of state agencies through capacity building. Unlike the Fogera MSP, capacity building of state agencies was not a priority area for the Achefer MSP. Hence, it had created only limited capacity building opportunities for *woreda* sector offices and hence, had limited impact on improving embedded legitimacy. The RWSEP-CDF program was highly embedded into the government structures where capacity building of participating government actors at all levels in general and at local level in particular constituted one of the core intervention areas of the program. In order to improve the dire shortage of skilled human resource, the MSP in collaboration with the *Woreda* Administration, provided a number of capacity building trainings to sector office experts. Such trainings played important roles in improving the technical and administrative capacities of sector offices to support the local people.

The provision of technical and administrative supports to the local people to help them develop acceptable WASH projects had boosted embedded legitimacy of state agencies. In the course of implementing the RWSEP-CDF program, *Woreda* CDF advisors and sector office experts were closely working with the community in identifying water sources, designing water point construction, monitoring and evaluating of construction contracts, and as well in ensuring proper operation and maintenance of water points. In such processes, community members realized and found sector offices

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<sup>134</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>135</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>136</sup> WSP-Africa (2010)

<sup>137</sup> Head, Health Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09); Head, Water Resources Development Office, Achefer *Woreda* (10/11/09).



important actors in improving local service development. Thus, the Fogera MSP had indeed, played important role in improving embedded legitimacy of state institutions by way of building their capacities and creating opportunities for them to work with local people.

Assessment of the independence of local governments revealed that in both case studies the *Woreda* Administrations and their agencies were independent entities enshrined by the Regional Constitution. Practically however, neither the *Woreda* Governments nor their agencies were independent. This was mainly attributed to poor financial resources where the *Woreda* Administrations largely depended on regional transfer.

Generally, local government councils did not suffer from lack recognition by citizens as a suitable representative of the state. Nonetheless, lack of full independence due to weak capacities of the local councils undermined citizens' trust and confidence in them and thus low embedded legitimacy.



Figure 5.1. Focus group [pictures taken by Mina Noor]

### 5.3. Process legitimacy

Process legitimacy can be derived from a process that creates space for debate and dialogue among relevant stakeholders to satisfy citizen's expectations and aspirations. The nature of interactions between relevant stakeholders and the processes that govern the interactions between stakeholders thus have an influence on legitimacy.

The MSPs in both *woredas* brought together multiple actors to discuss and decide on common agenda points to improve WASH services to the local people. The MSPs promoted coordination between state and non-state actors and between state actors in improving WASH services, which in turn improved the legitimacy of the MSP processes and in extension of the state actors involved in these processes. Previous discussions revealed that both MSPs had multiple structures operating at different levels of government.

Such structures introduced horizontal and vertical formal communication channels, different from the common bureaucratic channels, between state agencies as well as between state and non-state agencies. These channels primarily focused on soliciting voluntary participation of each member instead of creating a sense of bureaucratic compulsions. This improved cooperation and collaboration between participating actors and the legitimacy of the process<sup>138</sup>. Both MSPs involved small scale private entrepreneurs (water artisans) to participate in the WASH service development through construction of water points about which beneficiaries were happy since it opened a new domain of business opportunities. The MSP in Fogera *Woreda* involved not only water artisans, but also local traders who supplied construction materials and equipment. The hallowing out of state functions to private actors in the production of water supply also improved process legitimacy. The involvement of private actors improved the availability of construction materials and the required lead-time, which in turn improved completion of water construction and delivery time.

Coordination of multiple actors in general, and multiple state actors in particular, through an MSP was however, a demanding process. The Fogera MSP involved a large number of government actors at different levels, which demanded extra and relentless efforts to secure voluntary and active participation of these actors<sup>139</sup>. State agencies focus on sectoral responsibilities was a challenge for MSP activities. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* for example stated that despite their active participation in the RWSEP-CDF program, *woreda* sector agencies gave priority to their own regular bureaucratic activities over the MSP activities. These problems were not unique to the Fogera MSP; the Achefer MSP had similar problems. Such problems created delays in the planning and implementation of MSP projects<sup>140</sup>. Regional and *woreda* level officials<sup>141</sup> and experts<sup>142</sup> confirmed the above viewpoints and explained that sector agencies focused on sectoral activities since their performances were measured based on the degree of achievements of their regular sectoral plans, but not on how effectively and efficiently they carried out their responsibilities in the MSP. Hence, they considered their duties and responsibilities in the MSPs secondary. Such a bias undermined interest for and commitment to joint efforts for common ends, which ultimately would undermine process legitimacy<sup>143</sup>. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* however, identified a different factor that caused lack of attention among *woreda* sector offices to the MSP activities. Absence of incentive (per diem) for fieldwork that was paid in pre-CDF was a major factor for sector experts to lose interest in and commitment to the RWSEP-CDF activities<sup>144</sup>. Community members further elaborated that experts not only lost interest and commitment, but also tended to cause unnecessary delay in providing technical supports to WATSANCOs<sup>145</sup>. Respondents<sup>146</sup> from *woreda* sector agencies acknowledged the negative motivation caused by absence of per diems.

In spite of these challenges, the MSPs promoted cooperation between MSP members to address the problems of WASH in the region in general and in the case study *woredas* in particular. Hence, the MSP indeed contributed to process legitimacy. On top of coordinating the efforts and resources of different actors, the MSPs introduced collaborative governance approaches that influenced the modus operandi in decision making, which is an important element of process legitimacy. As discussed in previous sections,

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<sup>138</sup> Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (18/02/10).

<sup>139</sup> Team Leader, Management Advisory Team for RWSEP-CDF (22/02/10).

<sup>140</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>141</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10); Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (18/02/10); Chief Administrator, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10).

<sup>142</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10); CDF Supervisor, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10); Water Quality Officer, Health Bureau, ANRS (16/02/10); Gender Mainstreaming Implementer, Women's Affairs Bureau, ANRS, (16/02/10).

<sup>143</sup> Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (23/02/10); Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (12/02/10); Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (18/02/10).

<sup>144</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>145</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>146</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10); Environmental Health Officer, Health Office, Fogera *Woreda* (19/02/10); Training and Project Preparation Expert, Women's Affairs Office, Fogera *Woreda* (15/02/10).

the MSPs had formal structures at regional, *woreda*/local, *kebele*/community levels. These structures were different from existing government structures and so were the processes of decision making. Unlike bureaucratic decision making procedures adopted by government organizations, decision making in these structures were mainly characterized by dialogue and consensus. In Achefer *Woreda* for example, when differences about performance reports, resource allocation or utilization, etc., rarely arose; more discussions were conducted to the extent of organizing field visits to see the situation on the ground and generate consensus. In the case of Fogera MSP, similar procedures were followed by the *Woreda* CDF Board. This promoted cohesiveness and consensus between the various actors involved in the MSP decision making. Moreover, these structures created new avenues for complaint handling mechanisms; community members were able to present their complaints about WASH services to MSP structures<sup>147</sup>.

The involvement of grassroots/*kebele* administrations in the decision making processes of WASH services development boosted their process legitimacy. Discussions in section 5.2 show that *kebele* administrations had no budgets nor they had a significant place in the decision making processes of local service production and delivery. In the context of the MSPs for WASH, however, they emerged as one of the key decision making actors. Another important change observed in the governance procedures due to the MSPs was the nature and degree of community participation, which is at the centre of process legitimacy. In both case study MSPs, the role and place of community members had been transformed from mere receivers and/or beneficiaries of services to contributors and decision makers. Not only the degree of involvement, but also the approach had changed from supply-driven to demand-driven in which community members participated not only in readymade service development projects, but also came up with their own projects.<sup>148</sup> In both case studies, MSP facilitators focused on providing community members with information about the objectives, conditions and benefits of participation in the MSPs instead presenting readymade projects to which communities had to agree with and fit into. Such processes encouraged local people to actively participate, demand and own the development processes<sup>149</sup>. Community members in Achefer *Woreda* stated that the fact that they were being consulted and provided with clarifications about their queries and as well as the space they were given in service delivery planning and implementation had produced positive attitudes towards government agencies in general and to the processes in particular. In the case of Fogera MSP, community members were called up on not only to actively participate in all processes, but also to take full responsibility for service development project management including financial and contractual management, which boosted process legitimacy. Generally, the space created for local people and the participatory process introduced by the MSPs helped local people not only to demand service development and influence decisions, but also created opportunities for learning on how to articulate their interests and needs. The experiences from the two MSPs showed that government agencies should increasingly focus on facilitation instead of being locked into unilateral service production and delivery activities. Much of the credit for the improvement of community participation processes however, went to MSP initiators, i.e. ORDA (case 1) and FINNDA (case 2) rather than to government agencies, which undermines the legitimacy of state agencies. This was mainly due to the over publicity of the non-state actors (ORDA and FINNDA) about their roles and contributions in the MSPs. No matter how great their contributions may be, non-state actors should be aware of the fact that their ultimate objective is to complement but not to replace state agencies.

## 5.4. Performance legitimacy

Performance legitimacy derives from effective and reliable service provision. It refers to citizens' perception and degree of satisfaction with the range, accessibility, social and geographical reach, quality,

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<sup>147</sup> RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10); RWSEP-CDF Project Coordinator, Fogera *Woreda* (17/02/10).

<sup>148</sup> Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (18/02/10); Regional Water Supply Development Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (18/02/10); Regional CDF Advisor, RWSEP-CDF (18/02/10).

<sup>149</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

fairness, and sufficiency of services provided by the relevant government authorities. The degree to which state institutions are perceived as the central actor in the process of providing services is the key determinant of performance legitimacy.

A large number of people in Achefer and Fogera *Woredas* did not have access to safe drinking water. Local/*woreda* governments are characterized by weak capacity to provide services. Community members in Achefer *Woreda* stated that the *Woreda* Government had so far been able to provide only limited services and still had insufficient capacity to ensure universal coverage of safe drinking water<sup>150</sup>. The local people in Fogera *Woreda* also stated that *Woreda* agencies had weak capacity to provide sufficient and good-quality services to the rural population who are living in scattered and remote areas<sup>151</sup>. Community members did not believe that the geographical reach of the service was fair enough. They elaborated that not only those located in remote and inaccessible areas of the *Woreda*, but also a number of villages located close to their own village did not yet have access to safe drinking water<sup>152</sup>. Members of the community in Achefer also stated that coverage and distribution of services to the various *kebeles*, villages and communities in the *woreda* were far from equal in the sense that community members residing in remote *kebeles* and villages were receiving little or no services<sup>153</sup>. This showed that the local people did not perceive that *Woreda* agencies are capable of providing fair and sufficient safe drinking water service; hence, low performance legitimacy could be deduced. However, according to a respondent, in Fogera *Woreda*, a lack of fair geographical reach of safe drinking water service should not be totally attributed to weak government capacity, but also to the problem of 'elite capture' in the sense that local 'elites' (*kebele* leaders and some outspoken groups) had greater influence on water point site selection to deliberately concentrate services in their own neighborhoods<sup>154</sup>. Community members admitted the problem of 'elite capture', but they had a conviction that government should address the problem with more water point constructions that would avoid competition over limited services<sup>155</sup>.

Given this capacity gap in both *woredas*, the MSPs played important roles in bridging the gap between WASH service delivery needs and the performance ability of state institutions to fulfill these. The discussions in sections 5.1 and 5.2 revealed that the MSPs in Achefer and Fogera *Woredas* contributed a lot to the development and delivery of WASH services. Community members asserted that the MSPs improved the coverage and quality of water services in their villages, which helped them to enjoy better quality of life. Despite more attribution to non-state MSP actors, local people recognized the crucial role of state agencies in steering the whole MSP process. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* explained that though much remains to be done, the RWSEP-CDF program had indeed improved the quality, quantity and accessibility of safe drinking water supply in their villages<sup>156</sup>. According to participants, improvements in WASH services had contributed to better health condition and productivity of individual members; sickness due to water-borne disease substantially reduced. Much of the credit for the performance improvement however, went to FINNDA – the donor organization, which might undermine the performance legitimacy of state agencies, because local people would develop an attitude that only donor agencies have the capacity (and not state agencies). This, in turn, could undermine the expectations and efforts of citizens to demand state agencies for the development and delivery of services. In fact, attribution of performance improvement to non-state MSP actors was more extensive in Achefer than in Fogera *Woreda*. Community members in Achefer *Woreda* attributed improvements in WASH services mainly to ORDA. A study conducted by Assem et al.<sup>157</sup> (2009:16) reflected extreme view points of community members where they totally disregarded state institutions and attributed everything

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<sup>150</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>151</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09).

<sup>154</sup> Gender Mainstreaming Implementer, Women's Affair Bureau, ANRS (16/02/10).

<sup>155</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Fogera *Woreda* (21/02/10).

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Staff members of ORDA; the statement seems to have been exaggerated.

to ORDA. This sentiment is illustrated by professions that “It is better to take [authority from] the government and [give] to ORDA. ORDA is our sunlight; it is better than our fathers and mothers [...]. We are praying [day and night] for ORDA to be safe.” Another study conducted by WaterAid (2008:3) attributed much of Achefer’s success not even to ORDA as an institution, but to the project office team. The study stated that “Achefer seems to derive much of its success from the sense of ‘vision’ behind the project and the attitude in realizing this vision that originates [from] the project team.” While seeking explanations for why community members praise ORDA and/or its staff so loud, it was obvious that ORDA had been engaged in over publicity of its presence and activities, which overshadowed the role of *woreda* agencies and their legitimacy thereof. Though community members maintained their positions that ORDA deserves more credit, but they did not hide the fact that the roles of ORDA were pronounced more than those of the *woreda* agencies<sup>158</sup>.

Of course, it was also found that FINNDA had received a good deal of recognition among community members, mainly due to over publicity. Nonetheless, it was not to the extent that this overshadowed the legitimacy of state agencies. Community members in Fogera *Woreda* were found to be more aware of the role of state agencies than in Achefer *Woreda*. According to officials, this was mainly due to the fact that the MSP had been well integrated with government programs at all (regional, zonal and *woreda*) levels<sup>159</sup>. A respondent<sup>160</sup> from another donor financed regional program stated that RWSEP-CDF had been well integrated with government programs as a result of which it had received sufficient support and recognition from government actors at all levels as well as from the local people. Such views had been confirmed by an independent study (WSP-Africa, 2010). In addition to appropriate integration of the MSP into government programs, financial contributions of the regional and local governments to the RWSEP-CDF program in the form of matching funds were other important factors <sup>161</sup> that added value to performance legitimacy of state agencies. In fact, some community members in another *woreda* completely attributed improvement in safe drinking water to government agencies. One of the authors had a chance to participate in a field visit, organized by the CDF Summit (February 9-10, 2010), to one of the program *woredas* (Yelimana Densa *Woreda*, West Gojam Zone). Visitors were briefed by experts, WATSANCO members, and water users. In one of the water points, one of the users stated “I have a chance to experience life in three regimes of Ethiopia: the Imperial, the *Derg* and the current-EPRDF. I am a living witness to all of you the change we are experiencing in terms of safe drinking water. I am grateful to the government for such kind of services and in fact, to my God who gave me long years of age to see this.”

In spite of the tendencies to attribute performance to non-state actors (initiators of the MSP), in both *woredas*, it was learned that community members clearly understand that non-state actors could not implement any service development project without the involvement of government agencies. The local people in Achefer *Woreda*, for example, stated that even if ORDA had the fund and the willingness to help them in developing spring or digging well for safe drinking water service, it could not do without the involvement of the *woreda* and *kebele* administrations. Moreover, community members added, ORDA has no authority to enforce compliance of community participation and settle conflicts between community members over resource (such as land and stone) utilizations<sup>162</sup>. This clearly demonstrates the administrative and political legitimacy of state institutions among local citizens.

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<sup>158</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09)

<sup>159</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10); Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (18/02/10)

<sup>160</sup> Representative, Sida Amhara Rural Development Program (20/02/10)

<sup>161</sup> Deputy Head, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ANRS (23/02/10); Head, Water Resources Development Bureau, ANRS (18/02/10)

<sup>162</sup> Focus Group Discussion, Achefer *Woreda* (11/11/09)

## 5.5. International legitimacy

International legitimacy, has to do with, among other things, the degree to which state institutions are seen as making use of international resources to provide services; and the way in which their cooperation with international organizations is perceived.

In spite of poor performance legitimacy due to weak capacities of government agencies to produce and deliver services, community members in the case study *woredas* have major trust in these agencies in mobilizing international resources through acquiring donor support. Community members in both case study *woredas* underlined that international non-state actors cannot not intervene and fund local service development without authorization from regional and local government authorities. Community members in Achefer for example, acknowledged that they would not have benefited from ORDA's fund without the involvement of regional and *woreda* government agencies. Local people in Fogera *Woreda* had similar views with regard to the benefits they gained from FINNDA's support.

Funding agencies (the NGOs and the donor) played key roles in the establishment and functioning of the MSPs. To start with, both MSPs were initiated by the funding agencies. They had to negotiate and agree with regional agencies on the modality of interventions and degree of engagements, which were formalized through project documents. In Achefer, ORDA, through its project office that it had established at the *woreda* level, was on the front line of planning and implementation processes. ORDA had also an upper hand position in decision making at the local level. In such processes ORDA was engaged in over publicizing itself. Whereas, local government agencies, constrained with capacity problems, did exert little efforts to change project contents and implementation schemes. ORDA's excessive involvement and over publicity resulted in less attribution of the MSP's performance to the state agencies involved.

In the case of Fogera MSP, based on a bilateral agreement, FINNDA provided financial and technical inputs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland and the Embassy of Finland in Addis Ababa were also directly involved in the affairs of RWSEP-CDF project. In fact, the MFA was the highest competent body on the part of the Government of Finland that signed the bilateral development cooperation to which periodic reports were submitted. Both the MFA and the Embassy of Finland participated in major decisions such as approval of annual budget and work plans; approval of periodic reports; monitoring and supervision of the progress and performance; and in determining the strategic outlines and operating principles of the program. The project was strictly required to adhere to the terms and conditions of the bilateral agreement.

Moreover, FINNDA had assigned Management Advisory Team (MAT) at the Project Facilitation Office (PFO). The major functions of the PFO include provision of technical advisory and capacity building services to regional, zonal and *woreda* level public sector actors so as to enable them plan and monitor RWSEP-CDF projects. The capacity building trainings offered to local government experts were other important contributions. Some paradoxes can be noted in this regard, however. Most of the experts, who received the trainings through donor/NGO supported programs such as RWSEP-CDF, joined NGOs and other donor organizations; hence, there was less impact on the capacity of local government agencies. In fact, in such a process, it appeared that donors/NGOs were by default building their own local capacity instead of building the capacity of local government agencies. The view was widely shared by regional officials and even representatives of donor agencies because migration of trained and experienced staffs of government agencies to NGOs/donor agencies is a phenomenon that challenges government agencies at all levels (national, regional and local). If NGOs and donor agencies keep on absorbing trained and experienced staff of government agencies, they would play a counterproductive role in improving the legitimacy of state institutions by way of causing perpetuation of weak capacity to produce and deliver public services.

Generally, donor conducts matter for MSP functioning and state legitimacy. A development support that involves multiple actors (state, private sector and communities) and is well integrated into government

development programs improves not only service delivery, but also state legitimacy. For more significant effect on state legitimacy, in the course of MSP, donors should work towards state visibility instead of pronouncing their contributions and their visibility thereof. They should also avoid competing for state capacity by attracting public personnel to their offices.

# SECTION 6

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research covered two MSP case studies organized around WASH service delivery in two *woredas*/districts of the Amhara National Regional State of Ethiopia. The study, through a case study method, attempted to capture the whole milieu of the two MSPs in their own specific context. Thus, the two MSP case studies represent neither the ANRS nor Ethiopia as a whole.

### 6.1. Conclusions

The conclusions reflect on the major focus areas of the study that include actors, structures and governance, achievements/performance (improvement in WASH service development and delivery), and impacts of the MSPs on the legitimacy of state institutions.

#### *Actors of the MSPs*

The two MSPs have demonstrated their capacities in bringing together multiple actors representing various sectors of society that include state agencies, donors, NGOs, small private entrepreneurs and traders, and community members. The different actors of the MSPs played different complementary roles, which best fit to the logic of MSP in service delivery; their contributions to service development (fund, labor, materials, skills, best experiences, etc.) varied widely. The involvement of private actors and community members in the development and delivery of WASH services was indeed a special merit of the MSPs in the context of the case study localities. Communities have occupied a central place not merely as beneficiaries, but as primary actors of the MSPs that resulted in greater ownership of WASH facilities for sustainable use. The MSPs, however, consisted of only pre-defined actors rather than allowing free entry for potential actors in the course of their operations. This was due to the fact that the MSPs were initiated and introduced on the basis of planned project/program that had rigid boundaries for other potential actors. This undermined the opportunities for synergetic effect in resource mobilization to expand the WASH services beyond those localities covered by the MSP projects.

#### *The structure and governance of the MSPs*

The two MSPs involved not only multiple sectors, but also multiple levels of actors that resulted in multiple structures (notably at regional, local and community levels). These structures (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2) involved multiple state agencies operating at the respective levels, which was crucial to promote alignment and integration of the WASH services horizontally (between different sector agencies operating at the same level of government) as well as vertically (between higher and lower level government agencies). Yet, integration of WASH services did not only depend on the involvement of these actors, but also on the specific emphasis placed and efforts exerted by the MSP actors. The introduction of MSP structures and decision making processes different from the common bureaucratic structures and procedures constituted important contributions of the MSPs in the governance of the WASH services development and delivery.

Communications, decision making and accountability of the MSPs at each level were governed mainly by formal sets of rules specified in the project/program documents. The MSP structures brought communities to the forefront in the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of projects. Such a change in the governance of the WASH services proved against the idea, particularly common among government agencies, that community members have no capacity to design, plan, implement, and evaluate development projects. The findings revealed that if community members are empowered and provided with technical assistance, they are capable of undertaking their own development projects. The



introduction of demand-driven and community-centered service development was an important component of the new governance of the WASH services development and delivery. Findings from Fogera *Woreda* however, indicated that demand-driven and community-centered approaches are no guarantee for equitable service distribution among communities or for avoiding 'elite capture'.

The manner in which MSPs were initiated affects the balance of decision making power in the whole governance milieu. The rules of the game for each MSP specified that every actor had an equal say in the decision making process at the respective levels. Practically, however, it was evident that architects of the MSPs (NGO/donor and regional level government agencies) were more influential than local government agencies and communities. Weak capacity of local governments and communities was another factor for an extended intervention of MSP initiators and regional government agencies into the decision making and project implementation processes at the local level.

### *Performance/achievements of the MSPs*

The two MSP case studies were indeed successful in terms of meeting their objectives. Coverage and access to safe drinking water, community awareness and practices of hygiene and sanitation, and gender equability have significantly improved due to the MSPs' interventions. It is however, worth noting that the level of achievements in terms of promoting community awareness and practices of hygiene and sanitation was not the same; the Achefer MSP was more successful than the Fogera MSP due to the greater emphasis paid by the former in integrating safe drinking water with sanitation and hygiene. The credit in this regard primarily goes to the NGO -ORDA.

In a context where government agencies at different levels in general and local government agencies in particular, have limited capacity to produce and deliver satisfactory WASH services, the MSPs played key roles in mobilizing resources and efforts. They mobilized financial, material and human resources, and information from multiple actors (state representatives, donors, NGOs, private entrepreneurs and traders, and communities) while otherwise neither state nor communities would have had the opportunity and capacity to mobilize. As a result, the MSPs received a wide and increasing appreciation both for their resource mobilization capacities and service delivery results. The Fogera MSP was more institutionalized and embedded into government structures than the Achefer. As a result, it convinced and influenced regional and even national decision makers to the extent that it was taken as a model for service development beyond the WASH sector. The RWSEP-CDF experience demonstrates that an MSP can influence service delivery policies and the degree of its influence is dependent on the degree of embeddedness into government service development programs, applicability of the approaches it introduced, and as well as the degree of service delivery performance it achieved. The findings further suggest that donors/NGOs can influence government policies more on the basis of proven development approach rather than by normative arguments.

### *The MSPs impact on state legitimacy*

Evidence suggests that MSPs have a positive impact on state legitimacy. Important to conclude at the outset is that the difference in local versus international character of the MSP initiator does not seem to significantly impact the influence of the MSP on state legitimacy.

The MSPs created structures in which state agencies and community members had to interact and decide jointly. This had a big influence on the nature and degree of state society-interactions and thereby on the legitimacy of state agencies. Improvements in service delivery have positively influenced the perception and attitudes of citizens towards government in general and local government in particular. The local people have developed sense of citizenship and connection to their government. However, high levels of achievement/performance of an MSP will not necessarily result in high legitimacy of state agencies; it all depends on how well it is institutionalized and embedded into the government structures and service development programs. This was evident from the two case studies where the Fogera MSP had more impact on the legitimacy of state agencies since it was well embedded into government structures and service development programs at different levels. The Achefer MSP had significantly improved WASH

services, but had lower impact on the legitimacy of state agencies as it was not well embedded into government service development programs. Another factor that undermined the MSPs' impact on state legitimacy was over publicity of the initiators among the local citizens. The migration of local government experts, who received capacity building trainings through MSPs, to NGOs and donor organizations also poses serious concern for the legitimacy of state institutions. The net effect of such migration is that NGOs and donors are building their own capacity in the name of local government capacity building programs. This undermines the legitimacy of local government agencies since it causes perpetuation of weak capacity of local government agencies to produce and deliver public services.

Thus, state legitimacy as a function of participation in MSPs for service delivery seems to hinge on true core issues: integration between MSP and state governance structures; visibility of state institutions within the MSP; and avoiding competition between state and non-state partners (about, for instance, personnel and funding).

## 6.2. Recommendations

On the basis of the findings and conclusions drawn above, this section provides some recommendations that deserve special considerations by donor and NGO communities and governments at all levels while involved in an MSP for service delivery. These lessons and findings are further developed in the Policy Implication Note related to this Country Report (available through the author ([fenfet@gmail.com](mailto:fenfet@gmail.com)) or via [www.msm.nl](http://www.msm.nl)).

- **Ensure open access and inclusiveness** - The MSPs were found to have rigid boundaries for entry. The donor and NGOs did not want to put their resources into a common pool where many other similar agencies would have contributed. This is however, against the principle of open entry and exit of members from MSPs. *Hence, donors and NGOs should revisit their policies in this regard to design and promote an MSP project that is open to any interested actor who shares the objectives and is willing to contribute.*
- **Monitor equality among partners** - The introduction of demand-driven and community-centered service development through MSPs does not necessarily guarantee equitable service distribution among communities. The process may suffer from 'elite capture'. *Thus, government bodies should introduce a mechanism and undertake appropriate monitoring activities regarding distribution of services across communities.* Of course, one of the most important benefits of MSPs is to prevent such malpractices through the participation of different actors that represent diverse interests. This, however, can only be realized when the MSP members are equally strong and heterogeneous enough. *MSPs initiators and facilitators thus, need to ascertain that MSPs for basic local service development are not dominated by few and strong groups.*
- **Work towards state visibility** - The roles of MSP initiators and/or financers constituted an important policy dilemma. Donors and NGOs play key roles in initiating and financing MSPs and had a significant impact on the improvement of service development and delivery. This however, did not result in a parallel impact on the legitimacy of state institutions. Attributing improvement in service development mainly to MSP initiators and financers undermined legitimacy of state institutions. In an attempt of securing greater sphere of influence in the regional and local socio-economic settings as well as establishing clear evidences to funding agencies or tax-payers, initiators of both MSPs were engaged in over publicizing themselves. This had a counterproductive effect on the role of MSPs in improving legitimacy of state agencies. *Thus, NGOs and donors should not present themselves as omnipresent and the only way to improve the lives of poor citizens; they have to focus on how citizens learn and demand services from state agencies and as well as build the capacities of local government agencies to enable them to take the leading role in the production and delivery of services.* Of course, they need to document the results achieved in improving the lives of the poor through their supports so that they can legitimize their spending.

- **Ensure MSPs' activities constitute important components of government agencies' responsibilities-** government sector agencies focused on unilateral and sectoral activities since MSPs' activities were rarely taken into account in their performance measurement. *Thus, there is a need to integrate MSPs' activities into the activities and performance of each sector agency. Government sector agencies should increasingly focus on facilitation instead of being locked into unilateral service production and delivery activities.*
- **Embed MSP governance in existing state structures and build state capacity -** The problem of state visibility is more pronounced when the MSP project is implemented in a 'stand alone' manner, i.e., less embedded into the government service development programs. In Achefer MSP, ORDA, through its project office was a principal implementer. It was highly involved in the day-to-day activities of the project in general and community participations in particular that contributed a lot to the MSP's success in improving the WASH service deliveries. In this regard, the MSP is confronted with a dilemma; the success of an MSP in producing and delivering sustainable services depends on effective community participation in the whole processes. However, community members who historically passed through dominant political and social systems lack sufficient experiences in participation and hence, need external support. Unfortunately, government actors have limited capacity to deploy well trained social workers to introduce and demonstrate the values of genuine participation. In this regard, NGOs and donors have far better capacity. The paradox however, is that their excessive involvement in service delivery has undermined legitimacy of state institutions. Because valued community involvement is attributed to non-state organizations, not to the state. *Hence, NGOs and donors should limit their direct involvement in project implementation and should focus on building capacities of government staff in participatory approaches. They should serve as a shadow facilitator instead of directly involving in the day-to-day management of the MSP projects.*
- **Demonstrate government's commitment to MSPs beyond integration -** financial contributions of the regional and local governments in the form of matching funds promote the performance legitimacy of state agencies. *Hence, in addition to appropriate integration of the MSP into public programs, governments at various levels should contribute financial resources to MSP service development projects.*
- **Develop the policy relevance of MSPs -** Government officials are less receptive of policy inputs generated by donors and/or NGOs alone. Hence, MSPs that involve both state and non-state actors should be used as avenues to provide policy inputs. Evidence showed that in spite of rigid public policy making boundary, MSPs play important role in influencing service delivery policies through tested practices and empirical results. *Governments need to open up their domain of public policy making for effective partnership with non-state actors in improving public service delivery.*
- **Use MSPs to test and develop community-based and demand-driven service delivery -** Based on the best experiences of the Fogera MSP, it is recommended that MSPs should not only create opportunities for communities to participate in service development decisions, but also provide them with opportunities to take full responsibilities for planning, implementation and evolution of their own service development projects as well as management of service delivery. Capacity building support to communities is the crucial role MSPs have to play in such processes. This promotes not only the development of the specific services supported by the MSPs, but also creates community capacities for sustainable local development.

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# ANNEX 1

## FIVE FORMS OF LEGITIMACY AND THEIR INDICATORS

### General legitimacy

- Knowledge of the existence, objectives and activities of the relevant government authorities  
Willingness to participate in activities and projects organized by the relevant government authorities
- Willingness to pay the relevant government authorities for services
  - Willingness to pay for services indirectly, through taxes
  - Willingness to pay for service directly, to the provider
- To compare: the willingness to pay private providers for services
- Perception that the provision of these services should be the responsibility of the state (government authorities), whether at local, sub-national or national level

### Embedded legitimacy (deriving from prior state formation or other historical dynamics)

- Recognition of the relevant government authorities as a suitable representative of the state
- Perception of the relevant government authorities as strong and independent
- To compare: perception of the relevant government authorities as weak and dependent
- Perception of the relevant government authorities as operating in accordance with the law (i.e. an increase in perceived legality manifested in, for example, a perceived decrease in corruption)
- Recognition of municipalities and local councils as representing the population
- Overall trust in municipalities and local councils
- Complaints or queries concerning service provision are officially filed at – or otherwise made known to – the relevant government authorities
- Attribution of the problems related to service provision to constraints in the overall process of state building

### Process legitimacy (deriving from “a political process that creates space for debate and dialogue among powerful elites and includes all major political forces” (Papagianni 2008))

- Perceived role of the relevant government authorities in the MSP – or as a response to the MSP – to reduce the problems identified by the MSP
- Perceived cooperation among the relevant government authorities to solve problems
- Perceived cooperation between the relevant government authorities and other organisations active in the field to solve problems
- Perceived changes in the modus operandi and/or governance procedures of the relevant government authorities because of their role in the MSP – or in response to the MSP
- The perceived decision making procedures of the relevant government authorities providing services
- Perceived unanimity and cohesiveness of the relevant government authorities providing services

- Perceived degree of institutionalization (the creation of a formal organisational structure) of the relevant government authorities providing services
- Perceived responsiveness of the relevant government authorities to complaints
- Perceived degree to which consumers can claim their rights vis-à-vis the government authorities providing the services (accountability)
- Perceived sustainability and continuity of the capacity of the relevant government authorities to provide services (as a result of their participation in or response to the MSP)
- Perceived role of political elites in effectuating or preventing change

**Performance legitimacy** (deriving from effective and equitable service provision)

- The relevant government authorities are perceived as providing satisfying services
  - the perceived quality of services provided by the relevant government authorities, related to what must be paid for it
  - the perceived range of services provided by the relevant government authorities
  - the perceived timeliness and frequency of services provided by the relevant government authorities (reliability)
  - the perceived geographical reach of services provided by the relevant government authorities
  - the perceived social reach of services provided by the relevant government authorities
    - the perceived inclusion or exclusion from service provision of different social groups
    - the perceived number of households included in or excluded from service provision within different social groups
  - the perceived fairness of the provision of services by the relevant government authorities (equity)
  - the perceived degree to which failures and/or acute problems in the provision of services are tackled by the relevant government authorities (responsibility)
  - a decrease of extralegal activities (such as corruption and vandalism) in the relevant service sector which is perceived to be the result of the activities of the relevant government authorities

- The relevant government authorities are perceived as providing satisfying services when compared with other organisations active in the field

*The indicators mentioned above assessed in comparison with other organisations active in the field. And:*

- the relevant government authorities are perceived to have a more indirect, facilitating, role regarding the provision of services (supporting and encouraging other organisations in increasing and improving their service provision)
- to compare: the relevant government authorities are perceived to have a more direct, delivering, role regarding the provision of services
- The relevant government authorities are perceived as providing sufficient services
  - the relevant government authorities are perceived as providing services to a sufficient group of beneficiaries

- the degree to which the services provided by the relevant government authorities respond to the quantitative needs of citizen consumers (as expressed by consumers)
- the perceived number of industries and businesses benefiting from service provision by the relevant government authorities (as expressed by industries and businesses)
- The relevant government authorities are perceived as providing sufficient services when compared with other organisations active in the field

*The indicators mentioned above assessed in comparison with other organisations active in the field. And:*

- the degree to which the relevant state institutions are perceived as the central actor in the process of providing services<sup>163</sup>
- an increase in service availability which is perceived to be the result of the activities of the relevant government authorities
- an increase in the relevant government authorities' abilities to confine resource waste (i.e. water leaks, electricity dissipation)

#### **International legitimacy (deriving from international recognition and reinforcement)**

- The degree to which the relevant government authorities are perceived as providing services that meet international standards (for example 'human rights')
- The degree to which the relevant government authorities are perceived as satisfactorily making use of international resources to provide services
- The degree to which the relevant government authorities are perceived as cooperating with, and/or benefiting from, positively perceived international organisations (or countries)

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<sup>163</sup> In the words of the OECD (2008:38): "The latter does not mean that the government delivers all or most of the services, but the government does have final responsibility for regulation, monitoring and enforcement in the service sectors."

## ANNEX 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK<sup>164</sup>

#### State-society relations and state legitimacy

This section aims to conceptually define 'the state' and its institutions and describe the dynamics of state-society relations. This is followed by an overview of how state legitimacy is understood in this research and which features of legitimacy are important for the study of processes which involve state and non-state actors in the governance of services.

#### State institutions and state-society relations

The state has been conceptualized in a multitude of definitions. Notions such as the monopoly and legitimacy of the use of force, of a defined territory, a government, the capacity to enter into relations with other states, a permanent population, independence, or the ability to function as states, are contested and sometimes even tautological<sup>165</sup>. Most well known is Max Weber's definition of the state in terms of its (legitimate) use of force in a given territory (Weber, 1964:154). Similarly, Giddens conceptualizes the state as "a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule" (Giddens, 1985:20). The state has also been defined in legal terms, as "an entity having exclusive jurisdiction with regard to its territory and personal jurisdiction over its nationals" (Akinrinade, 2009:14), and in institutional terms, with a focus on the administrative capacity of governance.

However, the state is not one homogeneous entity, but represents a multitude of roles, positions, interests and relationships. For example, representatives of the state (e.g. policemen or senior civil servants), may simultaneously function in other positions and networks. According to Chabal and Daloz, in order to understand the state and its institutions, it is necessary to realize that a state is not merely the inevitable result of historical evolution, but rather an evolving entity that cannot be meaningfully assessed independent of context, particularly in terms of international factors and the dynamics of state-society relations (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:4-5 in Van Overbeek et al., 2009:20).

With regard to the state-society relations, it is often assumed that there is a clear distinction between the state and civil society, which is in reality much more complicated. Lund (2007:1) refers to 'twilight institutions', defined as organizations that engage in state-like performances in situations where the state institutions are not able to provide services. For example, Baker and Scheye (2007:512) find that in Africa customary courts are the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, covering up to 90% of the population. This makes it difficult to distinguish between what is 'state' and what is not, since these institutions perform tasks otherwise attributed to the state. They challenge the state but they do so in the same language of authority and legitimacy that the state uses, just like they use the state's procedural and symbolic forms of legitimacy to obtain legitimacy themselves. Thus, "while government institutions are important, the state qualities of governance, that is, being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society, are not exclusively nested in these institutions" (Lund, 2007:13).

When addressing state-society interaction, not only the concept of the state merits a definition. While there is a noteworthy lack of clear-cut definitions, 'society' is generally conceived as a field within which

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<sup>164</sup> This section is an adapted version of the Theoretical Framework produced for this research: Noor, M., N, Douma, G. Van der Haar, D. Hilhorst, I. Van der Molen and N. Stel. 2010. Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions. Theoretical Framework and Methodologies. Working Paper. Available on: [www.psdnetwork.nl](http://www.psdnetwork.nl).

<sup>165</sup> Both Painter (2006) and Akinrinade (2009) provide an overview of the debate, referring to problematic elements in the debate on the state and the state's legitimacy.

the interaction between the state and ‘social forces’ takes place. We propose to delineate society as the arena in which political, social, religious and cultural actors and structures interact and collide. When recognizing the state as more than an arena within which societal actors pursue their goals, but rather as one of these actors in a societal arena, one of the crucial questions remains how to assess the various sorts of interaction between the two spheres.

The multifaceted nature of governance is further complicated since the activities of institutions which perform tasks otherwise attributed to the state, can contribute to the weakening of state structures. The societal institutions can in some cases even be competing with state institutions. This challenge has been recognized by international donors, for whom it remains unclear how their programs can be structured in order to work more effectively at this ‘interface of relationships’ between state and non-state actors. This touches directly upon questions regarding capacity building, public authority, legitimacy and ownership, which are discussed below. The manifestation of governance and authority outside government institutions is important to bear in mind when studying the legitimacy of the state in the delivery of services. The question, in other words, becomes whether legitimacy is functionally defined (and linked to whatever actor or combination of actors provides this function) or institutionally (linked to the institutions with the legal mandate to provide this function)?

### **Legitimacy of state**

Papagianni defines legitimacy “as the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution should be obeyed [...]. Empirically, legitimacy is observed when rules and the decisions of rule-making and rule-applying institutions are observed” (Papagianni in Call & Wyeth, 2008:50). It thus refers to the degree to which relevant state institutions are perceived – by various target groups – as ‘right’ (i.e. preferable to alternatives) when assessed from a *public* perspective. In the context of this research, we follow the OECD in distinguishing five forms of legitimacy (OECD, 2008a:17):

- general (related to support for the state as a whole, for the idea of the state)
- embedded (related to prior state formation or other historical dynamics)
- process (related to the way in which the organisation operates, its governance procedures)
- performance (related to what the organisation produces/yields)
- international (related to international standards and contexts)<sup>166</sup>

Clearly, when measuring legitimacy, there is the question of “legitimacy in whose eyes?” The degree of legitimacy attributed to a specific state institution may, and probably will, vary distinctively from a civil servant to a citizen consumer. Moreover, legitimacy as approached here depends on both perception and behaviour. Therefore, in the course of this research questions were posed to explore, on the one hand, the way people think about certain situations – their *perceptions and opinions* – and, on the other hand, the way they act in response to these situations – their *behaviour and conduct*.

A further major consideration regarding the legitimacy of state institutions is that ‘the state’ operates on different levels and in various directions. Migdal (2001:117-121), for example, introduces four levels on which the state operates – ‘the trenches’, ‘the dispersed field offices’, ‘the central offices’ and ‘the commanding heights’ – and it seems important to determine to which level legitimacy is accredited by which target group and which categories of legitimacy are acquired by which level of the relevant state institutions. Is legitimacy attributed to individuals, organisations or events? How and why?

A final point of interest regarding legitimacy is the political organization of various forms of state-society interaction, the core of which is, many political scientists argue, the so-called ‘social pact’ or ‘social contract’ that refers to some degree of acceptance of a governing regime deemed to have the right and capacity to exercise its authority (Fritz & Menocal, 2007:12). Such a social pact usually manifests itself in

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<sup>166</sup> See annex 1 for an elaborate description of various forms of legitimacy.

what Fritz and Menocal (2007:27) dub a 'political settlement', or political system, the "expression of a negotiated agreement binding together state and society and providing the necessary legitimacy for those who govern over those who are ruled." As will be elaborated upon in section 2.2, we need to establish how expectations towards the state, as expressed through the metaphor of the social contract, get shaped in practice and how this affects the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of societal actors.

### **Service delivery and state legitimacy**

In current discourse, weak state institutions and poor performance in basic services are seen as strongly linked, with weak state institutions being seen as both a major cause and a consequence of poorly functioning services. Consequently, it is generally held that in order to restore the social contract between citizens and the state, improvements are necessary on the access, quality and governance of basic services. However, there are still major gaps in our understanding of the ways in which such improvements in basic services may contribute, or not, to the legitimacy of the state.

This section maps the dynamics around basic service provision and considers how they relate to the construction of state legitimacy. The widely held assumption that basic services are a key element in constructing state legitimacy is critically reviewed. The question discussed in this section is not so much *whether* basic services matter in establishing the legitimacy of the state, but rather *how* they may matter. Put differently, the aim is to try to grasp what processes and practices are at work around basic service provision that impact the legitimacy of state agencies. Here, we focus on service delivery in the water and sanitation sector.

## **Services, the state and development: current discourse**

Access to basic services is not a given for a substantial part of the world's population, in particular those living in marginal regions. According to the 2004 World Development Report, in 2000 20% of the world population had no access to safe water, 50% went without adequate sanitation and over 25% had no access to electricity (75% for Africa) (World Bank, 2004). With regards to the value per person available in terms of basic services infrastructure, high income countries present almost 12 times more access than low income countries (\$800 as compared to \$9,400) (Schwartz et al., 2004:2). The problems with basic services relate to coverage, access and quality, as well as to the governance of service provision. Services tend to be concentrated in urban areas, not covering rural communities in geographically remote areas. But also in poor urban neighbourhoods access to services may be very problematic. And where the physical infrastructure for drinking water or electricity might be in place, these services may be provided very infrequently and irregularly. In addition, services might be very costly, thus excluding the poorer households. Accountability to users may be poor and not seldom services are subject to clientelism and political patronage (OECD, 2006:9). Elite capture may play a role and limit equal access to resources (Bardhan, 2004). Thus, basic service provision intertwines with processes of social and political exclusion and with vertical and horizontal forms of inequality, and tends to reinforce gaps between the rich and poor and between different groups in society (e.g. based on ethnicity, religion, tribe, caste) (Berry et al., 2004:12, 21).

There is a strong consensus in the 'grey' literature on international development policies that poor performance in service delivery is a consequence of the lack of the capacity and/or willingness of states to provide for the basic needs of their citizens (e.g. Commins, 2005; Torres & Anderson, 2004; OECD 2005). Problems in service provision may be a consequence of states' unwillingness to invest in marginal regions or they may be related to a lack of capacity for public sector investments as a consequence of poor taxation practices (see for example Torres and Anderson, 2004: 15; Berry et al., 2004). Also, states may use basic services in politically strategic ways, as forms of political favouritism (OECD, 2006:9).

The link between poor services and state deficiencies is generally seen to work in two ways. While problems of state capacity and political will are drivers of highly unequal, poorly performing and often



costly basic services, such problems may feed political practices of patronage and undermine the legitimacy of the state. As such problems persist; it may be very difficult to increase state legitimacy.

In view of the above, improving basic service provision is often identified as a key issue in socio-economic development and in improvement of state legitimacy and the social contract between states and citizens. The expectation that the improvement of basic services contributes to both development and state-society relations explains the interest of the international community in this subject. International donors face the dilemma of supporting the state and its institutions or investing in non-state structures in order to improve service delivery and contribute to better state-society relations. The precise mechanisms linking state capacity, development and basic services need further exploration, however.

### **Services and the state: policy models**

Though states are generally seen to fulfil a key role in service provision, in both developed and developing societies, there are different models for the precise nature of this role. The “New Public Management” approach suggests that in basic service provision the state should “steer the boat instead of rowing it”, meaning that the state takes on a directive role in relation to public agencies, private providers and the end users (Miraftab, 2004:93; Batley, 2004:32; also Vigoda 2002, Antwi et al., 2008).

In developing countries, these ideas have legitimated a widespread privatization of public services in the framework of neoliberal and structural adjustment policies. These policies have, however, come under severe criticism because they have led in some countries to a weakening of the state and a re-enforcement of inequality (Vaux & Visman, 2005; Batley, 2004). Also, they stimulated elite capture, exclusion and repression in those cases where influential politicians hijacked services or blocked reform out of fear of losing their powerbase (Rosser, 2006:6). Such policies may thus have contributed to the current problems with service provision and may have led to an erosion of whatever social contract had been established.

Present donor policies strongly reflect the decentralization discourse that has become vogue since the 1990s. This model proposes to organize services through the dual processes of decentralization and partnership between public and private sector actors, or public private partnerships (PPPs) (Batley, 2006:244; Robinson, 2007; Helmsing, 2002). Increasing attention is paid to formalized dialogue and collaboration, with the ideal to improve pro-poor and localized implementation.

It is important to mention that in post-social welfare perspectives, service delivery is not just a relation between states and their citizens, but includes a triangular relation which involves also private providers. *Allocation* of services is generally seen as the central task of policy makers, whereas the *production* of services is in the hands of these service providers. The governance of basic service provision thus involves the organization of accountability relations between the state, providers and the users of services. Accountability between policymakers and service providers is subject to a so-called *compact*, “which includes service delivery standards, monitoring methods, rewards and sanctions” (OECD, 2008:16). In the context of this research, public-private partnerships are considered as a sub-set of multi-stakeholder arrangements.

### **Services and state legitimacy**

A key issue in this research program is how service provision figures in the construction of the legitimacy of the state and how it may anchor the social contract. Brinkerhoff argues, for example, that state institutions derive at least part of their legitimacy from service delivery, next to other factors such as citizen participation, inclusiveness, and efforts to reduce inequality and corruption (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Crucial to our research is the question what is the relation between these different factors shaping state legitimacy and how decisive basic service provision is within that. Performance legitimacy is related, according to the OECD, to the effective and equitable provision of services. So the central issue is: will improvements on service provision result in a greater legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens?

The evidence is less robust than one might expect. There is evidence that when states fail to respond to local needs in service provision, this negatively affects the legitimacy and credibility of local elected

officials and thus weakens the social contract (Crook & Sverrisson, 2001). However, evidence of programs in which *improvements* in service provision are actually shown to have contributed to the legitimacy of the state, are nearly absent. So outcomes on service delivery do not translate directly into increased legitimacy. For improvements to reflect positively on state legitimacy, two steps must be covered. First, improvements must be perceived as such by the users, and second, they must attribute these improvements to the state. This research argues that it is not or not only objective measures of improvement, but the *perceived* improvements in effectiveness of the services that make a difference.

In a context in which multiple actors together develop efforts to improve service delivery – as is the case in the multi-stakeholder processes – it is not self-evident how much of the positive results are attributed to state performance. It is important to note that the qualitative methodology chosen in this study does allow assessing appreciations regarding the perceived effectiveness of the state to provide for adequate services, within the context of multi-stakeholder processes; however, it does not allow contrasting these with objective measures of change in service output.

Finally, how improvements on service provision feed into state legitimacy hinges on the degree to which state authorities are able to frame such improvements as their achievements and make them add to their credibility. Thus, legitimacy is as much about managing expectations and appreciations as it is about achieving real improvements. We understand legitimacy primarily in *relational* terms, not as a property of a particular institution or authority. More precisely, it means that perceptions of improvement of services depend on how successful state actors are in managing relations with constituencies. This also prompts us to locate service provision within possibly competing strategies of legitimation, in which not only state actors, but also other actors (international agencies, political competitors, etc.) are engaged.

#### **State and non-state actors in service delivery**

In many developing countries, the provision of basic services is not controlled or organized exclusively by the state. Instead, a range of non-state actors is involved in service delivery, ranging from NGOs operating services on the basis of the humanitarian imperative to religious institutions, small scale community solutions, and private entrepreneurs offering services.

The engagement of international NGOs in developing countries is rather well-documented. Justified by humanitarian reasons, (international) NGOs bring in vast amounts of aid and set up structures for service delivery where state provisions are falling short. Relations between NGOs and state providers of public services are often marked by mutual distrust, the former doubting state capacities to deliver and state actors blaming humanitarian agencies for competition over available funding (Batley, 2006:247). Many authors argue that NGO involvement further weakens the service delivery potential of state structures and ‘crowds’ them ‘out’: it generates dependency and shifts accountability towards donors instead of state structures, reinforcing citizens’ perceptions of incapability of their political leaders (Vaux & Visman, 2005:24; Rosser, 2006:11). When states seek to re-enforce their role in service delivery they frequently suffer from funding problems and the lack of qualified personnel. Furthermore, services operated by humanitarian agencies are often offered for free, creating a problem for ‘regular’ state services which will need to be charged (Dijkzeul & Lynch, 2006). Donor aid for service delivery generally is temporary and volatile making it difficult for governments to effectively plan for longer-term public investments in the service sector. It is also often earmarked and mostly not spent on recurrent expenditures, leaving many services in place but only partly operational (hospitals without medicines, schools without electricity networks without maintenance). When no attention is paid to building of state capacity, NGO-operated service delivery may lead to a decrease in state legitimacy and an increase in governance problems (Berry et al., 2004:18). Such problems might be diminished when donor interventions in service provision are channelled through the state, but this is rarely realized (Berry et al., 2004).

Not only NGOs engage in service provision where the state fails to do so. Also many small-scale private or community-driven services seek to fill the gap. Some authors defend alternative channels for service delivery, whether community, NGO or church driven, as a realistic option where state deficiencies are unlikely to be resolved (e.g. Torres & Anderson, 2004:14; Rosser, 2006). However, the dominant view is to

see such alternatives as temporary solutions at best, leading to sub-optimal quality in services. Non-state service provision is believed to be problematic in terms of reliability, quality control, and mechanisms to keep prices in check (Batley, 2006). Finally, non-state service provision is believed to hamper the strengthening of state legitimacy. A key challenge is therefore whether and how these forms of service delivery might be integrated in the state system that is being built up or whether they need to be dismantled and replaced with a view to strengthening the state.

Yet, the dismissal of non-state solutions to service provision as a sub-optimal and temporary solution might be premature. It seems founded on the idea that adequate service delivery necessarily needs a (strong) state, at least in a directive and coordinating role. However, without denying the possible limitations of non-state service provision, this report argues that it should not be assessed in relation to ideal-typical conceptions of what state-controlled service delivery *should* look like, but in terms of the *real* alternatives for non-state initiatives in what are often marginal and resource-poor regions.

### **Governance in services: performance or participation?**

Deficiencies in the coverage, quality and access of services are also seen as a problem of governance in settings where effective control and accountability mechanisms over services are lacking. In theory, accountability may be organized indirectly, through the system of political representation, or directly between providers and citizens. However, both accountability routes tend to be weak in settings, where citizens lack trust, voice and client power to hold providers and policy makers to account (OECD, 2008:18). Efforts to improve service provision are thus often also seen as an opportunity to introduce mechanisms to strengthen citizen control and accountability (OECD, 2008:22), for example through the creating of village committees. Decentralization, public-private partnerships and participation are seen to offer avenues to improve public responsibility and accountability of the state as well as of providers. The multi-stakeholder initiatives that are the subject of our study include similar elements.

Decentralization holds the promise of increased accountability, but may sometimes results in the opposite. Decentralization is promoted on the premise that local authorities and local political leaders are better able to address local problems and will often have a greater social obligation towards their constituency than their national counterparts. However, decentralization involves a number of risks: local elite capture may still occur, technical capacities may be inadequate, regional disparities may be widened and financial deficits, poor taxation and over-spending may affect macroeconomic stability; and local state institutions tend to feel accountable to national counterparts rather than local constituencies (Robinson, 2007). Wolf adds that the success of decentralization vastly depends on the capacities of governance and the soundness of local funding bases prior to the process (Wolf, 2006:655; Miraftab, 2004:94).

In the context of decentralization, there has been much emphasis on the possible contribution of public-private partnerships to improving basic services. Such PPPs involve the implication of non-state actors in service delivery together with, or under auspices of, the central or local government. PPPs ideally combine welfare with profit objectives. However, as Miraftab argues, especially in settings where state institutions lack will and capacities, PPPs may operate as “Trojan horses”. In that case, power sharing, equity and the interests of the poor lose their value and PPPs end up as “pure privatization” (Miraftab, 2004:91). Miraftab also argues that partnership arrangements only work if all parties have reciprocal benefits and responsibilities and when power relations are equitable and aware of possible capacity gaps (2004:93). The lessons regarding PPPs hold relevance for the multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSPs) that this research is concerned with.<sup>167</sup>

Initiatives to improve basic service delivery in developing countries often emphasize increased citizen participation. So-called “pro-poor service delivery” entails “interventions that maximize the access and participation of the poor by strengthening the relationships between policy makers, providers and service

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<sup>167</sup> Within the context of the Peace, Security and Development Network it must be noted that another working group is focusing on public-private partnerships. Both researches are thus complementary to one another.

users" (Berry et al., 2004:8). Participation can evolve around two dimensions, usually labelled 'choice' and 'voice' (Devarajan and Reinikka, 2004; Mintrom, 2003). *Choice* broadly refers to consumption-driven behaviour of citizens in which they fix the type and amount of services used on principles like price, quality, satisfaction, performance, etc. (rational choice theory) (Vigoda, 2002:534; Mintrom, 2003:62). *Voice* refers to situations in which citizens claim power over service delivery by pressing for improvements/changes through, for example, public mobilization and dialogue. It also involves active participating in the delivery process through, for example community stakeholder groups (see Vigoda 2002; Batley, 2004:38). Especially the latter dimension, of voice over service delivery, seems relevant to the study of multi-stakeholder initiatives, where participation may have impact on process legitimacy and may result in the strengthening of the legitimacy of the state (e.g. Burde, 2004).

There are widespread critiques on the current emphasis on participation and many authors claim that it is an overvalued concept. According to Robinson, little research has been done to study if participation and accountability actually do stimulate improvements in service delivery (Robinson, 2007:7). The effectiveness of participation, it is argued, depends on *who* participates, the status of the crisis and the quality of the state. Public service organizations in general tend to have a "Weberian legacy" and may be, as Vigoda argues, little accommodating to participatory arrangements (Vigoda, 2002). Burde states that participation is often a concept valued primarily by the donor community and less effective or appreciated in the eyes of those who participate (Burde, 2004:73). In fact, reflecting their lack of confidence in state institutions, communities often arrange services outside the realm of the state (Batley, 2004:48). They seek "exit" rather than "voice" in their relation with state institutions. This type of citizen behaviour, obviously, breaks away from both participatory or consumerist notions as described above. This research suggests that the pertinence and even appropriateness of citizen participation in service delivery arrangements needs to be more thoroughly debated than has been the case so far. In societies where citizens are disproportionately poor it might be a misconception to think that their prime concern would be participation, especially when its effectiveness in improving the coverage, quality and accessibility of basic services, is doubtful. In a context where people are struggling for survival *performance* of services is likely to matter more to them than *participation*. This issue will recur in the next chapter where we discuss the concept of multi-stakeholder processes.

Behind the issue of participation is a more fundamental concern with the kinds of accountability relations service providers are tied into, whether these are state actors or non-state actors. Although internationally endorsed forms of 'good governance' usually display a preference for democratic and formalised accountability formats, it should be kept in mind that personalized or factional politics may nonetheless contain accountability mechanisms that give citizens certain channels to seek improvement of service delivery. Such accountability mechanisms should not be dismissed a priori in favour of idealized formats of decentralization and participation, but should be better understood and built on in effort to enhance service provision.

### **Donor policies: state first or services first?**

Most donors would hold that in societies where the state lacks the capacity to delivery services, it eventually should regain the responsibility to regulate services and to hold service providers accountable. But how to reach that situation is less clear. Quick and accessible service delivery on the one hand and long term reform and rebuilding of public institutions are often addressed by donor agencies in a non-integrated manner, either due to departmental differences and mindsets, traditional humanitarian response mechanisms and/or incompatible approaches (Commins, 2006:2).

Most authors seem to agree that the long term improvement in basic services requires specific strategies to strengthen the state. Vaux and Visman argue that programs that focused deliberately on state institutions, helping them to improve their credibility, have in the long run been most effective (2005:4). Donors employ different strategies to enhance state-based service delivery: providing direct financial support to reconstructing states or investing in capacity building. Donor imbursement on services, e.g. through budget support, might be crucial for the improvement of basic services, especially in states

which lack alternative sources of funding (Rosser, 2006:11). Vaux and Visman suggest that next to budget support, payment of salaries and training are possibilities (2005:23). Public spending alone does not necessarily work, however. The effectiveness of services also depends on factors like the allocation of the funds, social factors and the quality of governance, which may be strengthened through capacity support (Wolf 2007:654). Similarly, Robinson argues that “strengthening the professional and technical skills of local government employees and to improve the internal organization and management style of local administration” are key factors in improving service delivery capacities (Robinson, 2007:15).

State-based service delivery is not always feasible in the short term. However, also in situations where service delivery through non state providers seems the only immediate option, there are still options to involve and strengthen state actors. Government actors can, for example, be involved in coordination mechanisms (OECD, 2005:23). However, this still leaves many challenges regarding the ‘phasing out’ or incorporation of non-state service delivery into the state system. This will require the establishment of mechanisms to make services financially sustainable, often implying higher costs for end users, previously receiving services for free from humanitarian agencies. This might sometimes mean in practice that promoting the involvement and increased responsibilities of state actors implies some risks in terms of the continuity or costs of service delivery. The next section will describe multi-stakeholder processes and explore whether such processes can provide an environment in which these risks are diminished and both service delivery and state actors’ ability to effectively organize service provision are enhanced.

## **Multi-Stakeholder Processes**

Donors and NGOs often work with local civil society organisation, with a risk of setting up parallel structures which take over certain functions of the state and in the long run further weaken the position of state institutions. Therefore, it has been argued that operations of international NGOs, especially in substituting service delivery may ‘crowd out’ the state and weaken its legitimacy. As a consequence of substitution, NGOs and civil society organisations can turn into rivals of state-institutions, leading to repressive measures towards the civil society (De Boer and Pfisterer, 2008; World Bank, cited by van Tongeren and van Empel, 2007:15).

Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) have emerged as mechanisms which can link state and non-state service providers and possibly have an influence on the legitimacy of the state. This is one of the reasons why donors have recently become more interested in service delivery through MSPs. In this section the concept of MSPs is discussed, followed by a discussion on the governance of such processes and the opportunities and limitations they have for service delivery.

For the sake of brevity, we will refer in this paper to processes which emerge naturally as ‘locally initiated’ multi-stakeholder processes; and to ‘new forms of governance’ being part of donor intervention strategies as processes ‘initiated by international actors’. We do, however, realize that this duality does not manifest itself to such an extent in reality and that these types represent extremes in between of which a wide variety of forms of multi-stakeholder processes exist.

### **Emergence of new forms of governance**

Three shifts in state power and control (referred by Jessop (2002) as “destatisation”) have led to the transformation from hierarchical to non-hierarchical modes of governance. These shifts are: a) upward, towards international actors and organisations; b) downward, towards regions, cities and communities; and c) outwards, to institutions operating under considerable discretion from the state (Pierre & Peters, 2000:77).

The shift upward is mainly due to the growing importance of international organisations (United Nations, World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund and others), set up to deal with global issues concerning international security, environment, and trade policies (Pierre & Peters, 2000). The shift

downward has to do with the decentralisation of the state authority to local institutions. It is assumed that decentralisation increases efficiency, responsiveness and accountability of governments, and has attempts to increase participation and local ownership of decisions concerning communities (World Bank, 1997, cited by Devas, 1999). The third type of displacement has been the shift of power and capabilities of traditionally state-controlled institutions to private organisations. Indeed, “the neoliberal call for reinventing government” (Awortwi, 2004, cited by Multipart, 2008:43) during the 1980s and 1990s, stimulated privatization, contracting out of service and infrastructure projects to private sector actors and introduced private sector management tools in government agencies (Multipart, 2008). Moreover, civil society organisations have also become more involved in governance. Participatory processes became widespread partly as a response to public protests to privatization and implementation of large infrastructural projects. There was a growing discontent about the way international and national issues were solved, without the inclusion of societal actors. Solutions had to be sought through joined-up governance. Furthermore, more positive impulses for involving societal actors in such processes came from the realization that non-involvement seemed a waste of potential of capacities and knowledge (Warner, 2006:20).

The embracement of cooperation between societal actors was approved, when the international community adopted Agenda 21 during the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. This global plan of action for sustainable development introduced the term partnerships and multi-stakeholder processes as new forms of governance, aiming at jointly addressing global issues (Multipart, 2008). Ten years later, in 2002, the Johannesburg World Summit was held to identify concrete steps for the implementation of Agenda 21 (Warner, 2006, [http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/basic\\_info/basicinfo.html](http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/basic_info/basicinfo.html)). The concept of ‘Type II’ partnerships were introduced, which are voluntary agreements between actors from various sectors addressing a common challenge and carrying out the task they do best (Warner, 2006:15).

In the context of service delivery, most recognised cooperation between societal actors have been public-private-partnerships (PPPs), which often have the goal of introducing investment and efficiency into the public system, meaning that the private actor delivers a service and has a contractual agreement with the government who carries the ultimate responsibility for service provision. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) define such implementation partnerships as “arrangements whereby private parties participate in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure, resulting in a contract for a private entity to deliver public infrastructure-based service”. Although such partnerships providing (technical and social) infrastructure have gained much attention of scholars focusing on public management and procurement of services (Bovaird, 2006), discussions have also been raised on service delivery through participatory processes. Specifically, in the field of development assistance, participatory processes have flourished since the inclusion-oriented philosophy has been celebrated by various international organisations such as the World Bank and UN institutions (Warner, 2006:16). For service delivery, it has been recognised that increase in citizen participation may lead to improved quality of services, meeting the needs of citizens.

One of the many forms of such processes are multi-stakeholder processes that are supposed to link top-down strategies with bottom up approaches. Top-down approaches focus generally on centralized institution building and enabling of governmental organisations to gradually extend their administrative reach to local communities. However, according to Hoffman (2008), this approach incorporates a rather traditional assumption that positive effects of centralized institution building will eventually trickle down to local levels (Hoffman, 2009:81). Bottom up approaches support local initiatives and focus on traditional institutions present in a society. Finding a balance between these two approaches by responding to demands of people, including them in the process and respecting traditional values while at the same time building state-institutions may be enabled through multi-stakeholder processes. Although there is not much research conducted on the specific characteristics, outcomes and impact of MSPs in service delivery, they have emerged “as a preferred tool geared towards enhancing participation, legitimacy, and effectiveness of policy-making” and implementation (Multipart, 2008:12).

### **Multi-stakeholder processes and their characteristics**

Comprising from dialogues, policy making, and implementation, the term ‘multi-stakeholder’ is often attached to networks, platforms, processes, and partnerships (Warner, 2006). Some definitions are as follows:

*Multi-stakeholder processes are processes which aim to bring together all major stakeholders in a new form of communication, decision-finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue (Hemmati, 2002:2)*

*Multi-stakeholder processes are: processes that aim to involve stakeholders in improving situations that effect them; forms of social interaction that enable different individuals and groups, who are effected by an issue, to enter into dialogue, negotiation, learning, decision making and collective action; about getting government staff, policy makers, community representatives, scientists, business people and NGO representatives to think and work together (<http://portals.wdi.wur.nl/msp>). Multi-stakeholder platform is a decision-making body (voluntary or statutory) comprising different stakeholders who perceive the same resource management problem, realize their interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem (Steins & Edwards, 1998, cited in Warner, 2006:7).*

Central to the concept of multi-stakeholder processes is the notion of bringing together different actors, who have an interest in a problem and engaging them in a process of dialogue and shared learning and collective action (Vermeulen et. al, 2008:97). *Ideally*, MSPs have the following characteristics<sup>168</sup>:

- Involve stakeholders in setting ‘rules’ for constructive engagement;
- Engages stakeholders in learning and questioning their beliefs;
- The process has a set of agreed rules and agreements about cooperation;
- Has a clear timeframe;
- Has a focused objective to bring about change;
- Bottom up and top down strategies are integrated;
- Deals consciously with power differences and conflicts between stakeholders and interests;
- Engages with structural institutional change;
- Works across different sectors and different scales (Vermeulen et. al, 2008: 98, Hemmati, 2002, <http://portals.wdi.wur.nl/msp>)

The diversity of MSPs is expressed in several factors, which determine the nature of such processes, namely:

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Actors or participants involved</i>	MSPs can involve different numbers of stakeholder groups and different degrees of diversity such as public, private, civil society, scientists, national and international organizations. Moreover, they can be organized by a group of organisations or by one single organisation.
<i>Subject or issue area</i>	MSPs are often set up around an issue, which is being addressed; for example, management of water, health care provision, environmental concerns, cross sectoral or social and economic development (basic services) and accountability (democracy, good governance)
<i>Objectives or</i>	MSPs can be designed with various purposes or objectives. They can vary from

<sup>168</sup> These characteristics are often prevalent in multi-stakeholder processes, but do not always need to be present. As this research deals with processes, initiated in different countries and contexts, multi-stakeholder processes as defined, may not be identifiable or present in those contexts. Therefore, our working definition refers to processes which include various (public, private, civil society) actors who have an interest in a certain problem and engage in a process to work on that issue (focus on MSPs in service delivery).

<i>function(s)</i>	dialogues (to channel information from various groups to decision makers), to decision and policy making, conflict management, resource management, advocacy, financing, coordination, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.
<i>Scope or geographical range</i>	MSPs can be conducted at various levels: local, sub-national, national, regional, global/international, or a mix of these levels. Involvement at several levels can be a very useful tool to build on local experiences and to inform policy makers at national or international levels or vice versa (implementation of global agreements at local levels).
<i>Time lines</i>	MSPs can range from one-single event to processes going on over several years, depending on the other factors and on the resources available and the willingness of official bodies to engage with the actors.
<i>Degree of institutionalization</i>	Certain degree of governance structure (low, medium, high - existence of a secretariat, governing bodies and executive committees, coordinating groups, umbrella institutions, constitution etc.)

Table 1: Determinants of the nature of a multi-stakeholder process [Based on Hemmati (2002), Multipart (2008) and <http://portals.wdi.wur.nl/msp>]

Hemmati (2002) describes the design of multi-stakeholder processes and defines input, throughput, output, outcome and context<sup>169</sup>. It is important to note that in some cases MSPs are seen as processes which can catalyse concrete partnerships (PPPs), as they can stimulate the sense of common purpose, trust and collaboration (Hemmati, 2002; Lev-On, 2003).

Multi-stakeholder initiatives are generally characterised more horizontally organised, with a greater degree of flexibility and openness than traditional forms of governance. In policy-related documents, MSPs are often considered as highly promising alternative forms of governance. They are based on the “recognition of the importance of achieving equity and accountability”, involving equitable representation of stakeholder views, and are “based on democratic principles of transparency and participation” aiming to develop “partnerships and strengthened networks among stakeholders” (Hemmati, 2002:2). Through the inclusion of public, civil society, and private sector actors, these new forms of governance are often promising as they may deliver improved services, and enable “a coordinated and holistic approach”, taken “from the point of view of the people and their community, in all sectors ranging from road building, agriculture and rural development, as well as health, education and water and sanitation” (UNECA, 2003; Warner, 2006).

However, critics argue that MSPs are often put forward as idealised normative models, which imply that actors get involved in such processes with “a framework of shared values, continuous interaction and the wish to achieve collective benefits that cannot be gained by acting independently” (Stoker, 1998; Rakodi, 2003, cited by Swyngedouw, 2005:1994). Others argue that service delivery through state and non state actors does not lead to responsive state-institutions and democratic societies, but to increased exclusion and empowerment of only sections of the society.

*A multi-stakeholder process may empower those participants who are equipped to negotiate and take advantage of their voice and of new information...The poorest may not participate, because their opportunity costs are too steep.*

<sup>169</sup> Hemmati, M. (2002) provides an elaborate guide for designing multi-stakeholder processes. In addition, scholars and practitioners from Wageningen University have developed a similar set up of multi-stakeholder processes, which include various phases: 1. Clarifying reasons for an MSP, 2. undertaking an initial situation analysis (stakeholders, issues, institutions, power and politics), 3. Establishing an interim steering body, 4. Building stakeholder support, 5. Establishing the scope, mandate and stakeholder expectations, and 6. Outlining the process, time frame, institutional requirements and resource needs (<http://portals.wdi.wur.nl/msp/?page=1189>). These publications will be used in a later phase to operationalize the analytical framework.



*An especially serious problem occurs when marginalized stakeholders remain unheard and even stand to lose from the consultation process (Edwards and Wollenberg, 2001, cited in Warner, 2007:8).*

### **Participation: openness of the process**

MSPs try to bring different actors together and involve them in a process which concerns them. However, getting actors on board and ensuring that the process is inclusive carries some challenges. First, participation in MSPs depends on accepted norms for selection procedures and the willingness of initiators to include or invite stakeholders. While actors may be invited to participate in MSPs, the selection criteria which define which actors are relevant are often not clearly specified. Therefore, questions can be raised on who is invited to participate and why? It is especially important to have an understanding of who determines the selection criteria, as MSPs are often initiated and facilitated by an actor, a charismatic leader or facilitator (facilitating organisation). Facilitators have an important say in stakeholder selection and inclusion/ exclusion procedures (Warner, 2007). In such cases, certain groups might be deliberately excluded. For example, according to Boege et al. (2009), women and youth are generally excluded from many processes of decision-making.

Second, participation depends on the willingness of actors to participate. It is often assumed that as MSPs open up spaces for participation, stakeholders will automatically get involved. However, as discussed in chapter 3, actors may decide not to participate and remain excluded from the process.

Third, the willingness to participate, or to include or exclude actors may also depend on the relationship between the societal actors, the form of government and the openness to the society (UNECA, 2003). "Critical conditions for MSPs to make a difference are recognition of interdependencies and the willingness of involved actors to take joint responsibility" (Verhallen, Warner, Santbergen, 2007:261). However, in some countries barriers for cooperation and recognition of interdependencies can be present. Government officials can question the quality, legitimacy and accountability of civil society organisations (CSOs), and specifically non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Moreover, critique of civil society actors can be perceived as political motives to avoid government's authority. On the other hand, parts of the population may mistrust the government and avoid cooperation with public authorities. In some cases, if the state is controlled by an oppressive regime, it may even be inappropriate to engage with the government, due to the fear of being perceived as a tool of the government. In some countries the boundaries between the state and civil society are blurred, making the CSOs more like outsourcing agencies to deliver governmental services (Van Tongeren and van Empel, 2007:17).

In addition, while donors and NGOs are nowadays keen on facilitating MSP, Warner (2007) notes that "where MSPs are introduced by the state or a donor, co-opting the grassroots proves a difficult task. Conversely, where MSP initiatives are bottom-up, it may be difficult to co-opt the public and private sectors, for whom joining may pose a greater risk than staying out" (Warner, 2007:22). So although MSPs are seen as a bridge to bring actors together, in practice the process requires effort to make it possible and the actor who initiates it has to co-opt the others to join. Especially as the actors come from different cultures, distrust issues must be overcome (Warner, 2006).

To sum up, participation and inclusion of actors in MSPs depends on, on one hand, the openness of the process to include actors, and on the other hand, on various reasons, which determine the willingness of stakeholders to participate. Hemmati (2002) emphasises that MSPs should be inclusive to allow views to be represented and to increase the legitimacy of the process (2002: 29). Therefore, it is important that the criteria and reasons to include actors are made public, and self-selection is avoided.

### **Actors and their attributes**

While in the previous section actor participation was discussed, it is important to note that participation does not only refer to actors, but also to issues, interests and capacities brought up in the process. MSPs often are presented as neutral spaces for dialogue and negotiation among different actors, who are invited to participate and solve a certain conflicting issue (Moreyra & Wegerich, 2006). However, "political science reminds us that people do not come to the table as blank slates but with an agenda, and

this can have a beneficial or damaging effect on realizing coordinated action” (Warner, 2006:16). Evidence from case studies shows that although MSPs can be initiated around a certain issue, at the background more sensitive issues can be at stake, which shape the negotiation of policy design and implementation. According to Moreyra and Wegerich, “the definition of boundaries is not necessarily as neutral as it appears but is much more of a political decision that defines which resources are involved and which stakeholders are considered or left out” (Moreyra & Wegerich, 2006:630). From a more positive perspective, MSPs can stimulate the inclusion of certain issues in the process and create “package deals”, leading to support from stakeholders, which otherwise would have not been interested to participate (Warner, 2006:22). Actors do not have the same issues which they want to solve, but have “hidden” goals and agenda. So it is important to understand the motives of actors to participate and the individual issue they want to address through the MSPs.

Another aspect is the capacity of participating actors, in terms of what they can bring in to the MSP. According to Hemmati, meaningful participation depends on capacity, such as skills and information, time and other resources (2002:4). She notes, for example that negotiating skills often determine outcomes of MSPs. Research on group dynamics has showed that minorities are less heard and their contribution is taken less seriously (Hemmati, 2002:6). Similarly, access to information and ability to produce own data is an aspect, which determines the ability to negotiate. In such a process, more powerful actors with voice and negotiating skills can dominate and homogenize discussions, thereby diminishing the diversity (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001, cited by Moreyra & Wegerich, 2006).

### **Governance of multi-stakeholder processes**

Multi-stakeholder processes often have agreed rules about cooperation, which determine the outcome of the process. In this paper we refer to these rules as agreements on agenda setting, decision making, accountability, information sharing, communication within and outside the network and implementation of activities.

MSPs are horizontal networks. However, heterogeneity in MSPs may lead to differences in power of actors involved, which is often overlooked when studying MSPs. Actors participating in such processes do not necessarily have equal powers to negotiate, and influence the process of agenda setting and decision making. Especially in (traditional) societies, human interaction is determined by embedded social values, such as clan hierarchies, kin leadership, and gender imbalances. Therefore, although MSPs may create more understanding between various parties sitting at the same table, it is questionable whether MSPs are in reality horizontal processes in such contexts, or is there a degree of verticality present, related to internal power sharing and leadership (Warner, 2006:22).

Next to the power of individual actors or representatives, coalitions can be built within multi-stakeholder initiatives, based on economic, socio-cultural and political ideologies (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Governance arrangements are based on “interactive relations between independent and interdependent actors who share a high degree of trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within inclusive participatory institutional or organisational associations” (Swyngedouw, 2005:1995). There is a danger that MSPs allow elite groups to influence political agenda-setting and decision making. This may have consequences for the legitimacy of the government institutions (at local and national level) involved in such processes (Hamann & Boulogne, 2008:76).

Involving groups of stakeholders to participate in multi-stakeholder processes does not necessarily lead to increased participation and ability to influence decisions. Hemmati notes that sometimes actors are invited to join multi-stakeholder processes, while the inclusion is “extended to ensure a higher degree of legitimization for the process which might not be coupled with the willingness to take contributions fully into account” (2002:56). So although actors are included, they may lack the power to influence the decisions taken. This suggests that in certain cases, MPS may empower powerful actors, while disempowering less powerful ones, as in practice such processes may “rely on indirect mechanisms and passive forms of representation which reinforce existing power hierarchies and social inequality” (Tritter & McCallum, 2005:160, cited by Moreyra & Wegerich, 2006:633).

Accountability mechanisms are other aspects which influence the outcomes of the MSPs. Benner et al. make a distinction between actor and process accountability. Concerning actor accountability, it is argued that if actors involved in networks do not hold to basic accountability criteria, the network itself cannot be either (Benner et al. 2004, cited in Hamann and Boulogne, 2008:72). Actor accountability is therefore “assumed to be internalised” as participating actors in such processes account to their constituencies, which also legitimises their involvement. Participation is therefore only legitimate if actors are formal representatives or “direct” stakeholders. For example, “agents of the state, such as government or bureaucracy officials, have a formal constituency whom they can usually claim to represent. Similarly, company executives are, or should be, accountable to shareholders they are entrusted to represent” (Dore, 2007: 225). However, such framing creates dilemmas regarding legitimate participation of “actors who do not claim to represent others, whose status as a stakeholder may be contested, but who have much to offer in improving the quality of public debate” (2007:225). Civil society groups, and especially INGOs, are often challenged in this way. Dore (2007) brings in a normative concept of “political responsibility” as justification for involvement of actors, whose right to be involved in the process is questioned. So, actor accountability is closely linked with representation, derived from formal representation or from a form of commitment and responsibility. Process accountability refers to procedural aspects of MSPs and the extent to which these are transparent to participating stakeholders and broader public (Hamann & Boulogne, 2008:72). These procedural aspects refer to the selection of actors, the decision making process, availability and access to information and internal and external communication.

Access to and availability of information determines the ability to negotiate. Actors can be selective in their use of information and highlight, reformulate and/or adapt it for their own interest (Moreyra & Wegerich, 2006:632, Hemmati, 2002). Moreover, information is crucial for consensus-building and decision-making. Information which is required to make decisions is an important part in determining power fields. “Who presents (and produces) what kind of data and for what purpose, is an arena of struggle in the agenda setting process...information is not neutral or objective, and is rarely shared and exchanged in a “transparent and equitable” manner” (Moreyra & Wegerich, 2006:638). Verhallen (2007) defines the information requirements for MSPs as “accessibility, suitable format understandable for average platform members, adequate documentation, timely distribution, and information of good quality” (2007:101).

MSPs require an open and transparent procedure for information sharing and communication. Agreeing on ground rules on how decisions are taken and based on which information are factors which determine the credibility and legitimacy of the process. This also refers to the communication and information sharing with actors not involved in the process.

### **Understanding MSPs: actors, rules governing the process and outcomes**

Our research is interested in multi-stakeholder processes as mechanisms for interaction between state and non-state actors. Especially in societies where state institutions do not have the capacity to deliver services, governance and implementation of service provision is often multi-actor and MSPs may be useful mechanisms to stimulate complementarity. In order to understand the contribution of multi-stakeholder processes to state legitimacy, several aspects have to be analysed. First, it is relevant to have an understanding of the actors participating and excluded from the process, and the issues and capacities they bring in. Second, various issues related to how these processes are governed have been described in this chapter. Rules for selection of participating actors, agenda setting and decision making rules, access and availability of information, and accountability mechanisms, determine how MSPs are governed and therefore have an influence on the outcome of such processes. Third, the outcomes of the process must be defined. One of the main criticism on multi-stakeholder processes is that while they “provide opportunities for deliberation and wider participation in decision-making, they often produce implementation failures because of insufficient attention is given to outputs that will have an impact on the problem at hand” (Watson, 2007:43). Therefore it is important to understand the results which have

been attained through the MSPs. This may refer to concrete activities and implementation plans, changes in policy making, but also less visible benefits such as improved social relations.

## ANNEX 3

### MAPPING OF CASE STUDIES<sup>170</sup>

The first visit of Ms. Mina Noor, research fellow of the Maastricht School of Management (MSM), to Ethiopia, in April 2008, and her discussions with different relevant stakeholders, including SNV Ethiopia, indicated that SNV is not only a relevant stakeholder for several areas of cooperation, but also offers possibility to study its MSP on water, sanitation and hygiene operating in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia. Discussions with regard to mapping of a case study further continued along the same line, i.e., studying SNV's MSP. A request was made to SNV Southern Portfolio, which replied its willingness, but with many conditionalities aimed at addressing its major concerns about the nature and output of the research. The local research partner shared many of SNV's concerns and hence, requested MSM to address the concerns. Though MSM tried to address the concerns, SNV did not feel that its concerns had been addressed sufficiently. Unfortunately, time went fast and fieldwork was approaching. It was at this time the local research partner, in consultation with MSM, started to look for other alternatives,.

In the course of mapping alternative potential case studies, the local research partner first identified an MSP in WASH sector initiated by UNICEF in Amhara National Regional State (ANRS). Preliminary information indicated that the MSP fulfills most of the selection criteria, but it has been operating only for two years. As a result, it was dropped.

However, the extended discussions over the phone with the Regional UNICEF Coordinator were very insightful and informative and created an opportunity for the identification of another MSP in WASH initiated and financed by the Finnsih Government.called Rural Water Supply and Environmental Program (RWSEP). Through an informal network, the local researcher identified a contact person working for RWSEP. The contact person provided the local researcher with basic information important for mapping of the case. Preliminary information indicated that RWSEP involves government agencies (at federal, regional, zonal, and local levels), bilateral donor, private local actors, and communities at large. It has structures at regional, zonal, *woreda*, and community levels, which have different duties and responsibilities. The local researcher checked the preliminary information about RWSEP against established case selection criteria identified in the MSP study framework. The local researcher recommended to MSM that RWSEP be considered as a first MSP case in Ethiopia.

The RWSEP contact person informed the local researcher that additional information would be provided only when an official request is made and approved by the Regional RWSEP Office. This was communicated to MSM so that it could start official communication. MSM sought some clarifications from the local researcher before it decided to study RWSEP. On the basis of the preliminary information and further clarifications provided by the local researcher, MSM endorsed the recommendation of studying RWSEP. On October 26, 2009, MSM wrote an official letter of authorization and notes of clarification to RWSEP Regional Program Facilitation Office (PFO) via e-mail.

Unfortunately, there was no response from RWSEP Office. The local researcher had to find another alternative. Given the few days left for the fieldwork to start, the local researcher had to stick to ANRS where he has a number of informal networks and field research experiences. Through such networks and

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<sup>170</sup> Initially, mapping was supposed to be performed through desk research; however, this was found difficult due to: a) access to organisational/project information, without any face-to-face contact is difficult in Ethiopia. This means that travelling was required to meet potential organisations and identify MSP cases which could fit the pre-defined criteria. Since travel budget was not allocated for the mapping stage, the local research partner had to limit himself to cases which were accessible though his personal network. Hence, mapping of the MSP cases was basically carried out through personal contacts and informal interviews (over the phone) held with representatives of relevant actors. Contact persons for informal interviews were identified through a snowball technique.

already contacted persons from the Regional UNICEF and RWSEP, the local researcher identified another MSP initiated by a local/regional NGO called Organization for Relief and Development in Amhara (ORDA). Fortunately, the local researcher happened to know the Deputy Director of ORDA which enabled him to directly and immediately seek information about the initiative and its multi-stakeholder character in light of the case selection criteria. The preliminary information showed that though ORDA has initiated MSPs in different *woredas* of the ANRS, the one in Achefer *Woreda* is considered as a 'model' MSP in promoting integrated WASH services. Information further indicated that this MSP was the first in its kind that ORDA initiated and organized around WASH on the basis of which similar MSPs have been established in other *woredas* of the region. The MSP in Achefer *Woreda* involved regional and local government agencies, an international NGO, small private entrepreneurs, and communities. The information further indicated that the MSP has received local, regional and national recognition for its success in promoting an integrated community based WASH service development and delivery. The local researcher recommended to MSM that the case be studied. MSM endorsed the recommendation and field work was conducted in November 2, 2009. At the initial stage of the field work, the researchers sought more information about the MSP to further examine its nature against established criteria. The researchers found that the MSP meets the criteria and continued the full-fledged field research.

The researchers however, were still interested in considering RWSEP as a second case study. Taking the advantage of the fact that RWSEP's Program Facilitation Office (PFO) is located in Bahir Dar where ORDA is also based, during the fieldwork for the first MSP, the researchers made personal visits to RWSEP's PFO find out the communication failure that had occurred and to further seek for possibilities to consider it for the second MSP case study. The PFO appreciated the research agenda and accepted the proposal. Nonetheless, the PFO made it clear that study could be conducted after mid February 2010 due to busy schedule of the Office in organizing a high level summit - Community Development Fund (CDF) Summit to which the researchers were invited to attend. As per the invitation, though the MSM researcher could not participate as she was about to leave MSM, the local researcher participated in the CDF Summit (February 9-10, 2010) held in Bahir Dar.

## ANNEX 4

### QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF WASH CASE IN ANRS, ETHIOPIA (IN CATEGORY A-G)

Per question, the X mark indicates to which specific target group (1-5) the question was posed (target groups consist of informants from COMMUNITIES, PUBLIC, CIVIL SOCIETY AND PRIVATE SECTORS)

A) ACCESS, QUALITY, QUANTITY AND FREQUENCY OF USE OF DRINKING WATER	1. MSP participant: User/beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
A1. How much drinking water do you get? Is there any limit to the consumption? Please explain	X	x			
A2. What is the frequency of your access to drinking water? If irregular, what are factors contributing to this?	X				
A3a. Do you pay for water, and if so how much, and how often?	X				
A3b. Is this in line with your consumption? Do you feel this amount is fair/appropriate? Do you want to pay this?	X				
A4. Is there any agreement on how water usage is regulated? Between whom and how is this agreed?	X				
A5a. Is the service responding to your needs? Why (not)?	X				
A5b. Is the service responding to the needs of the communities? Why (not)?		x	x		
A6. Are there government policies in place on access to drinking water? Which ones? How are you informed about these?	X	x	x		
A7. Are there other ways in which people arrange access that you know off?	X	x			
A8. Does everybody have equal access? If not, why?	X	x			
A9. What about access to men and women, is it equal? If not, why?	X	x	x		
A10. Who is end-responsible for good	x	x	x		

service delivery? Why?					
A11. In your opinion, what are the characteristics of a high quality service? Does this apply to the drinking water accessed?	X	x	x	x	
A12a What kind of problems do you identify with the drinking water?	X	x	x	x	
A12b.What are the other needs of the community?					
A13a. What are some recommendations for improvement you would like to make regarding the effectiveness of service delivery?	X	x	x	x	
A13b. And who should make the improvement?	X	x	x		
<b>B) SERVICE DELIVERY AND CONTEXT:</b> How does the socio-political/security context impact the availability of services?	1. MSP participant: User/ beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
B1. Is the availability of services influenced by the political context? How?	X	x	x	x	x
B2. How has the impact of these contextual issues on service delivery changed over recent years?	X	x	x	x	x
B3. What is the most important factor in the context that has had the most significant positive impact on service delivery? And what about the most important negative factor?	X	x	x	x	x
B4. What other institution(s)/ actor(s) is (are) arranging for access to drinking water? Is this done in an (in) formal collaboration with others? If so, with whom?	X	x	x	x	
B5. In your opinion, who is/are the actor(s) that should ideally arrange for service delivery and on which level? Why?	X	x	x	x	x
B6. How do you describe the capacities of the actor(s) responsible for service delivery?	X	x	x	x	
B7. Could you please describe the process which has to be followed, before an NGO can start its operations in Ethiopia?			x		



C) ARRANGEMENTS AROUND SERVICES: BETWEEN USERS AND PRODUCERS/DELIVERERS	1. MSP participant: User/beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
C1. Are there any (legal) mechanisms put in place to assure a good quality of service delivery and protect users?	X	x	x		
C1b. If yes, which mechanisms?					
C2. Do service providers comply with such legislation? Why (not)?	X	x			
C3. Have you heard of legal cases over poor service delivery?	X	x	x		
C4. What happens when a breakdown or malfunctioning is observed? Who repairs it? Are these reparations done in a satisfactory manner? Why (not)?	X	x			
C5. Who takes responsibility for malfunctioning of services? How?	X	x			
C6a. What financial and fiscal arrangements are put in place to raise funds that can be used for service delivery?	X	x	x	x	
C6b. Do you pay for such arrangements (taxes)? Why (not)?	X				
C6c. Do the users pay for such arrangements? Why (not)?		x	x	x	
C7. Is all money raised invested in service delivery? Why (not)?		x	x	x	
C8. Do you think taxation policies work?		x	x	x	
C9. Do policies and formal arrangements on service delivery make gender equality explicit?		x	x	x	
C10. Has any sort of capacity building in the service delivery sector take place? What, and by whom? What results have been achieved?	X	x	x	x	
C11. What type of (public) actions and practices have led to policy changes? By whom, how many?	X	x	x		
C12. Have the policy changes led to changes in the actual functioning of services? Which, how many?	X	x	x		

D) MSP: DIALOGUE, JOINT DECISION MAKING AND ACTION FOR THE SAME GOAL	1. MSP participant: User/beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
D1. How was the MSP process initiated? When? And by whom (at which level)?	X	x	x	x	
D2. What is the main objective of the MSP process? Is it formalised?	X	x	x	x	
D3. Who sets the goals and agenda? And how?	X	x	x	x	
D4. At what geographical/administrative level does the process operate?	X	x	x	x	
D5. How often do you meet? What are concrete actions of the MSP?	X	x	x	x	
D6. Who facilitates the MSP? What is the exact role of a facilitating body? Is this a formalized function?	X	x	x	x	
D7. What is your motivation to participate in this process? What do you think you can reach through participation in this process?	X	x	x	x	
D8. What is your role of your organisation in general and specifically in this process? And what are your responsibilities in this process? How and by whom were these defined?	X	x	x	x	
D9. What is according to you the most important resource or capacity you bring in to this process? Why?	X	x	x	x	
D10. Is the process open in case the need arises for other stakeholders to be involved? Are there any relevant stakeholders left out?	X	x	x	x	
D11. Are there any factors limiting you to get fully engaged in the process or the activities of the MSP?	X	x	x	x	
D12. Which relevant government institution(s) take indirectly part in the MSP? How? What do you think of their role?	X	x	x	x	
D13. What type of information about the process is documented? Is it accessible to all actors? (e.g. budgets, objectives, plans,	x	x	x	x	

strategies) Is it externally accessible?					
D14. How does the MSP contribute to capacity building of its members? How are these capacities of use for service delivery?	X	x	x	x	
D15. Is the MSP linked to a decision-making process (es) of state institutions? Which ones and via which mechanisms?	X	x	x	x	
D16. Are the objectives defined in the MSP achieved by the specific actions? Which ones and how?		x	x	x	
D17. What other (unexpected) results are achieved?		x	x	x	
D16/17: What are the most important positive results achieved through this process until now and what are the limitations?	X				
D18. Will a decision be based on consensus? Does this mean unanimity? (specify which level the decision concerns)	X	x	x	x	
D19. Are there any agreements on how to deal with potential conflict?	X	x	x	x	
D20. Is the process being funded? For what activities, by whom and with what amount?	X	x	x	x	
D21. What is your perception regarding donor involvement in MSP service delivery? What impact does it have on service delivery by the state?	X	x	x	x	
D22. What preconditions must be taken into account by external donors funding service delivery?	X	x	x	x	
E) LEGITIMACY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS: How do the outcomes of MSP service delivery have an influence on legitimacy of state institutions?	1. MSP participant: User/beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
E1. Do you think access to water is now better organised and more available (because of the intervention of the MSP)? What elements of delivery have changed?	X	x	x	x	
E2. If yes, which actor(s) can be applauded for this achievement?	X	x	x	x	

E3. What are the changes you observe in the role government institutions play regarding service provision? How did these changes come about?	X	x	x	x	
E4. How have these changes impact (your perception of) the government institutions concerned?	X	x	x	x	
E5. Do you feel service delivery has become more in line with international standards? Why? In what respect?	X	x			
F) EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE INSTITUTIONS: how do the outcomes of MSP service delivery have an influence on the effectiveness of state institutions?	1. MSP participant: User/ beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
F1. Has the MSP influenced the investment of financial resources by the government institutions in production and delivery of services? If so, how?		x	x	x	
F2. Has the MSP influenced the investment of material resources by the government institutions in production and delivery of services? If so, how?		x	x	x	
F3. Has the MSP influenced the investment of human resources by the government institutions in production and delivery of services? If so, how? (human resources: specify in capacity, time, skills/know-how)		x	x	x	
F4. Has this had any influence on policy development by the government institution?		x	x	x	
G) ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS: Ethiopian context and WaSH case specific questions	1. MSP participant: User/ beneficiary	2. MSP participant: Service provider (public and private): production, delivery, maintenance	3. Policy maker	4. Donor (financer) or facilitator (initiator) of the process	5. Non-MSP actor: service provider and key experts
G1. How do you describe non-state/ state cooperation in the region and in general?		x	x	x	x
G2. Do you know the NGO ORDA? How do you view their activities?		x	x	x	x
G3. Could you describe the relationship between regional NGO ORDA and the government?		x			x

G4. How do you assess the participation of communities? Has it changed? If so since when and why?	X	x	x		x
G5. Are you aware of the new NGO legislation? If yes, what is your opinion on that?		x	x	x	x
G6. In how far was the original proposal submitted by ORDA to the government adapted due to the comments received?		x			

## ANNEX 5

### PROFILE OF PUBLIC SECTOR MSP ACTORS (FOGERA WOREDA)

No.	Actor	Level of government
1	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	National
2	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development	Regional
3	Women's Affair Bureau	Regional
4	Bureau of Health	Regional
5	Water Resources Development Bureau	Regional
6	Zonal Administration	Zonal
7	Water Resources Development Department	Zonal
8	Women's Affair Department	Zonal
9	Health Department	Zonal
10	Woreda Administration	<i>Woreda</i>
11	Office of Finance and Economic Development	<i>Woreda</i>
12	Water Resources Development Office	<i>Woreda</i>
13	Women's Affair Office	<i>Woreda</i>
14	Health Office	<i>Woreda</i>
15	Agricultural and Rural Development Office	<i>Woreda</i>
16	Education Office	<i>Woreda</i>
17	Kebele Administration	<i>Kebele</i>